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ABSTRACT
Departing from the definition of culture as a set of val-
ues and behavioral patterns shared by the members of a group,
organization, or community, this thesis tries to establish a
relationship between the collective culture of Venezuelans and
the phenomenon of socioeconomic development. Emphasis is
placed on the contradictions that exist between the economic
and organizational models that have been applied in the coun-
try, and the real culture and values of the people.
In order to highlight the existing gap between institu-
tions and idiosyncracy, a detailed description of the Venezue-
lan society, its values, traits, and motivations, is under-
taken, within a framework that refers to several moments in
the country's history as critically influential in shaping the
actual characteristics of its society. Where necessary, com-
parisons with the historical evolution of industrialized na-
tions were made. Additionally, various organizations that
currently function in Venezuela are analyzed, in terms of
their performance, culture, and overall success. The cases
of the national oil corporation and the political parties are
described in detail, to show the contrast between equally suc-
cessful enterprises that are, nonetheless, culturally differ-
ent.
Extensive data on the shared values of Venezuelan
leaders was obtained by means of a questionnaire that was ad-
ministered to 100 managers from the private and public sectors
of the country. It is felt that many things must change at
the levels of both the society as a whole and the local pro-
ductive sector, before socioeconomic progress is achieved.
Given the peculiar characteristics of the current situation,
the leaders of the country will play a critical role in the
change process; even though their values do not seem to be
radically different from what was described as the national
culture, the leaders must be able to direct the process from
without.
Finally, possible solutions are proposed, in the form of
social changes and a new managerial style, the basic idea
being that Venezuela must define its own model for development.
Past experiences, in which imported schemes could not deci-
pher the local culture, and failed, should always be kept in
mind.
Thesis Supervisor: Eleanor Westney.
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I) INTRODUCTION. CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT.
"COMERCIAL EXCHANGE MIGHT ENDANGER
THE VIRGINITY OF THE VIRTUOUS LA-
DIES AND THE PURITY OF THE NUNS".
Spanish monk, 16th Century.
While in northern Europe the principles of capitalism and
trade were starting to flourish, in Spain the situation could
not have been more different. Ruled at the same time by the
church and the monarchy, very strong religious principles consid
ered as evil everything related to business, industrialization
and capitalism. In spite of the great amount of precious metals
that were coming from its colonies in the new continent, the
standard of living of Spain was decreasing year after year dur-
ing the XVI Century. What was happening? Too much money (gold
and silver) and very little productive activities led into a pe-
riod of strong inflation within a nation whose main worries were
to spread the Catholicism all across America, by converting the
Indians from their pagan rites. Spain has lost so much ground
since the days of the emperor Charles V ("the sun never sets in
my dominions") that very little is left from an empire that once
covered the whole world, from Mexico to the Philippines.
In 1974, the price of oil went from 2.50 to 10.00 US$ per
barrel, practically overnight; Venezuela, a member of OPEC since
the foundation of the organization and the major oil exporter in
the American continent saw its national income jump proportional
ly to the scarcity of the vital energy source; in 1979, a sec-
ond oil shock ended up with a price of 30 $/barrel and a new bo
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nanza took place in the country. In 1983, and in spite of all
the wealth accumulated during the past 10 years, Venezuela was
facing a severe economic crisis: The local currency was deval-
ued, severe restrictions had to be imposed on foreign exchange
and public spending.
Relative to the rest of the world, the standard of living
of Venezuelans had decreased considerably.
If there is a striking similarity between the two situations
described above, it has to do with the apparent inability of the
two nations (Spain from the 16th to the 19th century; Venezuela
10 years ago) for transforming sudden wealth (silver, gold, oil)
into more permanent sourcesof income. When flooded with money,
the two countries were equally embarked in non-productive enter-
prises, be they the conversion of the Indians to the Catholic
faith or the execution of pharaonic projects with very little
pragmatic meaning, in terms of real welfare. It might be no co-
incidence that the majority of the Venezuelan population has very
deep Spanish roots and that during the first 3 centuries of its
life, Venezuela was a Spanish colony, together with a huge por-
tion of the continent that extended from the Rio Grande to Tierra
del Fuego.
What happens in Venezuela? The country has plenty of re-
sources of many kinds. It has been a major oil exporter for the
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last 60 years, enjoys a free democracy since 1959, and it has the
highest income per capita in Latin America. However, everytime
it tried to take off, something went wrong. I do not consider
Venezuelans less capable than any other national or ethnic group
living on this planet; to think so would open the door for racist
theories about the absolute superiority of certain portions of
the human race that I prefer to reject, by principle. On the
other hand, I do not think that our problems can be solved by
changing the structures, systems and written rules by which the
local society functions. Modifying the ideology of the govern-
ment (be it to the left or to the right) will not work, either;
substituting for the current, imperfect democracy a radical mili
tary state will only make things worse (there are plenty or exam
ple in other countries of Latin America). It looks like the
country is facing a dead-end street, since no explanation (and
hence, no solution) can be given that satisfactorily justifies
our status as a developing country.
Perhaps it is the culture of the people that causes the prob
lems. Culture has been defined as "a pattern of basic assumptions
- invented, discovered or developed by a given group as it learns
to cope with its problems of external adaptation-that has worked
well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught
to new members as the correct way to perceive, think and feel in
relation to those problems". (1). There seems to be a contra-
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diction, though, in an argument that signals the collective cul-
ture of the Venezuelan people as an important cause for the coun
try's inability to achieve higher positions in terms of industrial
and economic development. According to the definition, the cul-
ture of a group has to be successful before it is transmited,
otherwise it will be rejected. If certain patterns or basic
assumptions are not helpful in solving the problems that a group
faces during its existence, those patterns will not be accepted
(nor transmitted, of course) and new principles, values and as-
sumptions will be sought until one is found that provides solu-
tions to the main problems.
More contradictions; how can a culture exist for centuries
(Venezuelan idiosincracy has not experienced deep, significant
changes in many years) if it has consistently failed in achiev-
ing the main goals of a given group? The only explanation that
comes to my mind is that our culture has not failed; in fact, it
has been very successful. The only difference is that our main
goals have not been industrial nor economical development, but
something else. Our culture has succeeded in solving our prob-
lems for centuries, but the main problems of the Venezuelans have
been quite different from those of the industrialized world. Our
concerns have not been related to running efficient factories,
sending satellites to space or performing advanced research in
computer science, but something else.
-5-
Departing from the denial of superiority of any ethnic or
national group, and accepting that different countries (or ethnic
or national groups) might have completely different interests and
goals from one another, it is not surprising to find a broad va-
riety of final results among nations. So, it is not the results
that are different (they are only a consequence). The point is
that what might be an important problem (or goal) for the average
citizen in the US or Western Europe does not have any relevance
for the Venezuelans, and viceversa.
Within that context, all national cultures are equally suc-
cessful; it is in the nature of the problems they solve where the
real difference is. A person might not care for a pattern of
conduct that helps him in being admired if being admired does
not represent an important achievement for him or her. His main
concern could be to gain access to an exclusive circle of intel-
lectuals, for example, and so he will behave accordingly. Fur-
thermore, to be admired in Venezuela might imply a completely
different pattern of conduct from what would be necessary in,
say, Japan.
To illustrate the above, it might be helpful to mention an
old traditional story from an island right off the coast of Vene
zuela. It tells about a native of the island who would spend
day after day sitting on a rock watching the sea, from sunrise
to sunset. A foreigner, after noticing what he considered an
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abnormal behavior went to the man and asked him what he was doing.
"Watching the sea", answered the native, "I really enjoy it".
The foreigner, astonished, began advising the islander about how
he could find a job as a fisherman and then, after saving some
money, buy his own boat. Going fishing in his own boat would
bring him even more money that he could then invest in buying
more boats. "After a while", the foreigner said, "you could rent
your boats to other fishermen and earn enough money so that you
would not have to go fishing any more". "Yes", answered the
islander, "and when I do not have to go fishing I will be able
to come to this rock and watch the sea from sunrise to sunset,
which is what I really like".
It is clear that the islander was not interested at all in
the process that would allow him to be free to do whatever he
wanted; he just wanted the end result, his need of achievement
limited to watch the sea. The foreigner, in turn, would go away
completely puzzled, unable to understand a cultural pattern that
would fail completely in solving his (the foreigner's) particular
problems (or achieving his particular goals).
If a country like Venezuela is analyzed as though it were a
single corporation, several approaches could be tried to improve
its performance using broad generalizations and a huge amount of
simplification (I hope not too broad nor too huge). In fact, a
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possible solution might be defined as an analogy to devising a
strategy that could help a very big organization with tremendous
resources in getting out of a long period of poor results. The
question is, what has to be changed if superior performance is
to be expected in the future? If, for example, we take the
components of a strategic plan as presented by Hax & Majluf, that
is, "Planning, Controls, Communication & Information, Systems,
Reward Systems and Structure" (2), we find that what is called
corporate culture pervades the whole framework as a common denom
inator. The framework of the 7-S by Peters & Waterman (3) places
shared values in the center with the other factors spinning around
them. In summary, culture seems to be the independent variable.
Venezuela belongs to the western hemisphere and has always
been subjected to the strong influence of the dominant countries
of this part of the world. Being much closer to the United Stated
than to Europe we have tended to follow North American models in
most cases. From our legal system to the management theories
we apply in our corporations (be them public or private), the
U.S. style is taken as the reference point towards which our
behavior should aim. Let's divide arbitrarily the life of a giv
en individual into two stages, the first being the period between
his birth and the moment he finishes school (be it college, tech-
nical or elementary) and the second that which starts when this
person goes to work for a given organization. During the first
part of his life, a typical Venezuelan lives in an environment
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that is dominated by the culture of the country. He/she will be
influenced by family, friends and schoolmates and will receive
a basic education (both formal and informal) that follows very
closely the heritage of the Spaniards, Blacks and Indians that
mixed together and formed the Venezuelan idiosyncracy. Many times
during this period our average citizen will hear (and, probably,
learn) that the basic values in life are not those of hard work,
achievement and professional development, but something else.
When entering the work force, our Venezuelan will have to
perform in an environment where the goals and rules (at least,
the written goals and rules) are quite different from what he
had learned. He will hear about discipline, hard work, economic
development and industrialization in a way not experienced before.
Since our corporations (and our government) pursue the model of
the western industrial world as the right direction for Venezue-
la, it is not surprising that we try to apply the theories and
practices that have helped those countries to achieve what they
have today. Our workers, then, go through a socialization proc-
ess characterized by the divestiture of previous values (4);
such process, in many cases, simply does not work or, if it works,
it is painful for both the individual and the organization and
takes a great deal of time and effort.
The example described above can be summarized by saying that
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Venezuela as a country carries a basic handicap, given by the
fact that the socialization process that we go through during
the first part of our lives does not prepare us for what we are
supposed to perform during our years as productive individuals.
In a country like the United States there is a fluid continuity
between the school, the family, the street and the workplace.
In Venezuela, a young adult still has to be convinced that busi
ness does not endanger the virtue of the nuns.
Going back to the initial argument about the success of our
culture in solving our problems and achieving our goals, it might
be said that the right track for Venezuela would be to discard
foreign models and let the people decide what they want to do.
Why taking the effort of reeducating the people when such proc-
ess is obviously countercultural? In any case, why worry about
the whole situation? The average citizen knows how to cope with
the environment and has the psychological tools to solve what he
considers his real problems. The second education, that in
which the organizations try to divest the initial culture of the
individuals is, in reality, almost irrelevant, since it has the
purpose of teaching values and conducts that are not directed
towards what the individuals consider important. It is like send
ing an Eskimo to a course on how to grow bananas.
The problem is, however, that underdevelopment is a very
expensive luxury in today's world. Among all possible schemes,
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economic and undustrial progress represent the shortest way (and
the least risky) for a country to substantially increase the
welfare ot its people (which, in summary, is the main and almost
only purpose of society). When thinking about the social problems
that Venezuela currently has in terms of poverty, lack of oppor-
tunities, low standards of living and the like, and when analyz-
ing the tragic consequences that such an unequal distribution of
wealth can bring to the future, it is obvious that something has
to be done. In other words, some deep changes have to be made
and, I think, the main targets for those changes are not the
current leaders nor the constitution but the basic attitude of
Venezuelans towards work; that is, their culture and their values.
Up to this point, a critical issue has been brought. If
the Venezuelan culture is dysfunctional, then it has to be
changed somehow. It is perfectly clear that changing the culture
of even a single group or a corporation is a very complex and
difficult process; the change process will not occur withour
leadership from somewhere. The actual culture has to be well
understood (5) if we want to know what aspects of it are in need
of a change. Suggesting that the occupational culture of a whole
country needs to be modified might seem like going a little too
far.
There is, however, some hope that the change does not need
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to be as gigantic as it sounds. There are probably certain as-
pects of our idiosyncracy that do not have to be changed; only
redirected, or properly harvested. Perhaps our culture can find
its own niche, where our basic abilities and values can be best
employed towards some kind of productive activity. In any case,
Venezuela has to do it on its own and with its resources: "the
task is not to imitate cosmetically, but to evolve organically.
And each company, like each individual [and like each country],
has to develop in its own way" (6).
A. SYSTEMS, IDEOLOGIES AND SOCIAL PROGRESS.
When looking for answers to what has happened in Venezuela
(especially after the oil shocks) I said that standard solutions,
such as changes in the structures of the society (be them legal,
economic or social) or the election of new ideologies to power
would not contribute to any long-term, sustainable benefits.
With respect to the latter, and accepting that many Latin Ameri-
can countries face similar problems and share a common origin,
we have seen examplars of virtually every possible ideology sitt
ing in government's offices across the whole subcontinent. While
partial improvements have been achieved in some countries, the
major issues (extended poverty, inequality in the distribution
of wealth, political unstability, technological dependence, etc.)
seem to be there to stay. On the other hand, changing systems,
rules and structures would only affect the hygienic factors with
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out working on the intrinsic motivation of the people. (7).
Traditionally, the continous failure of our country in achieving
superior economic and social status has been attributed to the
different circumstances through which Venezuela has lived during
its 5 centuries of existence. The conquest by the Spaniards,
the colonization period and the discrimination against the nation
als, the independence war, the caudillos of the last half of the
19th and the first part of the 20th centuries, the negative influ
ence of the United States since the first decade of the present
century (in both the economic and political fields),the heavy
dependence on oil, the dictators that ruled the country before
1960, etc. While all of the above issues have been undoubtedly
influential on our destiny and our current situation, they can
not be invoked any longer. Their responsibility lies, indeed, in
the fact that they formed a culture within the country that has
not proven successful, so far; in the same way as the Indian,
Indonesian and Chinese civilizations were practically destroyed
by the voracity of the europeans, Latin America is forced to
carry with it the consequence of a particular inheritance that
includes historical mistakes and chaos, and dominance by the
world's powers of different eras. We can blame the rest of the
world for our current problems, and the blame will probably make
sense. We cannot be silent with the fact that our longer-lasting
dictator, General G6mez, was installed in power with the explicit
support of the United Stated. The disastrous episode of the
guerrillas of the 60s, which caused unstability and prevented a
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good part of the Venezuelan youth from participating in the na-
tional productive process, responded to the desires of the Soviet
Union and Cuba to propagate Soviet-style marxism across the sub-
continent, regardless of the specific conditions and circumstances
of the different countries of the region. The loss of 15% of our
territory to the British during the 19th century, by means of the
intervention of biased international courts, can only contribute
to collective frustration and sense of inferiority on one hand,
and rage and rebellion on the other. However, it is not a satis
factory explanation of history what is needed, or a justification
of our current problems by blaming the rest of the world. Since
history cannot be undone, we have no option but to start from
sratch, taking our dysfunctional culture as the only ingredient
available. Had we been a strong nation in the past, we probably
would not have suffered many of the situations that ended up in
our current position as a developing country. Since history
tends to repeat itself, we cannot expect much mercy from those
countries that can help us (the foreign debt situation is a clear
example); in the best case, the aid than can be received will
have a cost, be it economic, politic or social. The only solution,
then, is to become strong by increasing drastically our degree
of economic autonomy.
Historical excuses, on the other hand, are not always that
clear. It is certainly true that Latin America has lacked oppor
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tunities for development during most of the current century, but
there are a few countries in the region that have been somewhat
luckier than the rest. In the specific case of Venezuela, we
have enjoyed the right ingredients for more than 25 years: polit
ical stability, abundant resources, access to modern technology,
social peace and relative political independence; the country
does not have recent excuses at hand, such as, for example, Cen-
tral America's political unrest, Cuba's dictatorship and iso-
lation, Argentina's military forces, Chile's Pinochet, Bolivia's
lack of resources, and so on.
Venezuela, then, should be quite careful when trying to
justify its actual situation by claiming the unfavourable cir-
cumstances it had to face in the past; in fact, recent past cir
cumstances have not been that bad. The analysis has to search
for deeper reasons, more permanent than just the usual political
discourse. Even though odious, one cannot stop thinking of the
reconstruction of the Japanese and German economies after world
war II, once enough resources were provided. In spite of five
years of destruction, they could get back to their pre-war
economic strength. In Latin America, we are still trying to
theorize about the political ideology that is most convenient.
Whether Latin America can become strong through a capi-
talistic system or a marxist one, is out of the question. There
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are examples around the world of any combination of development/
underdevelopment with marxism/socialism/capitalism. In terms of
collective welfare, which must be our main goal (and not an
egoistic demostration of the convenience of a particular system)
ideology is irrelevant. If I am more interested in proving my
own ideology right than in the real consequences of its applica
tion, then I am guided by a selfish proposition and not by a real
desire of improving the conditions under which my compatriots
live. Being pragmatic, I consider that in the specific case of
Venezuela, the marxism/capitalism discussion is academic to a
great extent; without discussing the inner virtues of both sys-
tems, the fact that the country's current structure is best fit
to adopt a capitalistic system, and that the political orienta-
tion of the people is strongly towards the center (as it has been
showed by the last elections) suggests that the capitalistic mod
el is the one that will cause the least disruption. Moreover,
the terrible record of our governments as administrators, entre
preneurs or industrialists should be enough to post any increase
in government intervention as undesirable. Since a change in the
government's ideology will not imply a change in the occupational
culture of the rulers, it can only be obvious that a centralized
economy of the kind that exists in eastern Europe would be disas
trous; this situation would be exacerbated by the lack of adminis
trative experience of the leftist parties in Venezuela. The left
must exist as a balance of the right, to show that there is a
force that can gather the discontent of the masses if their
-16-
aspirations are not fulfilled properly, but the development
process has to happen under political stability of the kind we
have enjoyed during the last 30 years. Too many variables have
to change if we want our culture to become productive, so certain
degree of continuity will be highly desirable. If we had a
communist state instead of a capitalistic one, then the trans-
formation should be made under a communist system; unfortunately
for the marxists, this is not the case, and history cannot be
played backwards.
The ultimate objective of any political system must be to
increase the welfare of the population, be it through the control
of the means of production by the state, by an economy of free
market or by any in-between of the two extremes. It cannot be
denied that inequalities of the kind that exist in Latin America
are absent in the United States, the Soviet Union and Western
Europe, is spite of drastic dissimilarities among their respec-
tive governments. The main indicator of a fair distribution of
wealth, the existence of a large middle class, characterizes the
developed world, be it from the left, from the center or from the
right. In today's scenario, poverty, hunger, illiteracy or
economic stagnation are a syndrome of the Third World, not the
exclusivity of certain ideology or dominant political force.
In Latin America, the huge distance between the rich and the
poor and the lack of a significant middle class is a Latin
American problem, much more related to our culture, values and
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history than to the specific political systems under which we
have lived. True, some regimes have made things even worse and
the military governments that we have suffered through our his-
tory are a good example, but the core question is why the condi-
tions were there for the military to grab power, in the first
place.
Given that the needs in Latin America are so urgent, I do
not think we really care whether social progress is achieved by
moving to the right or to the left (provided that basic ethics
and vital social and political liberties are present). The
socioeconomic inequalities that exist in Venezuela cannot be
attributed to democracy and capitalism, but to our democracy and
our capitalism; what we have to change then is not the system but
our peculiar interpretation of it. In theory, both capitalism
and socialism should be able to achieve a sustained increase in
the living standards of the population, once economic development
occurs; to argue that one is differentially better than the other,
at this point, is sterile. Let's just try economic progress
first, with the system that creates the least friction, and lat
er on worry about more sophisticated issues. The process, in
any case, is much deeper than just changing governments.
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"The Motivation
II) THE CHANGE PROCESS. IN WHICH DIRECTION?
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Much has been said lately about an "ideal" culture that
should succeed in producing excellent organizations, whenever
applied. The Japanese model comes to mind in the first place as
a combination of management style and a set of shared values of
the work force that is pushing the Japanese corporations ahead
of the rest of the world in terms of productivity and product
quality. A modified Japanese approach has been suggested as a
preferred direction for U.S. corporations (1). There is also
"Lessons from America's best-run companies" (2) and many other
books that deal with the problem. The current literature is
filled with quality circles, participation, bottom-up approach,
consensus, hoopla, and many other motivational techniques design
ed to achieve high standards of personnel involvement and produc
tivity and, in turn, better products and higher efficiency (and
higher profits, of course).
The Japanese are celebrated for their excellent results;
U.S. corporations try to adapt practices currently applied in
Japan. Western Europe also tries to learn from Japanese methods
on the one hand and, on the other, develops its own way, accord
ing to its particular problems. It is somewhat clear that the
Japanese management is good for Japan. There is a frictionless
continuity between the idiosyncracy of the Japanese and the
attitudes and psychological skills of both managers and workers
that result, within the Japanese environment, in superior prod-
-20-
ucts with the lowest cost. The corporations, the government and
society add up in a constructive way; there is a minimum of re-
sistence between the patterns that are taught at the school and
family levels and the formal (or informal) rules that are fol--
lowed in the workplace. For the U.S., it was so a few years ago;
it does not seem to be like that any more, at least in several
industries. Projects such as Saturn in General Motors, and Alpha
in Ford Motor Co. represent an attempt to depart from a manageri
al style that is losing ground to foreign competition, seemingly
because the North American occupational culture is not competing
well in the marketplace. Part of what Saturn and Alpha are
about is to try to get a change in the occupational culture of
the people involved in those projects, not by following a pure
Japanese model, but by applying some principles coming from the
Far East combined with practices devised specifically to be used
in-situ. The idea then, is to stretch the frame formed by the
U.S. idiosyncracy so that a good part of the picture can be
painted with successful techniques from abroad; the rest of the
space will be filled with a mixture of original ideas and stand-
ard practices.
From what was said above it seems that the whole culture
does not need to be changed; a combination of cultural changes
with a style designed to get the most out of existing values
might be the right answer. Furthermore, if the existing values
are intrinsically good for some kind of productive enterprise,
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then the cultural change can be minimized. In other words, while
the Japanese might have the right skills to produce high quality
automobiles they are perhaps terrible in, say, oil exploration.
It is possible that the best basic attributes that are needed to
raise cattle are typical, for example, of the people in Zambia.
At this point, the Venezuelan crisis might be better under-
stood. The model applied for the future development of the coun
try is that which comes from the north: Venezuela is viewed in
the future as a mini-United States, manufacturing automobiles,
steel, computers, airplanes, etc. To achieve that, U.S.-like
corporations have to be created (or fostered), whether by the
government or by the private sector, and managerial practices
imported from the North Atlantic (and more recently, from Japan)
should be applied. Combine that scenario with a constitution
based on general principles from the U.S., France and Spain, a
school system inherited from Europe, and a collective culture
that resulted from 300 years of Spanish government with a mix-
ture of Black, Indian and White races and there is little doubt
that the results will be, in the best of circumstances, unpredic
table.
One conclusion can be drawn, so far, with enough arguments
on its favor: foreign managerial styles and corporate cultures
are unlikely to succeed in Venezuela (no matter how succesful
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they are in their country of origin) unless they come from regions
of the world with similar backgrounds (historical, social, etc.).
Since Latin America complies with such conditions, then Venezuela
should search its neighbors in the subcontinent for solutions.
However, it happens that none of Venezuela's neighbors has suc-
ceeded in solving what we are trying to solve, at least in a
permanent, solid way. That being the case, we have no option but
to work on our own way; at best, we can turn to very specific
examples of isolated projects in Hispanic countries that have
worked well and learn what we can from those few experiences.
The dilemma, then, is taking the form of a vicious circle:
If succesful examples cannot be copied or taken as models because
they do not fit our culture, and if our own approach has not
worked so far because our culture is dysfunctional with the prac
tices applied in the developed world, what can be done?. The
answer that come to my mind is a two-tiered solution: Change
both the model and the culture so that they meet in some feasible
area with a third condition labeled "social and economic develop-
ment". A schematic illustration of this concept can be seen in
figure 1.
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A: Cultural area.
Al: Actual culture.
C: Possible models.
Cl: Actual model.
B: Region in which Social
& Economic Development
occur.
Fig. 1
All the theories about management, motivation, excellence,
etc., that have been published during this century have originat
ed somewhere in the industrialized world, within enviroments that
share little common ground with Latin America. However, those
theories are translated into our native language and taken as
the latest gospel every organization should follow, with little
questioning about whether or not a particular way of managing can
be simply not suitable (or, worse, counterproductive) for nations
with structures and idiosyncracies that differ considerably from
those where the theories were first developed. Let's just wander
and try to imagine how a set of recomendations designed to apply
Japanese management in the U.S. can be put into practice in Vene
zuela. There are two cultural interfaces that probably represent
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a formidable obstacle.
As it was mentioned in the previous chapter, we in Latin
America do not have a model to follow; very little (or nothing)
has been written on how to manage our countries, or what should
(or could) be done to our collectively shared values to improve
our low productivity. The fact that by increasing the output of
our factories and by producing high quality items at a reasona-
ble cost the posibility of solving our social inequalities will
raise considerably is so obvious that it does not need to be
discussed or justified.
Summarizing, in the case of Venezuela the following condi-
tions must be highlighted:
a) There is certain degree of dysfunction between the national
culture and the psychological profile that is needed to suc
ceed in an organization that follows a model originated in
the U.S., Japan or Western Europe.
b) There is not a single example of a nation with similar val-
ues to those present in the Venezuelan society that can be
considered as successful; in other words, there are no
readily available models to be copied.
c) Management styles imported from the industrialized world
assume, or take for granted, basic conditions that, in many
cases, are not present in Venezuela.
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d) In spite of the social problems, the collective culture of
the Venezuelans is considered as successful by a majority
of the population, since it works in solving what are con-
sidered by the individuals their main problems.
e) Local managers usually develop a "native" style that fits
their culture (and the culture of the workers) but not the
cultural requirements of organizations designed by North
Atlantic standards.
f) It is very unlikely that changes in our structure, the ide-
ology of our governments or our presidential system bring
with them any practical solution: "Institutions may be
changed, but this does not necessarily affect the societal
norms; and when these remain unchanged, the persistent
influence of a majority value system patiently smoothes the
new institutions until their structure and functioning is
again adapted to the societal norms" (3). In other words,
culture seems to be the only independent variable.
g) There is considerable friction between the ethnic and socie
tal cultures in Venezuela (learned in the family, school
and the streets) and the occupational culture on which the
productive organizations are based.
h) Unless a significant change is achieved in terms of econo-
mic development, the social scenario with its problems
of inequality and lack of opportunities has the potential
to be explosive in the future.
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i) Cultural changes are very difficult and take a great deal
of time and effort, even for a single organization.
A. THE PROCESS. SOME SUGGESTIONS.
Within a scenario given by the above mentioned characteris-
tics, it is easily understood that a good set of original ideas,
conveived specifically for the situation they have to solve, is
needed. At this stage of the analysis, a few, broad directions
can be established as a guide for what will come later.
a) The dysfunction between the current socioeconomic model and
the culture should be corrected by changing both factors
(see fig. 1) within the limits of feasibility.
b) No successful model is available that can be applied with-
out modifications; no specific processes to smooth the
cultural interface between the industrialized world and
Venezuela have been studied. The solutions must come main
ly from within.
c) Local managers must develop a style that serves as a bridge
between the organizations and the culture. The role of
managers in Venezuela will be critical in achieving the
desired results. The leadership needed by the change proc
ess can only be provided by the supervisory levels within
all organizations. The problems are so embedded in the com
munity that only a topdown approach can be applied. Ideal-
ly, managers have the right combination to make things work:
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They know the culture because they come from it, and they
should be best prepared to perceive what the right direc-
tions might be.
d) The people have to be convinced that several aspects of
their national culture are dysfunctional (a tough job).
The actual economic crisis is a good opportunity to demon-
strate that a significant change is needed. It seems that
our tolerance for failure is quite high; the situation has
to be extremely critical for us to recognize the existence
of serious problems, if these problems are different from
those we handled successfully in the past with our cultural
tools. Crises are, both for individuals and groups, very
good opportunities to reflect about their past behaviour;
in the case of Venezuela, the dimensions of the current
difficulties must be somewhat exaggerated to the public.
e) "Native" management styles must be studied carefully, since
they can provide several clues with respect to the most
efficient approach. There are interesting experiences of
Venezuelan organizations that have developed a successful
mix of forein and local styles and corporate cultures; the
most notable of this experiences, the state-owned oil in-
dustry, will be discussed in detail later.
f) In assuming culture as the independent variable (and, as
such, the most permanent factor), one of the main tasks has
to be finding what our culture is good for; our competitive
advantage. Are there productive activities that best fit
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our shared values? The answer is probably yes. Can we
find areas in service, manufacturing, engineering, etc.,
where our skills (both physical and psychological) are
consistently superior? Are Venezuelans intrinsically best
prepared for, say, innovation? Routine tasks? High risk
ventures? Creative jobs? Cultivating soya beans?. Can
we feel at home by performing a certain type (or types) of
task within a carefully designed organizational system
that permits, with a minimum of modifications of the
existing values and structures, get the best out of our
workforce?. An attempt to do this is probably the main
purpose of the present work.
g) The particular nature of our national cuture has been dis-
cussed broadly by many authors in Venezuela, while continu-
ously searching for reasons that can explain our failures.
The very character of the Spanish colonization, when compar
ed with the process experienced by the U.S. and Canada
provides very good excuses and identifiable scapegoats to
Latin America.
h) It seems like our society does not prepare us for the pro-
ductive life that we have to face after finishing school
or when entering the work force. A good intellectual
excercise that can result in some pragmatic, useful recom-
mendations is to try to devise a strategy that reduces the
friction between the two halves of our lives and translates
the unused energy into profits.
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i) As it was mentioned before, the actual economic crisis has
closed the gap between Venezuela's economic performance and
the possibility of serious manifestations of social discom-
fort. Critical as the situation might be; it also provides
a good opportunity to start the change process.
j) The desired change in the occupational culture of the coun-
try will be better started by devising ways of changing the
behavior; as stated by Hofstede, "norms change rarely by
adoption of outside values, but rather through a shift in
ecological conditions: technological, economic and hygien-
ic" (4).
As an illustration of this fact, a good deal of effort
should be devoted to design reward systems that take into
account what individuals really want as a prize. The tra-
ditional combination of material rewards and punishments,
considered today as unable to insure superior performance
from the workforce, is not adequate for Venezuela if used
alone, either. On the other hand, the management of people
through motivational techniques that provide the individual
with non-material rewards (sense of accomplishment, self-
realization, etc.) will work differently in different
environments. It is only obvious that what ticks the aver-
age laborer in the U.S. might be irrelevant for a Venezuelan.
In choosing the parameters of motivation, the national
identity has to be taken into account with special care.
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Before getting any deeper into the collective culture of
the country, some data needs to be provided that define the en-
vironment with which the present analysis will have to deal.
A. ECONOMY.
Even though several attempts have been made in the past
to diversify Venezuela's economy, it still depends heavily on a
single product (or family of products): Oil and refined prod-
ucts. The oil business represents 20% of the country's GNP
(70 billion U.S. $ in 1985); most important, oil sales to for-
eign countries account for 90% of Venezuela's total exports.
GNP per capita as of 1983 was 4100 U.S. $ (population
= 17 million) the highest in Latin America. A broad composition
of the gross national product is as follows:
Agriculture 6.7%
Oil 20%
Mining .4%
Manufacturing 17.2%
Construction 5%
Service Industry 9.5%
Transport & Communications 11.2%
Rest of the economy 30%
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The Venezuelan economy depends heavily on the govern-
ment; the public sector controls 45% of the GNP through owner-
ship of the oil industry, the mining companies, water works,
telephone and postal services, part of the electricity supply,
airlines, steel mills, etc. The strong influence of the govern
met on the productive sector is viewed by many as an important
source of inefficiences and lack of quality. Governments, all
over the world, are not a model to follow when searching for
good industrial practices.
The current economic situation of Venezuela is almost
inexplicable. As it was mentioned before, the oil shocks that
happened in 1973 and 1979 increased the country's exports by
4 and 3 times respectively. It is clear that Venezuela did not
know how to invest its sudden wealth. The current oil glut
caught the country completely unprepared to face the new rules
of the game (a stop in the never-ending increase of the oil
prices). The GNP decreased 1% between 1981 and 1982 and 3% be-
tween 1982 and 1983. In 1982, for the first time in decades,
the balance of payments showed a marked decrease, although still
remained positive. Currently, Venezuela faces a foreign debt
of US $ 35 billion whose service is getting further away from
the country's capabilities for repayment. At the same time, no
real social progress can be felt: The cities are increasingly
surrounded by misery belts, where a good portion of the popula-
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tion lives beyond the limits of poverty; inflation has not reced
ed, and it threatens to become an important issue after the
recent devaluations of the local currency; the schools and
universities are overpopulated; crime rates are increasing; many
products are scarce or sell at prohibitive prices; the highway
system, once one of the best in the entire subcontinent, is
deteriorated; the public health service is facing one crisis
after another, and diseases that had been erased from the coun-
try's geography, such as malaria, are showing up again with unu-
sual strength.
In summary, what seemed in 1974 as an upward trend to-
wards superior perfomance has been revised downwards several times.
In total, the accumulated GNP of the country, plus the debt, dur
ing the period 1973/83 has been 500 billion U.S. dollars at market
prices. This figure, combined with an average population of only
14 million people, clearly demonstrates that resources were not
too well used.
In 1978, during the political campaign for the presi-
dential elections, COPEI, the party opposing the government,
held the motto "where did the money go?" as their main concern.
When that same party won the 1978 elections and was installed in
office, the population's expectations were that the previous
waste of money and efforts would be corrected. After the 1983
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elections (which COPEI lost this time), the same question of 1978
was still in the air. Ten years and half a trillion dollars
after, the standard of living of Venezuelans had declined sub-
stantially.
What had happened? Even though difficult to analyze in
detail because of the many factors that influenced the disastrous
utilization of resources, the answer is precisely that: A disas-
trous utilization of resources, not only by the government but
by the private sector as well. What happened between 1973 and
1983 can be measured in terms of inefficiency, corruption (the
infectious desease that has always been present in the Third
World), demagoguery, allocation of funds towards non-productive
activities, ill-defined projects, unrealistic goals, etc.
Could the results have been different? Certainly. Nev
er in its whole history had the country enjoyed more resources.
However, those resources were not transformed into sustainable
wealth; they were, somehow, evaporated.
Trying to oversimplify the picture, a country, like a
corporation, can be thought of as a combination of resources,
managers and workers. The main role of managers is to make the
best use of the resources available (manpower, financial resources,
raw materials and technology) to maximize the utility of the
organization, undestanding utility as profits, welfare, well-being,
-35-
etc. In the case of Venezuela, the managers did not use the re
sources in the best way, that is obvious. But was that because
of incompetency from the managers or because the human resources
which the managers were assigned did not serve for the purpose
of creating sustainable wealth, but for something elese? I think
that the reason for the failure is somewhat in the middle, and
this goes back to the opening statements: The culture of the
people is dysfunctional; the style of the managers is inadequate;
the goals of both (people and managers) are not coherent towards
the maximization of wealth and so the strategies aim in the
wrong direction. While management is thinking of foreign models
of national development and Japanese practices, the workforce
does not understand the process and keeps doing what their intu
ition tells them. The culture, the management style and the
model are incompatible; all have to be modified to a certain
extent.
B. SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL ISSUES; THE NATIONAL CULTURE.
It has been repeated several times that there are strong
differences between the attitudes and values of the Venezuelans
and those of the nationals from the developed world, be it the
United States, Western Europe, or Japan. To understand how
large the difference is, a few references to the origin of the
nation should be made. By analyzing both our history and evolu
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tion, comparing them with, say, those of the United States, it
is hoped that many of the contrasts will be clarified.
Bl. HISTORY.
The Islamic expansion that took place after
Muhammad's death in 632 A.D. did not stop until the whole Iberic
penninsula fell in the hands of the Arabs, during the 8th century
of our era. Between that time and the year of the fall of the
emirate of Granada, in 1492, most of the energy of the Spaniards
would be concentrated in what was taken as a crucial matter of
national pride: The expulsion of the invaders. Right after the
Arab occupation, the Spaniards retreated to northern lands and
lived in relative isolation from the rest of Europe, separated
as they were by the Pyrinees. While feudalism was occurring in
the whole continent, the Spaniards were obsessed with the re-
conquest of their territory. War with Islam was the main objec
tive of Spain for centuries, the main motivation by which popular
energies would be released. The permanency of the unfaithful on
their own territory and what the recovery of their land meant
for their collective pride stimulated epic values and brave souls.
The rest of the world seemed unimportant, and with it commerce,
international trade and economic development.
Once the Arabs were expelled, the combination of
church/state that ruled Spain at the time, looking for pagan rites
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to destroy and grounds on which to spread the Catholic faith,
turned its attention to the recently discovered continent. The
lack of a capitalistic middle class with political sensitivity
subsequently weakenend the economy (1); the comercial possibil-
ities of the new territory were overlooked by both church and
state.
The initial conquest of America was undertaken by
the Spaniards with two main objectives: The evangelization of
the natives and the search for gold -i.e., the legend of El Dora
do. In other words, a combination of power, adventure, wealth
and mystical goals were the motivators that brought the first
men to Latin America.
In the north, the expectations of the inmigrants
were quite different; the English Pilgrims who, fleeing from
religious persecution, came to the United States were driven by
the dream of establishing permanent settlements, concentrating
their efforts and achievements in cultivating the land and build
ing their towns. The British inmigrants came to America to stay;
they brought their families and belongings. On the other hand,
the Conquistadores always dreamed of going back to Spain, laden
with gold and treasures; they came alone, and when the return to
distant Spain could not be accomplished (because El Dorado could
not be found), they mixed with the local population and new ethnic
groups were created.
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When permanent settlements started to appear, they
were of a new type, totally different from those established in
North America. After the Spaniards gained control over the
Indians, the natives were allocated as slaves to the conquerors
(from then on converted into colonists) together with extensions
of land. The system under which land has been traditionally own
ed in Latin America, i.e., great extensions of territory in the
hands of a few, who enjoyed cheap labor maintained under slavery
conditions, originated from this initial practice. The descendants
of the first owners inherited both the land and the Indians, with
which the concentration of ownership among a few families (which
later on moved to the urban centers and got used to live lei-
surely from the profits that the farms yielded) was established
as a tradition that, in many ways, still exists. According to
Escovar Sal6n (1972), the conqueror did not bring with him the
culture and character of the farmers; "It was practically uncon-
ceivable for them to devote themselves to cultivating the land
and living in farms" (2). On the other hand, the Indians that
could escape from the Spaniards retreated to the mountain slopes
(the less productive lands) and established settlements where
little extensions of land would be cultivated, barely enough to
sustain the farmer and his family. When the land, after a few
crops, became exhausted, the Indians would abandon it and move
to a new place, where the cycle would be repeated. This style
of living and farming still exists extensively in Venezuela.
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The conquest of the new continent by the Spaniards
was characterized by a strong intervention into the existing
cultures. The social structure of the natives was largely de-
stroyed and replaced by systems imported from Europe. After-
wards, the natives,defeated and confused, were re-integrated into
a colonialist system that was completely unfamiliar (3). The
result of this process was that the Indians who survived the
initial war of conquest and later re-entered the established
society developed a strongly detached attitude, a result of their
previous defeat and the threatning environment. In other words,
communities were created in which a good portion of the popula-
tion did not belong to the system. "The survivors of the con-
quest ( the Indians) became ..... an underdeveloped mass of hu-
manity" (4).
During the 17th century, as a result of a series
of decrees that invoked humanitarian reasons to prohibit the
landowners from employing Indians in their haciendas, the third
ethnic component of the Venezuelan racial mix was brought to the
country -Black slaves from Africa. Being in a territory with
the same climate and similar geography to that of their native
continent, the Blacks soon became familiar with the new environ-
ment. They brought with them their magic, their idols and their
music. All across the Caribbean, the Black influence can be
felt. It is impressive how two cultures as dissimilar as the
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African and the Spanish mixed together to produce a unique musi-
cal style, a combination of Spanish melodies with African drums,
or a religion that worships Catholic saints placed next to Black
idols. Again, we are contemplating a phenomenon that has not
occurred yet in English America. In Venezuela (and in other coun
tries of the Caribbean, such as Cuba and Dominican Republic) there
is no separate Black culture or White culture: There is a single,
unique fusion of African magic, Spanish European traditions and
Indian detachment.
So far, several major differences between the his
tory of Spanish America and North America have been mentioned,
at least from both a social and an ethnic point of view. There
is another factor that, because of its extended influence on the
culture of nations, is critically important in the shaping of
shared values and collective attitudes. It is well know that
the Catholic faith deals with life in quite a different way from
the Protestant religions, producing a work ethic that does not
encourage the accumulation of wealth as an important objective
in life. The rewards for Catholics come in the afterlife, provid
ed that individuals live through the standards of love for one's
neighbors and other virtues. The Protestant faith, in turn, does
accept that people, through hard work and dedication, may become
wealthy during their lives and considers money and posessions as
prizes for their efforts. In other words, while the Protestants
are encourged by their philosophy to be achievers and winners,
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the Catholics are told to give up material posessions while
cultivating more mystical virtues.
Geographically, Latin America is mostly concentrat
ed in the tropics. Venezuela is 100% tropical, its northernmost
latitude being 100 north of the Equator. Whether this fact has
notable consequence on economic development, has not been ex-
plained satisfactorily yet. India and Indonesia, as late as the
17th century, were as advanced economically as Europe: "It was
European advances in specific military techniques rather than
general progress in the peaceful arts of civilization with enabl
ed her (i.e., Europe) to establish hegemony in Latin America,
Asia and Africa" (5).
In any case, Venezuela did not experience anything
comparable to the splendor of the native civilizations that
flourished in Mexico, Central America, Peru and Bolivia. Proba-
bly the country's separation from the main routes of the Pacific
coast by the Andes reduced considerably the possibility of major
Indian settlements. Does the climate and the geography shape
in certain way the character of the people? I think that it
does, at least partially; different traits can be found that
sharply differentiate, in Venezuela, the people from the moun-
tains (introverts, conservatives, traditionalists) from the
inhabitants of the coast (extroverts, emotional) and the plains
(fatalist, extroverts, mystical). The geographical environment
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of the three areas certainly requires different abilities and
attitudes to accomplish an optimal adaptation. For example, the
toughest climaticconditions in Venezuela are found in the moun-
tains of the Andes. Coincidentially or not, the Andinos (people
from the Andes) are regarded by local folklore as exemplified by
discipline, hard work and persistence, at least by Venezuelan
standards. Whatever the consequences are in practical terms,
our yearly life cycle differs considerably from what is typical
in the U.S. or Europe. We do not have to save for the winter,
and in general, we do not have to adhere to a vitaldiscipline
imposed by the environment, without which our own subsistence
would be jeopardized. If not our attitude towards work and
achievement, at least our character must have been heavily
influenced by the exhuberance and relative abundance of the trop
ics.
After the initial conquest of Venezuela by the
Spaniards, the country saw the begining of a new period, which
would extend by 3 centuries: The colony. During this time, a
Spanish-based system was imposed, and new economic, social and
political rules were designed and applied from Europe. At the
end of the colonization, by the begining of the 19th century,
the conflict between the Venezuelan aristocracy and the central
authorities, fueled by a set of non-pragmatic practices forced
by Spain, (through which both the economic and power aspirations
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of the locals were threatened) gave way to the war of Independ-
ence, a bloody, violent rebellion that would last 10 years.
By the end of the war, Venezuela was left in a
state of impoverishment and social chaos; the systems developed
during the colony were destroyed and something new had to be
invented. What resulted was an order of things influenced by
the romanticism, the ideas of the French Revolution (in which
Bolivar, the liberator, was a firm believer) and a total indif-
ference towards the problems of the masses living outside the
urban centers. The local oligarchy, living in the cities, con-
ceived a conservative country that was disconnected from what
was happening in the big, remote territories where "ignorant
masses were not nearly aware of the discussions in the parliament
and the rules of the constitution" (6). In summary, the trium-
phant local aristocracy, still carrying a strong cultural herit-
age from its Spanish ancestors, did not create a strong, coherent
nation. They preferred to ignore the equalitarian needs of the
masses and translate their view of the recently created country
into a "symbolic constitution, beautifully conceived and spirit-
ually followed and respected by the high class of the cities"
(7). It was a set of modern laws, democratic in essence, placed
on top of what was left from the economic and social structures
of the colony.
The masses, however, took their turn in the 1860s,
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when, under the direction of influencial personalities who emerg
ed as leaders of the liberal movement (in the absence of govern-
ment, structure and systems, caudillos appeared as the main
organizing force) they defeated the centralist government in the
Federation war. Since then, and until the middle of the 20th
century, Venezuela was mostly ruled by personalities, not by
governments. Revolutions headed by spontaneous caudillos, with
no ideological content and whose main concern was to gain access
to power (or a share of it) were the rule more than the exception
during the latter part of the 19th century. The last caudillo,
G6mez, who ruled the country as his personal property for 35
years, until his death in 1936, established a set of implicit
rules that would have a strong influence on the subsequent life
of the country. He emerged as the only leader by defeating
whomever tried to confront his authority and put an end to the
atomization of Venezuela's political spectrum. As the same time,
he created a primitive administration that allowed the country
to pay its foreign debt and achieve certain economic progress
while remaining, culturally and technologically, in the 19th
century. Even though G6mez eliminated all the other caudillos,
he did not eliminate caudillism from the minds of the people;
on the contrary, he reinforced it.
B2. THE NATIONAL CULTURE.
Today, Venezuela enjoys a democratic system of
government, one of the very few in Latin America that has last-
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ed more than one constitutional period. It is a very peculiar
democracy, however, shaped by the culture within which it func-
tions. Even though Venezuela has achieved a degree of political
stability that is atypical for Latin American standars, economical
and social stability seem out of reach for the time being. It
seems that institutional discontinuity, a parameter that has
been blamed repeatedly as one of the main causes of underdevelop
ment, cannot be mentioned this time as the independent variable.
After 30 years of democracy, Venezuela still shows many of the
characteristics of a traditional society, as defined by Kahl (8),
according to the following dimensions:
Division of labor: 65% of the population lives in the cities
(instead of the typical 30% of traditional societies); however,
as high as 40% of the urban dwellers live in conditions that
resemble those of the primitive farms, bordering the limits of
poverty without enjoying many of the civilized advantages of
city life.
State of technology: Technology is heavily dependent from foreign
sources; little development is achieved internally.
The economy: Strongly dependent on a single product, oil, that
represents 90% of exports and 20% of GNP. Industrial and econom
ic diversification are not within sight.
System of social stratification; even though intrinsically
democratic and socially mobile (there are no obstacles such as
castes or social origin, blocking one's promotion within the
society), the people in Venezuela are inmersed in a system where
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the gap between rich and poor is gigantic. Inequalities in the
distribution of wealth are notorious. Even though the influx of
dividends from oil exports helped to create a large middle class
(for Latin American Standards), still a good sector of the
population has not had access to the oil bonanza.
Education and communication; Illiteracy is approximately 15%.
Venezuela enjoys a good (although deteriorated) network of high-
ways and roads. As of today, only a small portion of the coun-
try is not accessible by conventional, modern vehicles.
3Values. It is difficult to classify Venezuelan values in terms
of the simplistic traditional/modern dichotomy. If I assume that
our values are traditional, does it mean that other "traditional"
societies, such as the islanders of the South Pacific or the
rural masses in India have a similar attitude towards life as
ours? Certainly not. In any case, Venezuelan culture seems to
be quite different from that of the industrialized world, which
it is trying to emulate.
Based on the pieces of history that have been
presented (which represent some of the critical moments of our
national life), the ground is somewhat laid to describe a few
specific characteristics of the Venezuelans. Even though, of
course, the list does not pretend to be exhaustive, nor is my
intention to pretend that all Venezuelan share the same traits,
it will represent a valid stereotype with practical implications.
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In the following chapters, the list will be treated with a little
more rigor and a few additionaly classifications and conceptual
work will be presented. Where necessary for illustrative pur-
poses, comparisons with other nations' cultures will be made.
B2.1. Attitude towards work: As it might be ex-
pected, work by itself does not carry the same connotation that
can be found in, say, the United States. In Venezuela, work
represents a means (a painful means for many) to achieve wealth
or power, and not an end in itself. The national folflore shows
abundant examples of derogatory names given to hard wok, especial
ly manual, "inferior" work ("God made work as a punishment";
"work causes me pain"; "three things are important in life:
health, money and love"; "work is my enemy", etc.).
A particular job is desired only if it car-
ries with it attributes that give prestige and status to the job-
holder, be it in the form of money, admiration or power. Jobs
that do not fall into this category (especially those that do
not require much intellectual effort) are undervalued by Venezue
lans and will be taken only by people that do not have better
options. As an illustration, it is very difficult to find col-
lege students (or prospective college students) working as wait
er, clerks in a "bodega" (small shop), or washing dishes. They
should not engage in tasks that are seen as lacking prestige.
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It will never happen that a middle class youngster goes to work
as a newspaper boy or as helper in a mechanic garage; his/her
family would not allow him to work in occupations that "are not
for him". Besides, parents take pride in the fact that they
are able to support their kids all the way through college, and
doing otherwise would be seen as lack of care and irresponsible
behavior.
When students that must support themselves
look for a job, they search for such positions as office clerks,
computer operators, laboratory assistents,etc. They will very
seldom consider the possibility of manual jobs (mechanics, car-
penters, etc.).
B2.2. Personal relationships. Especially important
because of its consequences in the workplace, any transaction
between individuals carries with it a heavy emotional content for,
say, North American standards. An impersonal, business-like
relationship, therefore, is very difficult to achieve since there
is always some deep, personal involvement even among acquaint-
ances.
When doing business. Venezuelans cannot take
the perspective of a professional, uninvolving, relationship.
Personal values and behavioral patterns (developed for adequate
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social contact) intermix with business interests and objectives,
the result being that the outcomes are frequently a combination
of external (i.e. profits, sales, deals) and internal (inner
needs) goals. An illustration of this is the terrible record
of Venezuela as a negotiator; by subsequent deals, the country
lost 30% of its territory to its neighbors, all of it accom-
plished without violence or threat of war. In another example,
a local executive from the government, while negotiating a sig-
nificant contract with a multinational corporation, told one of
his assistants not to keep arguing about the price, since their
counterparts would think that they (the Venezuelans) were bar-
gaining too much, and "that was not proper behavior among gen-
tlemen ". Their counterparts, of course, were bargaining as
much as the Venezuelans (or perhaps more) and felt very happy to
see the pressure coming to an end.
When Venezuelan negotiatiors come to friend-
ly terms with the other party after spending certain time to-
gether, a trap is sprung: Being friends with our counterparts,
profits, relative advantages and the negotiation itself becomes
less important than friendship. We have the notion that friends
can be trusted and mistakingly expect the others to act accord-
ing to the same principles. Quite often, the consequence is that
we lose our advantages because our opponents became, within our
mind, allies. If our opponents can separate both sides of the
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coin they will keep our friendship, and, at the same time get
the best deal out of the negotiation.
B2.3. Family. Family, in Venezuela as in the rest
of Latin America, constitutes the basic cell of society; "If
it is your relative, it is all right", can be heard continuous-
ly. Family ties are strong and lasting, and if there is a group
where an individual can enjoy permanent membership, in spite of
severe differences that may occur, that is his family.
The concept of a public corporation is not
well understood by Venezuelan businessmen. The major private
enterprises in the country belong to family groups and, in spite
of their size or complexity, are managed as family businesses.
Nepotism occurs constantly, to a point where the same names are
seen over and over on the boards of the most important corpora-
tions, be they banks, manufacturers or trading companies. The
selection process in such organizations is focused on parameters
other than merits and capabilities. On route to the top, rela-
tives come first.
B2.4. Being. "In cultures of Spanish origin, in-
dividualism is manifested in a respect for the inner uniqueness
of each person" (9). As a consequence, any attempt to massifica
tion, routinization or melting of the individual with a larger
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group where he/she would sacrifice his identity and personal
values for those of the crowd will be intrinsically rejected.
Traits such as discipline, collectivism and strict compliance
with the rules are somewhat objected by Venezuelans.
B2.5. Personality vs. attributes. Certainly re-
lated to the importance given to the person as a self-sufficient
entity is the fact that an individual is respected (or hated)
by what he is, not by his attributes or accomplishments. What-
ever an individual achieves (or does not) will be a direct conse
quence of his virtues or defects as a "total" person, not of
whatever efforts he might have put in the task, such as educa-
tion, hard work or dedication, etc. Usually people disagree cn
the grounds of personalities, not on points or view. Venezuelans
will oppose a valid statement if it is expressed by someone whom
they do not personally like.
B2.6. Friendship. In many cases, friends are taken
as an extension of the family, and friends' circles tend to be
very close and loyal: Once membership is acquired from a close
group, it is very difficult to lose it. Groups of close friends,
or clans, can be observed in the country at all levels, from the
high officials of the government to the associations of laborers.
There is a Venezuelan word, rosca, which means ring or closed
circle, that is used to signal groups of people intimately relat
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ed, mainly for comercial or political purposes.
A serious consequence of 5) and 6), direct-
ly affecting the selection process in Venezuela, can be quickly
understood. An important issue about the clans is that, as a
common practice, someone who is chosen to,say, an executive
position within an organization must belong to an exclusive
circle, or rosca. It is assumed that once somebody is admitted
into a rosca, he or she can be trusted (only those who can be
trusted will be selected). It has been explained that people
are preferred not by their achievements or attributes but by
their personality traits (simpathy, generosity, loyalty, etc.),
so it is expected that clans will be formed by people who like
one another emotionally; in other words, who sympathize with
each other. It is only obvious that, except for coincidence,
the selection process will be focused on those individuals who
are liked, not on the ones that have the best attributes or are
best prepared for a given job or position. Examples of this
practice are abundant, and it is very normal to witness how
certain executives surround themselves by college mates or how
a political party is divided into the group that follows Pedro,
the group that follows Juan and the clan of Jose. These groups
do not have any ideological identification as their cohesive
force, only friendship ties or family connections. Friends (or,
at the least, close acquaintances) are used for everything in
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Venezuela, from finding a job to obtainning an export license,
from setting a contract with the government to shopping in the
supermarket ("the butcher is a good friend of mine, and you
know that he saves the best cuts of meat for his friends").
B2.7. Machismo. "The quintessence of manliness is
fearlessness, physical strength, pride and readiness to defend
one's honor and that of one's family and closest friends" (10).
As another example of concern for the inner person and not for
his/her accomplishments, to be macho is one of the Venezuelan's
males main aspirations. Whether it is demonstrated by sucess
with women, absence of fear in a fight, resistance when drink-
ing alcohol, or ability in rude sports, to be regarded as a macho
is very deeply needed by most Venezuelan men. That particular
conduct of a "real man" is encouraged by the whole environment,
including women. To be a coward is like carrying a disease, a
stigma. Cowards are not to be trusted, and every male has to
show the others his bravery, his strength, his physical resist-
ance or his sexual potency.
A direct consequence of machismo is the
violent character of our nationals, made apparent by the popu-
larity of boxing as a national passion and the sport that has
provided more success to Venezuela in international tournaments.
Even though peaceful from a collective point of view (Venezuela
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has not had a war in 150 years) violence is always present in
interpersonal conflicts. Streetfights are not unusual in major
cities, where violent crime rates have been increasing steadily
over the last years. Probably fueled by Hollywood cowboy movies,
a violent end to disputes is always considered a possibility,
peaceful means to settle differences being seldom exhausted
before violence breaks out. Avoiding a fight is usually seen as
a sign of inferior human condition, not as a civilized attitude.
Our passivity as a society does not reflect our aggressive char
acter as individuals.
B2.8. Creativity/Discipline. The degree of crea-
tivity of Venezuelans is basically unknown; no formal studies
exist on the matter. However, if measured by our sense of humor
and our capacity for quick, imaginative reaction to difficult
situations it must be admitted that a high degree of spontaneous,
fertile imagination does exist. Our sense of humor is limitless,
and the number of jokes that circulate around the country and
are renovated from time to time (for example, when some important
event occurs) is huge. Such creativity, however, is very seldom
translated into permanent works requiring a more sustained effort.
We are much more inclined to quick, sudden solutions and responses
than to deep and thoughtful analysis. The persistence and disci
pline that are needed to translate creativity into a permanent,
concrete, finished work is scarce. We lack the patience and
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drive that such a hebavior needs. Our mind tends to wander
right after the start, and our need for accomplishment is very
much satisfied with the idea itself. Creation and enthusiasm
stop there.
As a consequence, improvisation and unfinish
ed works abound in Venezuela. Areas that need a sustained ef-
fort or the implementation of a strict routine, such as main-
tenance of public works, are in terrible shape. Our inability
to adapt ourselves to a strict discipline or to follow up a
brillant idea shows up everywhere in the country.
B2.9. Time dimension. The time span of Venezuelans
emphasizes the short term. Venezuelans are impulsive, emotional
and impatient and expect every action to have an inmediate ef-
fect on the event it was intended to modify. There are contra-
dictions, however; in spite on the need for inmediate feedback,
many things are delayed until the last moment (when, in many
cases, it might be too late to act), and the sense of urgency
that we show when expecting results lives together with a tenden
cy towards laissez-faire that delays indefinitely projects, com-
mittments and everyday tasks. The great capacity of vision into
the future that was displayed by the most admired personality in
Venezuela, the liberator Sim6n Bolivar, was not transmitted into
future generations of leaders who have always showed a dispropor
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tionate interest on the short term. Bolivar, especially during
the last years of his life and until his death in 1830, was some
what prophetic in predicting what the political future of Latin
America was going to be; in his opinion, the Independence wars
had left such a chaos and anarchy that a great effort would be
necessary to acquire certain degree of stability. However re-
spected the figure of Bolivar might be in Venezuela, one of his
most notable virtues has been lost by his compatriots. What
remains of his image are not his ideas or long-range political
vision, but the mythical image of a fearless fighter with a
symbolic, god-like set of epic virtues that inspired him to
defeat the spaniards and set us free for ever, while riding on
his white horse.
The pace of Venezuelans, in summary, shows
a strange combination of a never-ending sense of urgency and a
continuous "leave it for manana" on the other side. We do not
like to be pushed by the environment and adopt an attitude of
leisure towards our obligations, perhaps with the belief that
time, combined with some magic or miraculous intervention from
the supernatural ("God will provide") will solve the problem,
making our involment unnecessary. On the other hand, we show
very little patience to wait for results, once actions are taken.
Impatience is displayed in Venezuela by
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businessmen, most of which overemphasize quick profits, and by
government officials who often recommend the acquisition of ultra
modern, state-of-the-art equipment and machinery, in the hope
that the latest paraphernalia will create instantaneous progress.
The "manana" philosophy, on the other hand, is exemplified by
the continous delays that postpone the most urgent tasks. When
quick action is needed to solve a specific, localized problem,
(a pothole in the street, a polluting spill, etc.), the solution
is often not implemented on the grounds that, "instead of react-
ing compulsively, a permanent mechanism should be created to
gain economies of scale when dealing with problems of this sort
so that, when the mechanism is implemented, we can solve all this
problems (fill all the potholes, stop all the spills) at once and
more efficiently". With apparent long-term vision, committes are
designated, studies are started and resources are allocated to
design the macro-strategy. In the end, the strategy is never
implemented (its design was only an excuse to delay inmediate
action) and the inmediate problem remains unattended.
B2.10. Pragmatism. "Latin Americans are widely held
to appreciate poetry and abstract discussion more than techno-
logy and pragmatic action" (11). "The world is valued more high
ly than the thing; the manipulation of symbols (as in argument)
is more cultivated than the manipulation of natural forces (as
in mechanics)" (12). The lack of a sincere, hands-on contact
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with reality and its artifacts has many times resulted in phar-
aonic megaprojects, loaded with symbolism and expectations (as
well as wishful thinking) but either unfeasible or useless. The
combination of our attitude towards work and our peculiar inter-
action with real, down to earth problems is clearly reflected
in the political campaigns. The people who run for public posi
tions get their votes by promising the population to solve the
most important issues during emotionally-charged speeches. Most
of the time, how the solutions will be implemented is simply not
discussed, since there seems to be an unconscious agreement bet-
ween the candidates and the voters to remain within the abstract
level, so that the hopes are not disturbed by "domestic, parochial"
doubts. The few times that concrete projects are offered by the
politicians, our lack of perspective, frequently fed by a high
emotional identification with the leaders, does not allow a real
istic evaluation of what is being proposed. Many projects are
started (and, some times, completed) simply for what they repre-
sent, regardless of any practical value. In this sense, steel
mills, shipyards, huge resort complexes and ambitious urban
developments are built because they are symbols of economic and
industrial progress. Their necessity or feasibility are consid-
ered, in many cases, irrelevant.
B2.11. Valued personality type. Status symbols.
Individuals are valued, as it was mentioned before, by what they
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are, by what is considered to be given in the personality. Vene
zuelans are liked by their countrymen if they are extrovert,
loyal to friends and family, sensitive, gregarious, plain-spoken,
humble, quick-minded and with a good sense of humor. Those that
are individualistic, selfish, introvert, aristocratic, fearful or
nonemotional are distrusted. Generosity is a critical virtue
among Venezuelans. "Pichirre" (tight-fisted) is a strong offense
and an indication of selfishness and indiference towards the
others (serious defect). When a group of friends go out for din-
ner or drinks there will always be arguments about who pays the
bill (because everyone wants to be the one who pays); not partic
ipating in such arguments, or not sharing a sincere intention to
invite the others (buying their drinks or their food) is seen as
very improper behaviour since it implies that one does not care
for other people. Money, in consequence, is made to be spent as
quickly as it comes. The accumulation of money is not important
by itself, nor because it provides security for the future. Mon
ey is needed because it allows a life of leisure and, in some
way, respect and admiration from the others when spent heavily.
Venezuelans are cheerful people. Almost irreverent, our
sense of humor pervades the most catastrophic circumstance, and
every Venezuelan has no option but to be somewhat tolerant on
the jokes that the others will make on him/herself. Seriousness
is perceived with suspicion, at best seen as a sign of "a mature
character". "No entender de juegos" (not being acquainted with
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jokes) reveals a personality trait that does not attract popu-
larity; showing a good disposition for jokes and a quick mind
to transform a grave situation into sound laugh is eagerly culti
vated by politicians who aspire to be elected. Comedians in TV
achieve enormous ratings, superior by all means to other perfor-
mers. In business, a good manager has to develop an ambiguous
condition that shows him as cheerful and humorous when, at the
same time, he/she is trying to get a serious response from their
subordinates.
Even though the things that confer status in
Venezuela can be correlated with their equivalents in the United
States (money, posessions, luxury, power) the real meaning of
the status symbols is quite different. Money and posessions are
separated from the time and effort invested in acquiring them;
it is the end result, not the process, what people pay attention
to. As part of the importance of "given" aspects in the person-
ality of individuals, sucess (and, with it, status) is due to a
combination of personal virtues with luck, destiny or favors from
heaven.
A perfect way to show status and being
accepted as a likable person is to invite friends, relatives or
acquaintainces to very expensive places and, of course, paying
the bill. Whoever behaves in this way is satisfying his image
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as a person who cares about other human beings (and does not
object to spend a fortune if that makes his friends happy) and,
at the same time, lets the world around him know that he is got
money and must be admired.
B2.12. Criticism and dissension. Since there is
such a high degree of deep personal involment in relationships
among Venezuelans, it should be clear that criticism is not taken
impersonally. Criticizing an individual's acts or opinions means,
in fact, disapproval of the individual himself. In consequence,
criticism is seem as disloyalty, disloyalty is displayed by those
that cannot be trusted, trust is essential to friendship, friend
ship is critical to achieve material and spiritual success.
In view of the above, dissension is frequent
ly punished in Venezuela, in spite of an environment that ap-
parently encourages all sorts of intellectual liberties. Groups
such as political parties are perceived as monolithic blocks
where every member shares the same opinion on everything. Within
the national parliament, it is inconceivable to expect a member
of one of the parties to vote differently from the other members
on any given issue. The usual mechanism is that the leaders of
the parties decide which position should be taken about certain
law or project; such position is then transmitted down to the
representatives in Congress and followed strictly without question
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ing. When speaking publicly, the representatives of the dif-
ferent groups of influence that exist in Venezuela (be them
political parties, industrialists' associations, unions, etc.)
will always be in line with the opinions and positions that have
been decided in advance. Dissension not only means that critics
are being disloyal to the group, it gives the impression that
the group lacks strength and coherence (the latter being probab-
ly a consequence of the former).
A living illustration of the consequences
of criticism in Venezuela is given by the great number of politi
cal parties that participate in the national elections. Every
major political organization in the country has been fragmented
at least once in its history, every time as a result of differ-
ences of opinion between leaders of different factions within
the organization. The party that is actually in power has expe
rienced 3 major divisions in 30 years, and 2 of the groups that
spun off are actually established parties. In all three occa-
sions, dissension was not tolerated and the "deviates" that
objected to the position of the organization were expelled or
resigned. Our tolerance for conflicting views is so much influenc
ed by emotions and feelings of loyalty that it ends up being quite
weak.
The same attitude that applies for external
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criticism is valid when Venezuelans deal with internal conflict.
Self-criticism is quite unusual and, when achieved, is so smmoth
ed by justifications (the environment, God, the others, the
weather, etc.) that the punishment inflicted to our self-esteem
is reduced to a minimun. The fact is that our perception of an
individual as a whole entity denies the concept of partial failure;
in other words, if someone fails in a given activity it is seen
as a failure of the total person (even though this person might
have been very successful at other endeavors) and not as a specific
part of him/her that is not as good as the rest. Our lack of
tolerance to accept our own mistakes is only equaled by our cre-
ativity to find the explanation that does the least harm to our
ego. Again, government officials provide a good illustration;
even after the most disastrous performance while in public of-
fice, no president or minister will ever admit having been wrong.
To do so would place such a heavy burden on himself that he/she
would not even consider it. The pressure to disguise one's own
incompetencies comes from within more than from other people.
We are indeed less tolerant of our mistakes (if we ever accept
them) than we are of someone else's.
The records of our governments are filled
with examples of wrong measures taken at the wrong time that
were kept in place in spite of their inconvenience or obvious
failure, only because admitting the latter could not be accept-
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ed by the officials who originated them. Trial-and-error mech-
anisms are very difficult to implement in Venezuela, since once
something is tried it will be there to stay.
Criticism, be it from within or from with-
out, is often dealt with through our sense of humor, by mention-
ing in a humorous way what should not be said seriously. Our
high tolerance for jokes has a practical application; it permits
the release of criticism by providing a saving-face mechanism.
However, since jokes are not the real world, mistakes are mention
ed but not corrected.
Frequently, conflict avoidance and fear of
criticizing leads Venezuelans to remain passive even when their
rights are violated. In general, we tend to react violently to
criticism, and this prevents us, in turn, from claiming that the
law be followed or that the others perform their duties as expect
ed.
B2.13. Insecurity. As citizens of a nation that
has not succeeded in its search for economic development, Vene
zuelans show a degree of insecurity that feeds itself from the
perception of superior accomplishments made in the United States,
Europe or Japan. This perception, on one hand, leads us to
anticipate failure when trying to do something "that only the
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North Americans have been completely successful at"; on the other
hand, there is a strong bias for imitating practices and values
from the industrialized world, without a comprehensive analysis
about the convenience or feasibility of such practices. Our
limits for experimenting, then, are bound by what has been pre-
viously tried abroad, provided that it is not viewed as a "sacred
object", reserved only for superior intellects. The vicious-cir
cle potential that this situation presents is evident, since sel
dom we will be better than anybody by imitation, or worse, by
partial imitation. At the same time, the notion that achieve-
ment is closely related to what a person is intrinsically capable
of (according to "given" virtues), independently of the degree
of effort, creates a perception of the developed nations as
intrinsically superior and, in consequence, far beyond our ca-
pacity. Fortunately, the Venezuelan culture does not seem to
value industrial development as one of its vital goals, and the
degree of frustration that our underdevelopment causes in the
people is strongly disminished by our accomplishments in having
a big family, or a close group of friends, showing our success
with women or being proud of the heroes of the Independence war.
Venezuelans quite often fail to realize that
ours is not an inferior pattern of conduct uncapable of achiev-
ing high productivity (one that should be replaced by more "advanc
ed" practices), but just a potential source of development that
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must be exploited in its own way. A very high official of the
current government, when asked about the convenience of changing
the working hours of the public offices, to a U.S. -like 9-to-5,
gave as a justification that "in the developed countries, people
do not have big lunches; they just grab a sandwich and go back
to work". This same attitude can be perceived at all levels
within the country, from the private sector executives who apply
foreign management theories in their organizations, regardless
of the results, to the North American consultants who are peri-
odically hired by the local political parties to design and give
advise on the election campaigns. A foreign last name in Vene-
zuela (especially if it is english, german or french) is a status
symbol, and those natives who have it show it with pride. In
general, access to exclusive social circles is provided to North
Americans and North Europeans in spite of their true wealth or
social condition. The fact that we were conquered by the Spa-
niards and not the British is usually mentioned as one of the
reasons for our disgrace; whether or not that argument has any
value, the fact that it is being used by people who are 30%
Indian and 30% Black (who would not be in this world if Venezue-
la had been a British colony) clearly dismisses it.
B2.14. Leadership. Personalismo. For 35 years,
between 1901 and 1936, Venezuela was ruled by a single person,
whose authority and decision were never questioned or challenged.
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Before that period, during the second half of the 19th century,
several leaders came and went; some of them achieved considera-
ble power and became presidents, ministers or commanders of the
military forces, while others were defeated and failed in acquir
ing official authority.
The history of Venezuela is less a matter
of ideologies and political movements than it is of individuals
who because of personal attributes (charisma, intelligence,
vision, etc.), and particular circumstances, achieved command
over a group of followers and attempted to transform this tempo-
rary event into a permanent share of the institutional power.
During our recent democratic history (started 30 years ago),
several of the elected presidents have been true caudillos, with
unquestionable power over their respective political organiza-
tions; that they have not become autocratic rulers of the coun-
try is because our democracy, probably due to the abundant wealth
of the country and to the absence of strong social unrest, still
keeps a strong hold in the minds of the people. In turn, the
modern caudillos, together with their close circle (the rosca),
rule their parties, (instead of the country) with a tight grip.
It can be seen from the above that Venezue-
lans identify power with individuals, not with institutions or
organizations. The personal relationship that is typical in
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the country (as well as in the rest of Latin America) which empha
sizes the importance of the person as a unique entity determines
that organizations are not to be trusted, since they do not have
a life or a personality of its own. Our interactions with other
people are so charged with emotions and search for the inner
self that we do not like to deal with impersonal entities whose
language is rules, regulations, procedures and policies. In
Venezuela, governments and organizations are strong when their
leaders are strong; institutions are not living entities, no
matter how well conceived or tightly regulated they are. Their
performance and policies depend heavily on who's in charge.
Escovar Sal6m, in his book Political Evolu
tion of Venezuela, states that "when the State is a vague enti-
ty, without a strong framework, personal relationships replace
it". (13). It seems that the strong personalismo that charac-
terizes the interaction of the people with their leaders is a
consequence of weak institutions, and not otherwise. While this
explanation could apply to Venezuela during the 19th century
when, after the chaos left by the Independence war, the country
did not enjoy a stable institutional infrastructure, it does not
account for today's situation, where personal relationships are
still above an abundant legal system and well defined government
structure. Even though it might seem like the chicken-and-egg
dilemma, I think that personalismo comes from our inner culture
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and is the cause, and not the effect, of the strong personal
character or own institutions.
A question remains unanswered. What is it
that makes a leader in Venezuela? It is probably a combination
of manliness (machismo), knowledge (the wise are certainly admir
ed by the people, since they posess what it is necessary to stay
away from "inferior" jobs), equalitarian attitudes (preferable
of humble origin), speech ability, and, most important, a certain
kind of inner energy that allows an emotional interaction with
the followers. The relationship that is established between
the leader and the masses is mostly emotional, almost irrational.
When the candidate from a political party speaks to the voters,
the issues discussed are not concrete projects or realistic
projects directed to the solution of the most urgent problems;
the whole interaction is characterized by a strong intuitive
understanding of the inner person of the leader by the listeners
that can be compared to the communication established between a
musician and his/her audience. In Venezuela, a leader without
that sort of special charisma will find it very difficult to
succeed, since the masses are not convinced with arguments but
with emotions and ideals.
While the above happens in the political
arena (where leadership is exercised in the true Venezuelan
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style), in the productive sector the parameters are different.
Here, a leader must focus his energy in managing resources ef-
fectively and convince his/her superiors that he is doing so.
Again, I find the cultural dysfunction; whatever is needed to
inspire the subordinates (charisma, emotional communication,
manliness, etc.) is not necessarily adequate to produce tangible
results. In fact, corporate managers, especially in the private
sector, are likely to be promoted when they are profitable,
regardless of their rapport with their people; managers are
rewarded by performing a task by which they are not becoming
true leaders, since their communication with their subordinates
in terms of objectives, hard work, numbers and the like very
seldom can carry the emotional content that people need to be-
come followers. Is that one of the reasons why there are no
national leaders that came from the private sector? IS it why
government enterprises have seldom been successful? Is that a
reason for our productivity in the private sector to be low?
The answer is probably yes; the leader/follower combination
might account for a good part of the national failures.
A high official from one of the biggest
private corporations in Venezuela, when asked about the manager-
ial style of his company, answered that a benevolent autocratic
approach was what he felt was the most appropiate to deal with
the local labor force: "Have you noticed that we often need the
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tender punishment of the protective father ....... to feel that
we are being taken into account?" (14). Whether that is the
best way of producing results in Venezuela or just an interme-
diate style that produces partial productive success and partial
lyv avoids discontent from the laborers is still unresolved, but
given our not so outstanding productivity, I would be inclined
for the second explanation. A certain number of our managers,
whether through a rational analysis or by an intuitive, intrinsic
understanding of the local conditions, have developed a patern-
alistic approach that mixes rapport with production but does not
excel on either one. A father-son communication where work is
delegated (but not authority) is typical in this case.
A very small number of leaders seem to
achieve superior results by establishing rapport with their
followers while, at the same time, are using it to get the peo-
ple in the right direction. This apparently ideal solution hap-
pens only casually, since the two attributes (rapport and direve
for efficiency) do not necessarily happen together; in fact,
they can be thought of as opposing each other, since one belongs
to the emotional world and the other to rationality. A techno-
cracy, however appropriate it might seem to identify Venezuela's
areas for improvement, will not succeed unless it understands
the magic of the people.
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IV. PREVIOUS STUDIES ON THE VENEZUELAN CULTURE.
A. THE UNIVERSITY OF THE ANDES.
The cultural analysis described above has been based main-
ly on direct observations and evaluation of both the history
and the actual situation of the country. More formal studies
have been made by social psychologists, in an attempt to clarify
some aspects of the Venezuelan idiosyncracy. A particular inves
tigation carried by Colombia Sal6m de Bustamante, (1) analyzed
the expectations of success and failure of Venezuelans by inter
viewing a group of College students from the University of the
Andes.
In the first place, it was established that, from the 5
basic needs mentioned by Luthans (2), that is, n achievement,
n power, n affiliation, n security and n status, n achievement
is significantly low in Venezuela (additional studies showing the
same results will be discussed later). The same study also
evaluated the bahavior of Venezuelans according to the attribu-
tion theory (3) which differentiates individuals according to
their locus of control (internal or external). Finally, the
authors analyzed the content of stories written by schoolchildren,
investigating the degree of n achievement found in the stories
and looking for negative feelings related with the failure of
reaching a certain goal.
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In a first experiment, several college students were asked
to estimate the grade they would obtain in the first exam of a
specific course. After the exam, it was showed that 75% of the
students over estimated their grades, 18% underestimated it and
only 7% made an accurate prediction. All three groups had studied
the same number of chapters from the books and (approximately)
with the same intensity.
To validate the results of the first survey, the same stu-
dents were asked to estimate the grades they would obtain in the
second exam. In spite of the fact that the average grade obtain
ed in the first exam was 10 points on a maximum of 20, the aver-
age estimation for the second test was 17 points. Expectations
were too high again, and the feedback from the first exam was
not used. Apparently, the expectations were not based on a
cognitive process, but on luck, destiny or magic. "Forecasts
were an unrealistic measure of hope, desire and aspirations" (4).
Two explanations for the results of the survey are closely
related to several aspects of the Venezuelan culture, previous-
ly discussed. The first refers to the lack of both pragmatism
and sense of reality of our people, exarcerbated by an imprecise
time orientation (5), and unrealistic committments to make an
effort (study harder). The second issue is related to the deep
belief (shared by most of the students) that external factors
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can modify any situation, so that intervention (read effort) is
not necessary. When discussing the political campaigns in Vene
zuela, I mentioned that a similar phenomenon operated between
the candidates and the voters with respect to pre-election of-
fers and promises; either the difficulty of the task is under-
stimated or the ability of the people who will carry it out is
overestimated.
Weiner points out that, from the perspective of the student,
the causes of his/her performance can be grouped into a) inter
nal (intrinsic ability, effort) and external (luck, difficulty
of the task); b) stable (intrinsic ability) or unstable (ef-
fort, luck); c) controllable (effort) and uncontrollable (in-
trinsic ability, difficult of task, luck). (6).
An investigation performed by Sal6m de Bustamente and SAn-
chez (1983) classified a group of students into high and low
achievers; both subgroups were assigned several tasks, but they
were manipulated to succeed in some of the assignments and fail
in others. As it was expected, success was perceived by the
high achievers as a result of ability and effort, while low
achievers attributed success mainly to luck. (7). With respect
to failure, the high n achievement team explained it in terms of
low effort, while the other group pointed bad luck as the main
reason, The most revealing result of this survey occured when
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the participants were asked to classify different factors (rea-
sons for failure or success) according to locus, stability and
control. The students with low n achievement perceived ability
as an unstable factor (susceptible of improvement) and both abil
ity and difficulty of the task as controllable (only luck was
uncontrollable).
The majority of our students considered that their intrin-
sic ability could be modified with time (since it is unstable
and controllable) and that the difficulty of the task can be
controlled somehow. "Even if our students give lack of ability
as a cause for failure, expectations can still be high, since
their ability level could be better next time" (8). At the same
time, if the difficulty of the task is controllable (by magic,
our destiny, or God), it is to be expected that our performance
could be better if our desire is strong. Strangely enough, ef-
fort (which could be considered the most useful attribute since
it is internal, unstable and controllable) does not appear
frequently in the answers; sustained effort "is conceptualized
as negative .....sacrificial. Rejected are also the search for
excellence, competition and sustained study" (9). If our nation
al average correlates with the sample from the Andes University
(75% of low achievers), many failures of our culture can be
easily explained.
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Another study, also conducted with college students, ana-
lyzed the content of short stories that the participants were
asked to write. In a majority of cases, the initiation of a pro
ductive endeavor was interrupted by some unexpected problem or
attitude that preventedthe effort from being carried any further.
Fragments of the stories are the following: "The young and
bright scientist is about to make a very important discovery, but
on his way home is involved in a car accident an gets blind".
"Luis is an excellent student of architecture and is about to
start a project when the image of his mother, who lives far away,
comes to his mind" (10). Even though the initial intention is
not translated into a tangible result (in spite of the intrinsic
abilities of the scientist and the architect, who are brilliant
and excellent student, respectively) no manifestations of nega-
tive feelings could be found in the stories. Neither the indi-
vidual who failed nor the rest of the people who played roles in
the stories perceived any guilt or responsibility that could not
be released by using luck, destiny or, more generally, external
factors. In many cases, the need for affiliation (the mother
who is distant) perfectly justified the interrruption of the
task.
The above situation also became apparent when stories writ-
ten by 232 school children were analyzed, looking for indications
of n achievement and reactions to failure. Among others, the
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results showed that: 1) only 25% of the children wrote stories
in which reference to the achievement of goals was made; 2) abso
lutely no stories (0%) mentioned (directly or indirectly) any
negative feeling associated with failure in attaining a specific
goal.
In summary, the following conclusions can be drawn from the
surveys and studies mentioned above:
1) 70% of the participants, at least, showed low n achievement.
2) Within the group of low achievers, failure and success were
handled with the same parameters (mainly external).
3) Feedback did not seem to affect the forecasts, since predic
tions were made on the basis on non-cognitive judgement
(hope, desire).
4) Expectations were constantly high; either the task was un-
derestimated or the abilities overestimated.
5) Affiliation needs were rated above achievement and the
former justified the abandonment of the latter.
6) Since failure was largely perceived as the consequence of
external, uncontrollable factors, there were very few indi
cations of negative feelings (guilt, shame) associated with
unmet goals, either from the individuals or from the people
who witnessed the fact.
7) Ability and difficulty of the task were deemed controllable.
8) There was little relationship between the instrumentation
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and the execution of a specific task or project. The lack
of both pragmatism and rational estimation of the task were
evident.
9) Effort (and its consequences and importance) was consistent
ly left out as an important attribute.
B. MC CLELLAND'S STUDY: MOTIVATIONAL PROFILE OF VENEZUELANS.
In 1974, D.Mc Clelland performed a study in Venezuela to
investigate the intensity with which n power, n achievement and
n affiliation showed up when analyzing stories, articles, speeches
and other material published by Venezuelan authors in local ma-
ganzines, newspapers, books and the like. (11). Table IV.1 shows
the final results of the analysis, which included material from
three periods: 1920/30, 1940/50 and 1960/70. Subsequently, the
Venezuelan results were compared with a multinational study
published by Mc Clelland in 1961, where a similar methodology
was used. (12).
The numbers included in the table form a linear scale from
which the relative importance of each motive can be read. They
are related to the frequency with which references to achieve-
ment, power or affiliation were found in the materials analyzed.
Additionally, a comparison was made between the motivational
levels found in Venezuela and those observed in the international
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sample analyzed by Mc Clelland in 1961. It was found that, among
45 different countries, only three showed a higher n power and
only two presented lower both achievement and affiliation scores.
It can be noted that the results obtained were quite consis
tent throughout the whole sample, with the exception of political
speeches (where only power and achievement are present, with 0
affiliation) and a children's magazine that shows higher n achie
vement than n affiliation. While there is no clear explanation
for the latter, except for the fact that Tricolor is a govern-
ment-sponsored magazine whose main purpose is to promote good-
citizenship among school children, the political speeches show
a pattern that has been mentioned before, where the apparent
concern for problem-solving really means high forecasts with lit
tle rational support. Since the main concern of the politicians
is to grab power, their speeches have to be charged with promises
and projects of all sorts. Even though no such survey has been
performed (at least to my knowledge), a quick review of the per
formance of Venezuelan governments during the last 25 years would
show that only a negligible part of the goals expressed during
the political campaigns were met once the elections were won and
official power was exercized. The only reason for the high n
achievement score in political speeches is, then, that hopes and
desires must be articulated by the candidates in orden to estab-
lish a real communion with the masses; besides the emotional rap
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MATERIAL:
FOLKLORE
POLITICAL SPEECHES
LITERATURE
ELEMENTARY SCHOOL
TEXTBOOKS
TRICOLOR (CHILDREN
MAGAZINE)
TELEVISION
RADIO
TOTAL
(ALL MATERIALS)
TABLE IV.1.
MOTIVATION:
n achievement
n affiliation
n power
n achievement
n affiliation
n power
n achievement
n affiliation
n power
n achievement
n affiliation
n power
n achievement
n affiliation
n power
n achievement
n affiliation
n power
n achievement
n affiliation
n power
n achievement
n affiliation
n power
SCORE AVERAGE:
.09
.39
2.83
2.13
0.00
3.20
.24
.96
3.24
.34
.54
1.45
.39
.23
2.13
.05
1.50
1.89
.18
1.25
2.15
.36
.69
2.04
Data taken from M. Castillo, (1982).
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port, a joint mesage of "dreams of grandeur" is needed.
A living example of what results from the external locus
of Venezuelans can be seen in the lack of efficiency with which
crimes are punished in Venezuela. Convicted murderers are releas
ed, corrupted government officials circulate freely and public-
ly enjoy their wealth, traffic regulations are violated repeated
ly. When confronted with the authorities, the offenders always
find an acceptable explanation for their misbehavior that either
attenuates or justifies it. The very fact that external events
are the real cause of our failures and mistakes prevents us from
paying in full the consequences. If we add influential friends
and inefficiences in our legal system, the picture is very clear.
Venezuelans have an intrinsic resistance to accept mistakes, a
strong external locus of control and a light perception of duties
and responsibilities; how can we be punished?
Venezuelan children are protected by their parents until
well above the adolescence. Our governments are paternalistic
and are always ready to shield individuals and institutions from
their destiniesby forgiving loans, rescuing enterprises that lose
money or decreeing trade protectionism. Men and women are rais-
ed in a secure environment where the real word is looked through
a tinted glass and responsibilities with society are carried by
the heads of the family. Whether or not that is the reason for
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our perception and attitudes toward the world and ourselves is
not clear, but is probably quite influential. The government,
as a general practice, never admits the existence of a crisis,
even in the case where the crisis was really not the government's
fault. Public officials are known to transform the most demand-
ing and critical situation into a rosy picture where "things are
kind of bad, but nothing to be really worried about, since we
have got everything under control". That the people have to be
protected from bad news seems to be the general norm.
A final comment on the low score obtained in the Mc Clelland
study by the n affiliation of Venezuelans, with respect to the
multinational samples. It must be noted that if political speech
es are excluded, the score raises to .81 (30% higher) which does
not rank so low among the different countries analyzed. In later
chapters, the affiliation motive will be treated in more detail
using additional data from recent surveys.
C. HOFSTEDE'S WORK.
Additional data on the Venezuelan idiosyncracy can be colect
ed from a study published in 1980 by the Dutch psychologist Gert
Hofstede, in which results were shown from an extensive survey
on national cultures and shared values performed by the author
during a period of 6 years (13). In the survey, 116.000 question
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naires were collected from nationals of 40 different countries,
all of them working for a U.S. multinational with subsidiaries
in each country. Four dimensions were used to characterize the
different idiosyncracies, as follows: Power distance, uncertain
ly avoidance, individualism - collectivism,and masculinity. Each
of them is described below.
Power distance.
This factor indicates the extent to which a society accepts
the fact that power in institutions is distributed unequally,
being a measure of the gap in privileges, status, authority,
etc., that separates the power holder from the non-holder, or dif
ferent hierarchy levels.
Uncertainty avoidance.
Uncertainty avoidance represents a measure of the extent
to which a society dislikes uncertain and ambiguous situations
and tries to avoid these situations by providing greater career
stability, protection to the citizens and intolerance to deviant
ideas and behaviors.
Individualism-Collectivism.
Individualism implies a loosely knit social framework in
which people are supposed to take care of themselves and of their
inmediate families only, while collectivism is characterized by
a tight social framework in which people distinguish between in-
groups and out-groups. In the better case, people expect their
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in-group to look after them, and in exchange for that they feel
they owe absolute loyalty to it.
Masculinity.
This factor relates to the extent to which the dominant
values in society are "masculine" (assertive, money-driven, lack
of care for others) or "femenine" (sensitivity, care for others,
etc.).
The results of Hofstede's work were quantified by using a
statistical index that indicated the relative strength of each
of the four dimensions for every country where questionnaires
were administered. "Cultural maps of the world" were shown,
where specific dimensions were plotted against each other and
countries grouped in clusters that indicated their similarity
in terms of the two parameters included on each graph. Of spe-
cial interest for the present work is the similar values shared
by the Latin American countries included in the sample (Argenti
na, Brasil, Colombia, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela) in terms of
all four dimensions, which clearly speaks about the cultural
consequences of having a common history and a similar environ-
ment.
Without analyzing Hofstede's results under strict, academic
criteria (that was accomplished by L. Goodstein and J. Hunt in
1981 and, in my opinion, satisfactorily answered by Hofstede)
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(14) (15) (16), one finds a strong intuitive correlation between
the dimensions' indexes and the personal perception one has of
the world and its inhabitants. Hofstede's data bank is quite
valuable, and opens limitless research possibilities in the
field of national cultures. Combining the four dimensions with
detailed multinational studies of historic evolution, government
systems, economic development and the like would surely bring
light into issues that are currently explained by abstract num-
bers and short-term analyses. Things like underdevelopment,
dictatorships, technological failures and so on probably have a
strong component that cannot be found without taken into consi-
deration the specific culture of each nation.
Cl. VENEZUELA IN HOFSTEDE'S DIMENSIONS.
Hofstede's study provides a good starting point to ex-
pand the description of our identity undertaken in previous chap
ters. Table NV.2 shows the scores obtained by Venezuelans in the
different dimensions (17).
Intuitively, the position of Venezuela brings quite a
few deviations from what was expected. Hopefuly, they can be
explained by suggesting a more subtle distinction between the
different dimensions and trying to refine the definitions.
The first surprise comes from the third highest score
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TABLE IV.2.
1) Power Distance.
Range of Index: 11-94
Lowest Score: Austria (11)
Highest Score: Philippines (94)
Venezuela's Score: 81 (3rd. highest)
2) Uncertainty Avoidance.
Range of Index: 8-112
Lowest Score: Singapore (8)
Highest Score: Greece (112)
Venezuela's Score: 76 (14th highest)
3) Individualism.
Range of Index:
Lowest Score:
Highest Score:
12-91
Venezuela (12)
U.S.A. (91)
4) Masculinity.
Range of Index: 5-95
Lowest Score: Sweden (5)
Highest Score: Japan (95)
Venezuela's Score: 73 (3rd. highest),
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in power distance, right behind the Philippines and Mexico.
Any close observer of the Venezuelan environment will soon con-
clude that equalitarianism is intrinsic in our people. Accord-
ing to Escovar Salom, "Venezuela has had the privilege, among
the Latin American countries, to be one of the most open, making
it necessary to distinguish it from other countries in the sub-
continent, where stratification and social structures have been
more permanent. Venezuela is, by far, a country of intense
social circulation, where neither birth nor any other circum-
stance are obstacles against social promotion". (18). Be it a
consequence of the Federation war in the 1860s or of the non-
existence of a native civilization with castes such as the
Aztecs or the Incas, previous to the Spanish conquest, the fact
is that social mobility is apparent in Venezuela. Presidents,
political leaders, industrialists, government officials, high
executives and other prominent positions are not reserved for
a particular sector of the society (as it happens in other Latin
American countries). Many of our Presidents, for example, have
come from very humble origins, Even though there is a small
economic aristocracy, related to traditional families, that
exercises considerable power and owns a good amount of enter-
prises and financial institutions, high economic or political
positions can be achieved regardless of social origin.
However, there are two sides to the dimension of power
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distance, as it applies to Venezuela. In spite of social mobili
ty and the absence of a formally stratified society, there must
be certain absolutist tendency in our people that compels power
holders to exercise authority strongly and delegate as little
power as possible. A living example of this situation is the
large number of attributions that are concentrated in the Pres-
ident of the Republic, and the centralist character of the gov-
ernment. Our history, at the same time, shows numerous instances
in which Venezuela was ruled by all-mighty dictators who exercis
ed absolute authority over the entire country. The phenomenon
of caudillismo, previously mentioned, is another indication of
large power distance; in fact, the identification of authority
with people and not with institutions or positions increases the
perception of power. There is a sharp difference between the
preferred "he/she is where he/she is because he/she is powerful"
and "he/she has become powerful because he/she is in this or
that position". When positions are personalized, with the kind
of unique personalization that we see in Venezuela, power seems
to have a permanent character.
A third ingredient must be considered when discussing
power distance. Venezuelans, for the most part, feel no mystic
respect for authority, of the kind that can be observed in other
parts of the world. Due to our equalitarian character, we con-
sider no one within the country superior enough to deserve
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special treatment or deference from our part. While we believe
in caudillos, we do not see caudillos as distant monarchs coming
from the Olympus but as familiar figures that look more like an
authoritarian father. How can such a relationship produce an
environment where large power distance is the norm? I think
that leaders exercise power in spite of the people; in other
words, Venezuelans do not pay respect when looking up, but they
request obedience when looking down. An ambiguous situation,
indeed. How can Venezuelans be much higher in power distance
that, say, Germany, a country where a single leader dominated
the whole country for more than a decade in the most absolute
way? In Germany, the leader finds a population that is "docile"
and implicity follow him in a fluid way. In Venezuela, by con-
trast, the leaders have to concentrate power and show the people
that they can be feared, if necessary, before they get any res-
ponse. The concentration of power, then, is the only way by
which authority can be exercized (with considerable friction,
however) due to the lack of collective direction. At the same
time that the concentration of power is perceived by the people
as a large distance when looking up to the leaders, the need for
power showed by motivational studies imply that Venezuelans like
positions of high authority and, in consequence, tend to look
down on their subordinates to increase their relative height.
The second dimension studied by Hofstede, uncertainty
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avoidance, shows a score for Venezuela which places it in the
14th position among the 40 countries where the questionnaire
was administered. I think that this circumstance matches quite
well with what has been said previously about our national cul-
ture; our need for protection, the extent to which criticism and
dissention are not well received (although widely permitted, in
theory), our strong involvement with the family, etc., point in
the direction of high urcertainty avoidance. Radical changes
are unwelcomed by Venezuelans, unless stronger forces (such as
the emergence of a new, charismatic leader) get in the way. This
is probably a partial explanation for the failure of the politi
cal parties from the left in achieving a greater share of the
votes during the election. Even though rationally convinced
that the two major parties have left the country worse off when
they have excercized power, the voter, subconciously, is afraid
of the change that may come if he chooses a new alternative and
goes for the options that he has already experienced. This is
also related to power distance, since no one wants to be identi
fied with a group that does not have a real option in the elec-
tions; in other words, people want to go along with the winners,
since they feel that by doing so they obtain a little share of
the power.
With respect to rules and regulations, we prefer to be
inmersed in a regulated environment where everything is clearly
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defined, including duties, attributions and responsibilities. We
do not like the uncertainty of informal organizations, where
hierarchies are vague and rules are not specific. However, our
ambiguous culture encourages us, on the basis of our individua-
lism and respect for the self, to quite often break the rules
that form the protective structure under which we feel so comfort
able. Regulations are used to create psychological protection,
not to be implemented.
Finally, the "do not rock the boat" attitude of our
governments also reflects the need for protection (both of the
one who protects and the ones who are protected) and, in turn,
the high uncertainty avoidance.
The dimension of individualism does also bring a sur-
prise, originating another ambigous situation. It is true that
Venezuelans share a high need of affiliation (discussed previous
ly under personal relationships, family, friendship and leader-
ship), but to classify the country as highly collectivist simply
does not fit with the observed behavior of my compatriots. In
fact, we are reluctant to follow rules, do not like regulations
and hate to be told what to do, either by our group or by the
authorities. This pattern of behavior can be clearly identified
in the streets, public beaches, stadiums and other public places,
the constant being that the most basic rules are simply not
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followed by the majority, unless they are very strongly enforced.
Hofstede's definition of collectivism, however, tends
to focus more on the affective side of groups than on the organiz
ed conduct of society, and perhaps that is the reason why Vene-
zuela scored so high. More analysis is needed to separte need
affiliation from collective conciousness if a clearer picture is
to be obtained. In any case, the individualism of Venezuelans
is not characterized by the absolute prominence of the I over
the we, since it was mentioned before how we value friendship
and family and how we demand the right to get into the inner self
of those whom we consider to belong to our group. Our individua
lism is represented by the desire to do things the way we feel
like, interpret the rules to our convenience and have the liber-
ty to behave accordingly. In other words, the rules that we
follow strictly are affective and emotional; we are absolutely
faithful to the "laws of the heart". The other rules, those that
are imposed by society to achieve collective order and social
organization, are abstract codes that satisfy our risk aversion,
but do not belong to our culture. A good contrasting position can
be established by discussing individualism in the United States,
the country that achieved the highest score in that dimension.
As it is expected in a modern society from a western industrial-
ized country, U.S. citizens pay very high attention to the rules,
and their collective behavior is organized and implicitly
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controlled by both the structure (rules) and society itself (the
people). On the other hand, their individualism is quite ap-
parent when it comes to personal relationships, where the degree
of emotional involvement is small and the distance between one's
self and other people's is large. While in Venezuela people are
expected to penetrate rather quickly the inner self of others,
in the U.S. such attempt would be seen as improper behavior, at
least until a long, stable relationship is achieved.
The last dimension of Hofstede's survey, masculinity,
shows Venezuela scoring quite high among the countries that
participated in the sample. Again, I feel that there are two
sides to this parameter.
According to Hofstede's definition, masculinty express
es values such as assertiveness, not caring for others, drive
for achievement, etc. It was showed before how low the need
for achievement was in Venezuelans in two different studies; at
the same time, the above discussion about individuality and
need affiliation and the comparison with the United States sug-
gested that we are more "feeling" (feminine) than rationally-
driven (masculine), while North Americans seem to be the other
way around.
What is apparent here is another ambiguity. The high
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score in masculinity detected nothing but Venezuela's machismo
(separation among sexes, manliness, etc.); it failed in obtain-
ing information about our low n achievement, our sensitivity and
our high degree of emotional involvement when dealing with other
people. In spite of their much more pragmatic approach to per-
sonal interactions and their high n achievement, North Americans
score significantly less than Venezuelans in masculinity (62 vs.
73), a fact that can only be explained by the inability of the
questionnaires to capture certain subtleties that cannot be ask
ed in the same way (ever if the native language is used) from
one country to another.
In summary, I think that Hofstede's study is an excel-
lent starting point to try to refine the 4 dimensions by which
the national cultures were established. In the particular case
of Venezuela, I would propose to use the following option:
DIMENSION: SUB-DIMENSION:
Power distance Authoritarianism
Equalitarianism
Risk avoidance
Individualism Need affiliation
Collective conciousness
Masculinity Machismo
Emotionality/caring.
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D. THE VENEZUELAN CULTURE. AVOIDING VALUE JUDGEMENTS.
So far, I hope to have described the main aspects of the
Venezuelan culture in a way that allows the non-native reader
to have a general idea of how we are and why. For the Venezue-
lan reader, such as myself, the previous chapters probably show
ed a great deal of familiar traits and behaviors, many of them
so imbedded in the inner self that are not easily recognized
without some effort and introspection.
In general terms, many aspects of our conduct could be
perceived as basically "bad"; that is, they do not fit with the
standards encouraged by western industrial civilization and as
such should be criticized and, if possible, prevented (or pu-
nished). However, I do not intend to make judgements of value,
and I hope that no one does so; our culture is not better or
worse, is simply different from what is the norm in the most
advanced societies of the planet. U.S. values are probably bet
ter suited for industrial development than Venezuela's, but they
are probably less adecquate for the development of a deeper,
less alienated, human being. In other words, no culture can be
thought of as better than another, and no universal principles
should be established. We as Venezuelans probably enjoy our
lack of discipline and consider funny and mechanic the obsessive
hard-work culture of North Americans. What I have tried to
describe are facts, and whoever finds a derogatory message in
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those facts is taking a biased view of the world. In cultural
terms, the distance between, say, the U.S. and Venezuela should
not be measured by dimensions that imply any superiority from
either part.
Besides avoiding value judgements, the difference between
our culture and the behavioral patterns of the industrialized
world must be kept apart from the anecdotic, superficial distan
ce that is perceived by casual observers, and that seems to be
what most people actually recognize. The cultural analysis
presented previously shows that the separation is at least wide
enough to discourage the transplant of leadership and organiza-
tional models from the North. Even though we in Venezuela are
not people from another galaxy, managing an enterprise, a cor-
poration or a country is so related with the inner characteris-
tics of individuals that it is rather endemic. Management theo-
ries and business practices are full of references to motivation,
people involvement, corporate culture, shared values, and re-
ward systems, all of which are based on the people's response
to specific stimuli. Both responses and stimuli are defined by
the intrinsic psychology of the communities where they are ap-
plied.
The influence of cultural differences must not be limited
to practical rules in the workplace. The whole concept of
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economic development (how, when, where, in which direction) has
to be revised, both for the short and the long run. Unless we
have a farsighted strategy that takes into account our particu-
lar needs and capabilities, we will be condemned to a never-
ending mediocrity. The anecdotical differences in lifestyle,
food, character and the like between Latin America and our North
ern neighbors are merely the tip of the iceberg; any serious
analysis has to reach far beyond what is apparent to the casual
tourist.
The very rationality of the Latin American world can be
questioned at any time, when measured by Anglo-Saxon standards.
Business an political strategies assume that organizations and
countries behave to certain degree as rational actors.(19).
There is one set of goals, and action is decided as a rational
choice based on goals/objectives and alternatives/options in a
continuous search for value maximization.
Without even considering less rational models for decision
making (organizational or bureaucratic), the question that comes
to mind is, whose rationality will be applied? What values are
to be maximized? What are rational goals? Even though we in
Venezuela might have appeared as quite irrational during the
past years, the problem might be in the selection of goals to
be achieved and values to be maximized. If both goals and values
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are not chosen in accordance to what the people really want, the
rational process will be almost impossible to achieve, since the
main motivating forces (the right goals, the right values) will
be absent. Bureaucratic processes, as defined by Allison (20),
will start to occur, fueled by the increasing friction between
the real needs and motives of the people and those imposed by
the leadership when trying to copy foreign experiences. We have
to find the rewards that make us behave rationally, and the
processes through which we can achieve those rewards.
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V. CULTURE CONSEQUENCES; EXAMPLES FROM VENEZUELAN INSTITUTIONS.
To have a better understanding of the Venezuelan culture,
a few practical implications should be discussed, since the real
consequences of our behavioral patterns can only be perceived
when observed in real action. The examples that follow do not
pretend to be an exhaustive list of the institutions and organi
zations that exist in the country, but just a small selection
for which information was available at this time, and that are
considered particularly conspicuous.
A. THE POLITICAL PARTIES.
Throughout the present analysis, several references have
been made to the political parties that currently exist in Vene
zuela. In my opinion, they probably represent a clear example
of what our collective culture is about when put to work toward
a clear goal.
In a recent interview, published in one major Venezuelan
newspaper, a political leader, now retired from active party
membership due to what he calls "a total disenchantment with the
Venezuelan political system", offered a dramatic insight which
revealed many important characteristics of the local political
culture. Among other things, the following statements are
important: "Venezuela is a country that has been invaded by
the political parties. They operate as a force of occupation...
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They pervade everything, and prevent the average citizen from
self-expression and self-realization". In another part of the
interview, he mentioned that "while investment in R&D is ex-
ceptionally low in Venezuela, the cost of our political infra-
structure is probably the highest (in per capita terms) of the
whole planet.... The biggest employer in the country is not the
oil industry nor the steel mills, but AD, the ruling party" (1).
The influence of politics can be felt all across the coun-
try; every institution or group that designates its authorities
by some form of voting mechanism will feel the presence of Vene
zuelan politics. Every time unions elect their leaders, schools
their student representatives, Universities their authorities,
professional associations their boards of directors, elections
are not based on the relative merits of the candidates but on
the political groups they represent. The major parties in Vene-
zuela, AD and COPEI, plus a third, smaller force that represents
the left (formed by several minior organizations whose orienta-
tion goes from radicalism to socialist reformism), have an abso
lute monopoly of almost all elections at the local, regional and
national levels. In Venezuela, every group which uses an elec-
tion-based process to designate its officials, where every mem-
ber has the right to vote periodically for the candidate he or
she prefers, will eventually be divided into AD, COPEI and the
left. It is astonishing to watch organizations drift toward po
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litical involvement over time, even in the least ideological
environments (associations of college graduates, clubs, etc.).
Voters elect whole groups, or clans, identified of course,
with one of the political currents. "Individual" elections,
where people from different parties can be selected and voted for
are unusual.
In view of our history, I am tempted to contend that polit
ical parties are a natural institution in Venezuela; perhaps the
most authentically native.
In other words, if the national culture is left alone and
allowed to function freely, the way people will organize will be
very similar to the actual structure of the political parties.
Within the parties, people have cohesive forces that are repre-
sented by a common ideology and, most important, by party leaders
or caudillos; at the same time, they have a common goal which is
very important for Venezuelans: The attainment of power. Between
the cohesive forces and the goals, structures, planning and control
mechanisms, decision making procedures, etc., are shaped by a
style that presents the least friction to the national culture,
that which is most "natural" to the people.
The political parties that exist today in Venezuela are
relatively new; the oldest organization was founded 45 years ago.
-105-
Before that, and since the beginning of the 20th century, the
country was ruled by a single man, G6mez, the last of the true
caudillos. During the 19th century, the country was divided into
conservatives and liberals, each one with its own local, regional
and national leaders. Even though these leaders actually belong
ed to the parties, they did not achieve power through an ideol-
ogical message, but rather due to personal attributes and charis
ma that made them attractive to their followers. When they felt
that their personal kingdoms were big enough to exercise influ-
ence, they would play a convenience game where they would choose
the ideology that best guaranteed access to official power and,
either through negotiation or violence, they would try to get a
share of the government.
Originally, AD and COPEI showed a wide ideological distance
from one another, partially correlated with the traditional
liberal/conservative dichotomy. COPEI was the Christian Democ-
racy, conservative and clearly tilted to the right. AD, in turn,
was the Social Democracy, a moderate socialist party. Today,
both organizations have closed the gap considerably and they
seem to gravitate around the center with few practical differences.
In fact, ideology has been reduced to an ornament that has much
of a symbolic meaning; the policies followed by both parties,
when they have been in government, have not had a clear orienta-
tion in the form of a vision or a major strategy shaped by an
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ideological view of the world. The doctrines of AD and COPEI
have been gradually replaced by personal relationships and cau-
dillismo as the main cohesive forces.
Escovar Salom mentions that "Among Venezuelans, political
cohesiveness is achieved more easily by personal solidarity and
loyalty than by the abstract adhesion to a political ideology"
(2). It is, again, an example of the societal norms smoothing
the institutions until the structure and functioning of the lat
ter is again adapted to the societal norms (3). Even though
conceived originally as institutional organizations, guided by
a philosophical vision of the world, whose main goal was to
achieve what was best for the country within a climate character
ized by internal democracy and a strong sense of integrity,
honesty and service, the dominant political organizations in Ve
nezuela have become tightly-controlled clans, plagued by corrup
tion and selfishness, where the main goal is to obtain power for
the power itself and where the dominant forces are not ideology
nor democracy, but personalities, alliances based on interest
and interpersonal relationships and nexes.
It would be naive to think that organizations founded right
after the end of the last caudillo, with an inheritance of
centuries of personal, absolutist power, were going to behave as
democratic institutions simple because their doctrine said so.
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Furthermore, their ideologies and original structure were copied
from imported models from the North (the U.S. and Europe), where
totally different cultures existed by the time.
AD, COPEI and the small leftist parties, then, represent a
good example of the kind of organization the Venezuelan idiosyn-
cracy intrinsically favors. "Every political party, even the
most caudillistas, proclaim the principles of internal democra-
cy; however, the usual trend is toward a strong centralization
of the decisions" (4). Even though national conventions are held
periodically by every party (the equivalent of stockholders me-
etings), they only ratify what has been decided in advance by
the minuscule group that forms the National Directive Committee
(CDN). During the period between one convention and the next,
different currents within the parties play a power game to
determine which one will dominate next time. These currents, of
course, are not guided by different ideological views within the
organization but by factions that gravitate around one or several
of the members of the CDN. As it was mentioned before, the cur-
rents are named after the particular CDN official who is trying
to get an additional quota of power (the ones that follow Pedro,
those that are with Jos6, and so on).
In summary, political parties are one of the real sources
of power in Venezuela; they act as middlemen between the average
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citizen and the state. They are perceived by the masses as means
of achieving superior status and economic progress and not as
institutions through which they can organize their desire to
serve the community.
Under the circumstances that have been mentioned, it is no
surprise that the political debate in Venezuela looks absurd.
With no ideology, no real service orientation from the members
and a strong desire for power, AD, COPEI and the left oppose one
another for the heck of it, just to show the country that they
disagree. In the end, they come to criticize themselves, since
they act quite alike when the government falls in their hands.
Venezuelan political parties are not restricted to a specific
sector of the population; their constitutuencies pervade the
whole social spectrum, from the local "aristocracy" to the pro-
letariate. While the proletariate looks upon the parties as an
instrument to climb the social ladder, the oligarchy plays a
convenience game, giving contributions and support to the group
that most likely will win the ellections (or to both groups, if
the race is tight) in exchange for favors and preferential treat
ment. Since the government is so influential in the national
economy (it controls 45% of the GNP), to be close to the party
in power is a critical competitive advantage.
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B. THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM. THE UNIVERSITIES.
The Central University of Venezuela, founded in 1721 by the
Spanish authorities, represents a microcosm of what the country
is like. Venezuelans place in high esteem those who hold college
degrees; in the absence of nobility titles, which had such a
high demand during the years of the colony, being an engineer or
a lawyer is quickly incorporated to the total person. Following
our perception of individuals as unique entities, the degreesare
internalized into the person itself and confere him or her supe-
rior status. After graduating, the word "doctor" (instead of a
simple "senor", or mister) is commonly used before the family
name. Being a doctor is so appreciated that massive numbers of
high school graduates apply every year for college education.
Besides the strong desire of Venezuelans to achieve superior
status by the nobile title of doctor, another reason for the over
population of our institutes of superior education rests probably
on the large share of the national budget that the government
invests in the school system. Education is free, except for a
few private institutions that receive less than 10% of the college
students. Free education and a theoretical possibility of access
to college regardless of social origin speaks clearly about our
intrinsic democratic character.
The total picture, however, is far from rosy: Only 7% of
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the students finish their careers. The public universities are
overpopulated and in deep financial crisis, in spite of billion
aire budgets. Politics and demagogy pervade the whole institu-
tion, from the election of the high authorities to the designa-
tion of small department's heads. The processes by which the
incoming students are slected has frequently been denounced as
biased and influenced by personal relationships, godfathers and
the like.
The teaching methods themselves are based on an obsolete
French-Napoleonic method, according to which "rigid course
schedules did not allow students to pursue their individual
aspirations, since different careers had no possibility of cross
communication" (5).
In 1918, under the principles of the Cordoba reformation,
the whole conception of the University was changed in Latin Ame
rica. For Venezuela, it meant that our superior schools would
have the right to choose their own authorities, designate their
professors, administer their budgets (supplied by the State) and
enjoy territorial autonomy. In other words, they became a state
within the State. 70 years later, the Napoleonic methods is
still used; an authoritarian style that blocks the participation
of the students in class discussions (even though the students
are an important part of the internal government), discourages
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rationalism and creativity while fostering memory and conformism,
and places the professors on a kind of Olympus where students
are not supposed to reach, much less criticize.
Competition among students does not exist (grades are abso-
lute), a fact that combined with the large distance and impersonal
relationship that characterize student-professor interactions,
encourages a system where the students act as a fraternity that
distrusts the institution and will act against it whenever neces
sary.
Due to their high visibility and relative autonomy, the
political parties have invaded the universities (the invasion
has come from within, not from without, since parties are "natu-
ral" in Venezuela). The result, according to Mayz, "is a bizarre
'partidocracia' (government of the political parties) .... where
electoral fanatism has resulted in a game of selfish interests,
professoral demogogy and student laissez-faire" (6).
As is typical in Venezuela, there are no universities spe-
cifically designed for the country. The usual pattern, as in
the political parties, is an imposed foreign design that is gra-
dually modified by the local culture until a hybrid entity, with
its structure pointing to the north and reality to the south,
is achieved. As illustrations, there are "colegios universita-
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rios" based on the North American Junior Colleges; technological
institutes that follow a new French model; an open university
copied from a British scheme, and so on. Many of the critical
issues in these new institutions, however diverse their struc-
tures may be, correlate perfectly with those suffered by the
older universities: Budget deficiences (due to wrong administra
tion practices and implementation), overpopulation, inadequacy
of the selection process (both for students and professors),
growing influence of politics, old-fashioned educational systems,
little emphasis on research, and distrust of the institution by
the students. Other common problems are related to the lack of
coherence between the needs of the country and the basic design
of our educational system. Again, people are reluctant to addapt
effectively or invent original solutions, where it is much
easier to copy foreign experiences.
In summary, our university students, besides their curricula,
will learn about (and most probably assimilate) a culture where:
a) Institutions are not to be trusted; they have to be counter-
balanced by a strong solidarity among peers. b) The way to
achieve power is through politics (from the president of the
University to the Department head, all academic supervisory posi
tions are either elected through or influenced by the political
parties). c) The student leaders (delegates to student councils,
board members of the student federation, representatives to the
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university boards and other ruling bodies where academic author
ithies and students form a joint government) are not those who
work harder or show the best academic records, but those who
have the best political abilities (usually mediocre students,
profesional politicians). d) Professors are distant and detach
ed, their opinions are not to be critized, at least face-to-face
(in class). Criticism and dissension in-class are not welcome.
e) Discipline and sustained effort are not critical. The
education system does not require the students to keep a continu
ous track of what is being covered in the courses; if they can
succeed in taking three tests per semester on each course (point
sampling), they will get through. f) Being the university a
separate entity from the rest of the country, with territorial
autonomy, self-government and independent budget, the perception
of the real world is distorted; the rest of the country is perceiv
ed unrealistically (threatening, materialistic, even unimportant)
from within this self-contained society. Formal contacts of the
universities with other institutions (private sector, industry,
other government agencies, etc.) in the form of joint projects,
cooperation, etc., is almost inexistent. g) The strong dicotomy
students/institution fosters cooperation among peers, which many
times results in violation of the rules (cheating, revolts, etc.).
h) Failure is not punished; it does not matter how many times a
student fails in getting through his/her curriculum or how badly
he/she performs or how many courses he/she flunks. There is not
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an efficient mechanism that allows the university to get rid of
the worst performers. Regulations that tried to accomplish this
were left without effect by the political parties and alliances.
i) Narrow focus, centered around one's discipline (i.e. engine-
ering, physics, etc.) is the right way to academic excellence;
cross-disciplinary training is not appreciated.
In the first chapters, it was mentioned that there was a
strong friction between the culture that was learned in the home,
the streets or school and the behavioral pattern that was needed
to achieve economic progress if Western models were to be fol-
lowed. In terms of school culture (at least in college educa-
tion), I hope that the point is clearer now.
C. THE LEGAL SYSTEM.
A few inserts from Venezuelan newspapers will help in under
standing where one of the key issues of our legal system, close-
ly related to our collective culture, lies: "We have a Constitu
tion whose main principles are not honored". "The three powers
(executive, the parliament and the courts) are exercized accord
ing to the dictates and suggestions of the political leaders".
"The judicial system lacks both the independence and hierarchy
needed to sustain a true democracy". "The members of the supre
me court have always showed a strong political bias during the
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last 27 years" (7). "There are many defficiences in the laws
that regulate urban developments in our country, but the main
problem rests in the reluctance of authorities to apply them"
(8). "Our prisons are conceived as the madhouse for the
marginal criminals, the destiny of the miserable robber; misera
ble not because of ethical considerations but by the fact that
he does not have a lot of digits in his bank account" (9).
During the colony, the laws and regulations that were con-
tinuously coming from Spain caused strong resentment among the
local criollos (descendants of the Spaniards who had been born
in Venezuela); official positions were, by law, reserved for
appointees from Spain. In consequence, even the churchmen and
bureaucrats in the colonies, who wanted to run things their way,
devised a great deal of methods to bypass the written word.
"Evasion and foot-dragging became a major political strategy,
expressed in such formulae as se acata, pero no se cumple (ins-
tructions acknowledged, but not carried out)" (10).
The intrinsic resistance that Venezuelans present to fol-
lowing regulations and rules, the fact that courts and judges
are designated by the political parties in power, our ability
to find convincing excuses that justify almost any kind of indi
vidual failure, our lack of pragmatism and sense of reality
(which make us believe that the law is magic and will provide
-116-
the solution by itself) and our tendency to establish clans and
roscas, have resulted in a state of affairs where justice is
administered very ineffectively. The end result is a highly
regulated environment where, in contrast, rules are violated
continously. Since the judicial authorities respond to political
interests and alliances, the interpretation of the law is strong
ly biased by who's in power. On the other hand, maffias that
operate around the courts provide expensive releases for pris-
oners by paying off gross amounts to corrupt officials. Follow-
ing a common practice used in many other areas, laws are import
ed from overseas and tried to implement with little or no adapta
tion to the local situation: "The Venezuelan constitution is
an artificial cap placed on top of a contradicting national envi
ronment that rejects it", said Laureano Vallenilla and Pedro M.
Arcaya, two pessimistic interpreters of the Venezuelan history
(11).
The situation, again, sounds familiar. Implicit norms (The
collective culture) smoothing out explicit structures and regu-
lations. An idealistic set of formal practices designed by
people who believe, or wishful-think, that our society can be
managed by decrees, or that strategy follows structure.
In the same way that Venezuelans underestimate. the tasks
and overestimate their abilities, we think that written words
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are more powerful than idiosyncracy. Our large uncertainty
avoidance makes us feel better when surrounded by rules and
regulations, while our Spanish individualism prevents us from
following them.
-118-
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VI. SUCCESSFUL INSTITUTIONS IN VENEZUELA.
Given the below-average record of most of the country's
organizations, be they government corporations, public agencies,
private enterprises or the central administration, it is not
surprising that many people look for oversear models in the
hope that, by copying them, productivity, efficiency, and ef-
fectiveness will improve. The imitation syndrome pervades the
whole society, and cultural differences are very seldom taken
into account.
There are a few examples, however, of local organizations
with a record of successful performances. The Instituto Nacio-
nal de Hip6dromos (INH), the National Agency that manages the
horse-race tracks) impresses everyone for its efficiency in
organizing the heavy calendar of horse races that are run every
week in 5 different tracks across the country. Races are run
two or three times a week (an average of 14 races per meeting)
on such a strict schedule that the official announcers express
their concern when delays of one of two minutes occur. The bet
ting system works with a minimum of problems, the tracks are
well maintained, the installations look clean and modern; every
thing seems to be under control. Even more impressive is the
national betting game, the 5&6, in which people from all over
the country bet on the last 6 Sunday races of the Caracas track
for a prize that divides the betting pool among those who pick-
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ed 5 or 6 winners. In spite of the fact that the collection of
bets has to include even the most remote towns, and that 1 mil-
lion tickets are submitted every Sunday, a combination of sophis
ticated technology and very efficient distribution systems allows
the INH to announce the official results (number of winning
tickets, size of the pool, money earned by each winner, etc) by
late Sunday evening. The differences between the administration
of the horse-races and other government agencies, are quite
evident. The desire for quick money and the seriousness with
which the people take their gambling give rise to public pressure
and anxiety to know the winners, thereby producing an unusual
drive for efficiency. Even though the INH has been involved
several times in corruption scandals, this has not affected its
operational performance; the races must go on.
A second example of an above-average performer is found in
the government's agency that manages the Caracas subway. Through
out its short life (it was inaugurated in 19814, the Subway has
been the showcase of the government and, by extension, of all
Venezuelans. Entering the subway's stations is like being intro
duced to a world of fiction where rules are strictly enforced
(and followed by the people), maintenance is of exceptional
quality, and schedules are strict-in summary, where everything
works. It is like being in a cathedral; even the behavior of
the people is different from that observed once on the surface.
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The reasons for the subway's exceptional function. are not
very well understood, but all Venezuelans are proud of it. It
probably has to do with a gigantic public campaign that started
long before its official inauguration. In messages aired
through radio and TV, or published in newspapers and magazines,
the citizens were told endlessly that the subway should not be
(and was not to be) another white elephant. "The subway", one
of the ads said, "is yours; do not let it deteriorate. Help
us in make it work". Even though similar campaigns have been
carried out in the past for different purposes, the results were
never that good. On the other hand, the Compania Metro de Cara
cas (CMC, the organization responsible for the operation of the
subway) has been provided, apparently, with wide autonomy and
the best management team that was available. Politics has not
been a major issue within the organization, and the whole project
was perceived, both by CMC itself and by the average citizen, as
a crusade against the general notion that things do not work ef-
ficiently in Venezuela, especially if they are handled by the
Government.
However, the subway is still a young project. No one knows
whether the current situation will be maintained in the future.
Society is a strong smoother, and anomalies do not last for long.
Besides the INH and the subway, other instances can probab
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ly be found, both in the private and public sectors, where things
work well. Two institutions come to mind, in spite of basic dif
ferences between the two in terms of goals, management systems
and use of resources: The oil industry and the electoral cam-
paigns. The former operates within a corporate culture inherit
ed from the multinationals that operated in Venezuela between
1910 and 1976 (the year of nationalization). The electoral cam-
paigns constitute the most important project that every political
party executes every 5 years, and whose reward is probably one
of the most motivating in the country: Power.
A. THE VENEZUELAN OIL INDUSTRY.
In Venezuela, there is little doubt about the success of
the local oil industry. Even when compared with the multina-
tional majors, Petr61leos de Venezuela (PDVSA) sticks out as one
of the most profitable. In 1982, for example, PDVSA was No. 16
in sales among the oil corporations of the whole world. While
reporting sales of 16.5 billion U.S.$ (Exxon, No. 1, sold 97.2
billion), it ranked No. 8 in assets (22.8 billion), No. 3 in
profits (2.5 billion) and No. 1 in earnings as a percentage of
sales (15.4%). Another measure of profitability was given by
the fact that, although No. 17 among the oil corporations in
number of employees (44.414, 1982 figures), it ranked 12th in
sales per employee and No. 1 in earnings/employee.
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Undoubtedly, PDVSA's performance is unusual. In a country
where public corporations show a never-ending list of failures,
poor results, inefficiency and corruption, the national oil in-
dustry not only maintains but improves the profitability of its
pre-nationalization predecessors. Today, 10 years after the
change of owners, PDVSA is keeping up with the depressed oil mar
ket by applying a rational strategy that should help her through
the current bad times.
Al. THE OIL BUSINESS IN VENEZUELA. 1900/1975.
In order to provide a better understanding of the con-
trast between the country and its oil industry, a brief history
of the latter will be useful. The comparison between the oil
corporations and the rest of the Venezuelan economy will be plac
ed in a better perspective.
First oil was discovered in Venezuela in 1900, when a
group of explorers found what they called "an asphalt lake" in
Guanoco, in the Northeast part of the country. Later, during
the 1910s, several major reservoirs were drilled in the Maracai
bo basin, attracting the attention of the major coporations that
dominated the world oil scene at that time.
In 1922, a well called "Barrosos No.2", located in the
area of Mene Grande (a few kilometers from the Maracaibo Lake,
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about 1000 kilometers west of Caracas) went out of control and
oil flowed at a rate of 100.000 barrels per day during 10 days,
until the blowout could be stopped. Pictures of 100 meter -high
oil columr> were shown all over the world, and Venezuela entered
a new era.
After the Barrosos discovery, every oil company wanted
to have a piece of the treasure, a situation that ended up with
the granting of acreage to 14 different corporations from the
U.S., England and Holland. These companies signed agreements
with the local government under which the former bought rights
to explore, produce, refine and sell crude oil, natural gas and
products during periods that varied from 50 to 100 years. Dur-
ing the 1920s, most of the major oilfields in the eastern shore
of Lake Maracaibo were discovered. After several years of un-
successful exploration, several giant fields were found in the
eastern basin. New discoveries happened in Lake Maracaibo dur-
ing the 40s and 50s, and a 500 million barrel oilfield was dril-
led in the 50s in the Barinas basin, 1000 kilometers southwest
of Caracas.
Intense activity characterized the oil industry in Vene
zuela until the late fifties. By 1959, the country's production
was 2,8 million barrels per day (93% of which was exported), prov
en reserves were near 17 billion and more oil was being discover
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ed on the western shores of Lake Maracaibo. The oil companies
employed more than 40.000 people, Three major refineries had
been built with a total processing capacity of 1.5 million bar-
rels per day. A network of oil and gas pipelines covered the
northern half of the country. Venezuela was totally dependent
on oil as its main source of income: 95% of total exports, 45%
of GNP and 65% of the Government's revenues came from the oil
industry.
In 1959, after 10 years of military dictatorships, a
new government, elected through direct, democratic vote, was
installed in office. Moderately left-oriented, and heavily
nationalistic, the party in power rushed a new law through the
parliament prohibiting private oil companies to get additional
acreage for oil exploration and/or production under the conces-
sion regime that had been used in the past. Any new areas to
be developed in the future by private firms should be requested
to the government under a negotiation process that would be
directed to obtain the best possible conditions for the country.
According to government officials, it was felt that under the
concession agreements the advantages had been always on the side
of the multinationals.
The consequences of the 1959 law were quickly felt. Sens
ing the new line of thought that was going to prevail in Venezue
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la for the years to come, the oil companies started a slow proc
ess of divestiture that would allow them to keep producing at
the current rate with a minimum of investment. The first conces
sion contracts would expire in 1983, and that year was set as
the target for complet withdrawal, unless unexpected events
(government changes, reversal of the oil market, etc.) were to
happen.
In 1969, a "coup de grace" was given to the foreign oil
companies by a new law which stated that, after the concessions
expired, all assets belonging to the multinationals that remain-
ed in the country would be transferred to the government at no
cost. The new situation accelerated the process of disinvestment;
the companies were, more than ever, purely extractive.
Finally, the year of 1974 brought together several is-
sues that would created the critic mass for the nationalization
decision: The new government, recently elected, belonged to the
social democratic party that had always been in favor of a high
er degree of control of the oil business, and it enjoyed an ab-
solute majority in the parliament. The oil embargo had just
occurred, and oil prices were already at the level of U.S.$ 10/
barrel. The new government, headed by a charismatic (and popu
list) leader, was receiving an overwhelming degree of support
and enthusiasm from the population.
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The law that would regulate the nationalization process
by establishing the terms under which the oil industry would
operate in the future, was approved by the congress in August
1975. A date was set for the end of the concession system and
the transfer of assets, people and rights to the new owner: Jan
uary ist. 1976. Looking back, most observers consider that the
nationalization of the Venezuelan oil industry was characterized
by its moderation, good judgement and long-term vision. A good
deal of time was devoted to set a strategy that would allow a
healthy transition into the future, based on the current situa-
tion of the oil business, nation-and worldwide.
Several major issues were confronted by the Venezuelan
oil industry, right after its start as a national enterprise:
- Oil and gas reserves had been declining continuously since
1965; moderate increases were achieved in 1974 as a conse-
quence of the new economics of the oil business, not because
of new discoveries.
- The new corporation did not know how to sell in the inter-
national markets. International sales had been traditional
ly handled by the parent companies of the local subsidiaries.
- A good part of the supplies needed by the oil industry were
not available in the country, and Petr61leos de Venezuela did
not have the expertise nor the contacts to realize massive
buys in foreign markets.
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Oil technology (in exploration, production, refining, etc.)
was heavily dependent from abroad. The multinationals de-
veloped their technology outside of the country and handed
it to their subsidiaries only when needed.
At the end of 1975, there were 14 different oil companies
operating in Venezuela. Horizontal integration and re-
source sharing was a high priority.
With the withdrawal of the foreign companies, numerous key
managerial positions would have to be filled by local tal-
ent. Many of the would-be managers lacked the experience
and knowledge required, and had to be trained intensively.
The contraction period that started in 1959 caused the mul-
tinationals to reduce investment to a minimum;in consequen
ce, production facilities, refineries, pipeline systems,
the tanker fleet and other installations lacked adecquate
maintenance and updating. The modernization of the exist-
ing infrastructure was most urgent.
There were 15000 local employees in Petr6leos de Venezuela
(PDVSA) by January ist. 1976. This number was totally insuf
ficient for the level of activity that waited ahead. At
the same time, the organizational culture of the Corporation,
shaped by 17 years of disinvestment, was one of "cash-cow-
ing" the business.
The multinationals had always maintained themselves detach
ed from the country, Even though 95% of the employees, by
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the year of the nationalization, were Venezuelan, the for-
eign companies were perceived by the general public as extra
territorial. Their office buildings, both in the cities
and in the areas of operation, were surrounded by fences
and guarded by the local army. Inside the offices, the
environment bore little resemblance to the noisy streets
or the offices of the government; these people had devel-
oped a different culture. Whether they were North Americans,
Venezuelans, British or Dutch, they were identified with
the organizations they worked for. The rest of the country
seemed distant, and different.
For the foreign employees, the change in ownership
would mean only a transfer to another subsidiary, outside of Ve
nezuela, within the same corporation. For the Venezuelans, the
future was threatening; the new situation could jepardize their
stability, their salaries (very good for local standards) and
their protective environment. Being owned by the government was
not good news.
However, the cultural shock never occurred, and the
transition was surprisingly smooth. The people who would run
the corporation from 1976 on would be Venezuelan oilmen formed
mostly within the multinationals. Only general guidelines would
be provided by the government through the Ministery of Energy.
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Outsiders did not invade PDVSA; politics and politicians were
kept out.
A2. THE RESULTS.
Ten years after, the results speak for themselves. PDVSA
started a far-reaching expansion program that slowed down only
as a consequence of the current oil glut. The following are some
of the main goals achieved by the corporation since 1976:
- Oil reserves increased from 18.4 billion barrels in December
1975 to 28.0 in December 1985. Gas reserves also increased
(1.1 trillion cubic ft in 1975 to 1.6 trillion in 1985).
- To support the expansion strategy, the number of employees
tripled in 10 years, to 43.500 in 1985.
- Earnings in 1985 were 2.5 billion $, up 300% from 874 mil-
lion in 1976.
- Investment in new production facilities and updating of old
ones amounted to 1.5 billion $ in 1984, up from 203 million
$ in 1976. The potential of production was increased to
2.6 million barrels per day, up 9% from the 1976 figure.
- The market for Venezuelan oil has been widely diversified
during the last 10 years. The number of regular buyers
was increased, from 53 in 1976, to 107 in 1985. Only 29%
of international sales were made to "traditional" customers
in 1985 (down from 81% in 1976).
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Overseas purchases are handled by a subsidiary created for
that purpose, with several offices abroad.
An R&D subsidiary exists today, employing 1000 people. IN-
TEVEP, the name of PDVSA's lab, holds patents in several
areas of oil technology. In fields like production and
processing of heavy crudes, Intevep is considered state-of-
the-art, by any standards.
The processing pattern of the Venezuelan refineries has
been improved towards a greater fraction of high gravity,
more valuable, products.
The tanker fleet, consisting in 1975 of 12 ships with a net
weight of 371000 tons, and an average age of 16 years, has
been renovated. Today, PDVSA owns 20 tankers (725000 Tons)
with an average age of 3.9 years.
Fifty-seven% of PDVSA's purchases during 1985 were of Vene-
zuelan products. At the same time, local firms supplied
80% of the engineering contracted by the corporation during
1985.
The 14 companies that operated in the country until 1975
have been rationalized to four. Each of the 4 subsidiaries
has been assigned acreage in different parts of the country.
They act as geographic divisions that must compete for the
resources allocated by the parent (or "holding") company.
The numbers and facts shown above speak quite clearly. The
current health of the national oil corporation strongly con
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trasts with the rest of the government's administration and
a good part of the private sector.
Where does the difference come from? The generalized
opinion is that the structure of the corporation (by structure
meaning the formalized systems of planning & control, rewards,
information, etc.), combined with the absence of politics in the
decisions, account for the miracle. Respect for the rules, mer
itocracy and discipline are also mentioned as anomalous traits
in Venezuela and they can observed to be the norm, more than the
exception, in PDVSA.
A3. THE REASONS.
Some interesting conclusions can be drawn from several
excerpts from interviews made to a group of employees of PDVSA
on the occassion of its 10th anniversary (1):
- "During this period, we had to recover from the pre-nation
alization years. We had to hire and develop the people
with which we could show the country and the whole world
that the industry, once managed by Venezuelans, could be
more productive than the multinationals", (District Manager).
- "The organization has the highest responsibility towards
the country, given its critical importance in the national
economy... We have applied the right management practices,
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some inherited from the multinationals, some developed in-
situ, to carry forward this huge task" (Exploration Manager).
"It is evident that the oil industry represents the best
instrument the country has to generate wealth. There is
no other local entity, within sight, that can replace PDVSA".
(Operations Manager).
-"Many people insisted that Venezuelans could not handle
their own oil corporation. We have modernized it, we have
adapted it to the most difficult and diverse circumstances"
(Accounting Supervisor).
"In this company, we feel that we work for our country...
we join efforts to meet our goals, keep our company produc
tive and continuously increase our efficiency" (Production
Superintendent).
"We feel satisfied when we see PDVSA managed by competent
people, efficient and organized" (Planning Staff).
-"Every one of us has become cost-conscious" (Drilling Su-
pervisor).
"We regret the way in which the wealth that we in PDVSA
generate has been poorly administered by the government...
We observe a clear trend, subtle but yet continuous, to
introduce politics in this industry. That would cause chaos
and, eventually, lead to our ruin" (District Supervisor;
gas operations).
"After the nationalization, everybody, from the laborers to
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top management, is conscious of what they do, why they do
it and what the consequences are for the whole country"
(Operations Supervisor).
"PDVSA is the most efficient and productive company in the
country. This is possible due to the contribution and
dedication of each employee on one hand, and to the reward
systems on the other... PDVSA's autonomy has prevented its
politicization....The top management teams of the corpora-
tion and its subsidiaries are formed by peole with a long
history within the local oil industry" (Office Clerk).
"The corporation has kept the highest standards of efficien
cy" (District Supervisor; gas operations).
"Our human resources have maintained very high motivational
levels and a great sense of responsibility" (Services Mana-
ger).
"We have demostrated that we can manage our most important
industry". (Laboratory Supervisor).
"We have kept a unified attitude against unfavourable opi-
nions that come, every now and then, from outside of the
industry...there is a set of shared values that make PDVSA
function as an efficient, private enterprise...We have to
thank the legislator, our congress, who wisely designed the
nationalization law that allowed PDVSA to keep its autonomy.
The selection of our personnel and the reward system based
on merits and performance are some of the basic ingredients
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of our success" (Member of the board; operating subsidiary).
There are several words and concepts that can be extract
ed from the answers of the interviewees: Efficiency, productivi
ty, responsibility, motivation, rewards, performance, best indus
try, goals, organized, shared values, cost-conscious, autonomy,
job-enrichment, most important industry, personnel selection,
merits. So far, it seems like the reasons for success are mixed.
A rational strategy on one hand, the adequate structure on the
other; a strong corporate culture everywhere. I'll try to ana-
lyze each area separatedly and, in the end, find the deeper rea-
sons, the independent variables.
A3.1. Strategic Management.
If a single word can describe the strategy fol-
lowed by Petr6leos de Venezuela since 1976, it is rationality.
Even though wrong decisions have been made, the process has al-
ways been characterized by the maximization of value (profit,
wealth), the evaluation of valid alternatives and the implementa
tion mcde thatwould cause the least friction. The 10-year
results described above were achieved through a continuous eval
uation of the business. The initial plan departed from an
analysis that included almost everything the books recommend:
A detailed framework for competitive strategy (buyers, suppliers,
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competitors, substitutes, new entrants) (2), studies of internal
strenghts and weaknesses, environmental analyses, present and
future plans for each functional department, human resources
strategy, etc. Today, with the current oil glut, PDVSA has
designed a strategy of internationalization, looking for foreign
patners with a strong hold in the downstream side of the business
to gain better access to markers. At the same time, the govern-
ment has granted it more autonomy by allowing it to fix the pri-
ces of oil and products without consulting with the central ad-
ministration (as it was the practice in the past) in an effort
to give PDVSA the higher flexibility it needs in the current
markets.
Whether or not the strategy is technically cor-
rect, or whether it contains the best possible decisions, is
not the point. It is rational, and was designed after a ration
al analysis that took into account all the information available.
A3.2. The Structure and Systems of Petr61leos de Venezuela.
PDVSA is organized as a parent company or "hold-
ing" of 4 operating divisions (distributed geographically) that
are integrated oil companies themselves. The Divisions explore,
produce, transport, refine and sell crude oil and products. Other
subsidiaries include the R&D Lab (INTEVEP), the purchasing com-
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pany for overseas buying, the petrochemical complex, a recently
acquired refinery in the island of Curazao, in the Caribbean,
and offices in New York, Houston and London that act as gath-
erers of information and foreign contacts with overseas organi
zations.
The core of the corporation, the operating divi-
sions, are organized by line (exploration, production, refining,
marketing) and staff functions (human resources, planning, public
relations, etc.). Every function has a General Manager that re-
ports to the board of Directors of the Division through a "con
tact" board member. The Divisions report to the corporate board
mainly through the Divisions' presidents. At the same time, the
corporation's headquarters has a number of staff executives or
Coordinators (organized by function) that act as a link between
the General Managers of the functional departments in the Divi-
sions and the members of the board of Petr61leos de Venezuela,
to whom the coordinators directly report.
The headquarters of the operating subsidiaries
are located in the cities of Caracas, Maracaibo and Puerto La
Cruz (to the center, west and east of the country, respectively),
while the field operations (production, exploration and refining)
are handled by District offices (Suddivisions) that are, like the
parent divisions, functionally structured.
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Strategically, the chain starts with general direc
tions given by the Ministery of Energy & Mines, concerning issues
like production quotas, broad targets for exploration, etc.
These instructions are passed to the subsidiares by the parent
company in the form of guidelines and objectives that will be
used by each Division to design its 5-year functional plan and,
according to it, its annual budget. The divisions submit their
specific projects back to the corporation in the form of an oper
ational plan for the coming year and a program of general activi
ties (separated by function) for the medium term. The allocation
of resources, from PDVSA to the divisions, is made yearly accord
ing to the strategic objectives of the corporation, the available
budget (PDVSA works with its retained earnings and does not
receive money from the central government) and the merits of each
project in terms of profitability (ROI), NVP, rates of return,
and payback periods. The time span of the different organizations
are: strategic (PDVSA), tactics (Division boards), and operation
al (Division departments).
The strategic plans in the divisions are design-
ed by each function, once the guidelines from the board have
been received, without the intervention of the planning depart-
ments. The main task of the latter is to consolidate the func-
tional plans and prepare the Division package to submit it to
corporate headquarters.
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Once their annual budgets are approved, the Divi
sions are responsible for their execution, and will be measured
accordingly. At the end of each fiscal year (December 31st),
the Divisions submit their results in terms of money spent,
reserves incorporated, production potential, sales (domestic and
international), etc. The execution of both capital and expenses
budgets are evaluated by confronting them with the assets incor
porated, cost levels, and profits vs. sales
The information flow is hierarchical. Besides
the continuous communication between the parent company and the
Divisions through the functional coordinators, formal reports
covering partial budget execution and results achieved are sub-
mitted every month by the subsidiaries, with complete presenta
tions of progress reports due every quarter. Less formal daily
and weekly information is also sent to PDVSA, including several
key indicators.
Evaluations of personnel are made every year,
within a very formal system that requires every supervisor to
fill out forms, discuss them with his/her subordinates and obtain
the aproval of one (or two) additional levels above him before
the appraisal is made official. Salary raises, promotions, trans
fers, employee potentials and the like are carefully analyzed
and written down. An employee ranking is established for each
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function and later for a whole subsidiary; individual rewards
depend on the relative position within the ranking and this in
turn depends on performance. Annual employee performance is
measured against individual goals that are establihed at the
beginning of the year after a negotiation process between super
visors and subordinates. In summary, a management by objectives
style that is followed strictly. PDVSA's salary scales are
autonomous from the rest of the public administration; annually,
the corporation reserves a portion ot its expense budget for
salary raises and benefits, the size of which is determined in-
ternally (with only formal aproval from the government) by tak-
ing into account factors like inflation rate, profitability of
the company, salary scales in the private sector, etc.
Today, the employees of the oil industry are among
the best paid in the whole country. Job security is an important
factor, too (only the very worst performers are asked to leave,
after repeated failure), and a sense of pride and responsibility
can be perceived almost everywhere in the corporation.
A3.3. The Culture.
So far, the systems are also rational, like the
strategy. And, most important, they work; the norms. and proce-
dures are enforced strictly. It is a case of professional man-
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aqement translated into action. And here is probably where the
main difference with many other organizations in the country,
rests. In Venezuela, even though strategies are designed, rules
written, organizations created and resources allocated, and
even if the formal processes reflect rational choices made by
professional administrators, the results quite often show the
opposite. The years of the oil shocks speak for themselves.
Back to the answers of the interviews, the values
expressed by the workers of the oil industry show a wide gap bet
ween our oil-men and the reality of the rest of the country.
Studies of our collective social norms that revealed low need
of achievement, high risk avoidance, external locus of control,
and so on, do not seem to apply here. A different occupational
culture emerged in a country that is quite used to see its public
agencies facing one crisis after another.
Several explanations can be provided that will
point towards the culture as the independent variable. In the
first place, the 15000 or so Venezuelan employees that worked for
the multinationals by the time of the nationalization had develop
ed a particular occupational culture that fit with little fric-
tion, the goals and objectives of their respective organizations.
PDVSA has enjoyed a good deal of autonomy during its 10 years of
existence: Managers have mostly come from within, it has select
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ed its own personnel-in summary, it has been left mostly alone,
with only broad directions coming from the central government.
(in fact, an increasing degree of intervention has been felt dur
ing the last years, but I will put this situation aside to make
the central argument clearer). The basic systems that exist in
the Venezuelan oil industry are mostly inherited from its for-
eign predecessors; they have been modified, addapted and moderniz
ed but the principles are the same. These principles are coher-
ent with the organizational models that the multinationals had,
all of which were developed in the U.S. and western Europe.
PDVSA has not yet been smoothed by the social norms, in spite of
the strong pressure from the local society to modify imported
models,when they are perceived as countercultural and do not take
into account the local behavioral patterns. The corporate cul-
ture of PDVSA is quite coherent with an organization whose design
does not correlate with the local reality -it is a "cultural is-
land". Furthermore, the culture of the organization is so strong
that is was able to socialize 30.000 new employees in 10 years
with the same shared values of the old timers.
A critical question remains unanswered: How was
it possible that the Venezuelan political parties and the govern
ments that ruled the country during the last 10 years allowed
such an important entity to operate with so little intervention?
How come that the nationalization process was so smooth, so
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rationally conceived, in spite of our idiosyncracy? The answer
rests in the stakes. The fear of jeopardizing the basic indus-
try of the country, by converting it in another public white
elephant, was too intense. Ninety % of the country's exports
and 20% of its GNP cannot be taken lightly. The decision to
nationalize was inescapable in 1975 (the best external conditions
were present, and the multinationals had not acted in the best
interest of the country for a long time), and the leaders of the
country responded with a historical example of rationality. They
made the right political decision, one that would result in the
highest approval from the public and, at the same tile, left the
original culture alone, gave only overall direction and enjoyed
the abundant profits. When there is fear, idiosyncracy can be
controlled.
How can be PDVSA's dynamics defined? Where are
its cohesive forces? Its goals? From the description above,
several conclusions can be drawn: The existence of a reward
system that promotes high performers, by measuring performance
as the contribution towards the goals of the corporation; the
delegation of work and authority; the rationality of structures
and practices; the participation of the functional departments
in the planning cycles; a divisional structure that fosters,
competition among divisions for the obtention of resources (the
divisions with the best projects, as well as the best results,
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get the biggest share); all these issues contribute. indeed to
the success of the organization, but they are not the only rea-
son. While it is well understood that the right strategy and
the structure that follows are crucial for a corporation, they
can only operate in a frictionless contact with the culture of
the employees. In other words, culture make structure work.
Going back to the interviews with PDVSA's employ-
ees, the cohesive force that maintains the organization together
goes beyond the reward system and the rationality of the goals.
The corporate culture that glues PDVSA together contains several
critical ingredients: A sense of challenge, both in managing
the country's most important industry and in showing thatthe
nationalized corporation can be more productive than the multina
tionals; a special pride that comes from belonging to the "most
efficient and most important" industry in the country; a notion
of being the best, the l1ite; a comittment to certain shared
values, mentioned repeatedly by using the words efficiency, re-
sponsibility, organized, etc.; a rejection of the traditional,
political-driven system, that influences other government of-
fices; a sense of unity against the criticism that comes, from
time to time, from different sectors of the local society, be-
cause "PDVSA's employees earn too much money", "the oil industry
is still in the hands of the multinationals" or, simply, "our
most important industry has to be closely monitored and tightly
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controlled". Such values are quite different from what is the
norm in most of the country. Whether by direct observation, by
evaluating the behavior of the economy and the productive sector,
or by analyzing the results of local studies in social psycholo
gy, the conclusion that PDVSA has an endemic occupational cul-
ture is inescapable.
Maintaining the organization free from external
intervention, however, has not been easy. PDVSA is perceived
as too powerful by several interest groups in the country, be
them factions within the political parties (who would like to
share some of the power) or influential individuals from the
private sector (who would like to share some of the profits).
Even though the long-term survival of the national oil corpora-
tion is vital for the country, the short-term benefits that some
people could achieve if let in are very tempting, and we in
Venezuela have a short-term span.
The strategy of PDVSA in terms of public affairs
has been, again, quite rational. From the low-key, "do not rock
the boat" style that the multinationals practiced, a more open
contact with the public, the media and the government has develop
ed. It is not enough with being efficient if nobody knows it;
the PR departments at the corporate level and within the subsid-
iaries are particularly concerned about letting the country know,
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through advertising, advocacy and press releases, that PDVSA is
doing its job as good as humanly possible. The possibility of
chaos and catastrophe if the industry loses its autonomy is
emphasized rather frequently by the company's officials, feed-
ing the widespread fear and making the high stakes nothing but
obvious. At the same time, the corporation has taken special
care in dealing with its share-holder: The government. Even
though governments are less predictable and difficult to analyze
than private organizations (there are many more untangibles and
non-rational interests), the relationship between PDVSA and the
public administration evolved from a shaky start to what it is
today: Stable and meaningful.
B. THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS.
The main goal of the Venezuelan political parties is obtain
ing power. It is obvious that they will dedicate their strongest
efforts to the process through which the citizens of the country
decide on the next authorities (president, senators, representa-
tives, city councils, etc.): The national elections. The elec-
tions in Venezuela are held every 5 years, and they are divided
in two different parts. The president of the republic and the
members of the national and state parliaments are voted for in
December; 5 or 6 months after (may or June), the city councils
and other local authorities are selected. It has been tradition
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al, however, that the party that wins the national elections
obtains an even higher margin in the local process. Venezuelans
are so fond of power that they always want to be with the winners.
It is certainly impressive to watch how efficient the polit
ical organizations are when campaigning. The same parties that,
once in possession of power, have wasted hundreds of billions
of dollars without improving the standard of living of the coun-
try, plan, coordinate and execute a complex calendar of activit-
ies during a whole year (official duration of the election cam-
paigns), clearly demostrating that, if the reward is attractive,
superior results can be achieved.
The political campaigns include activities like the follow
ing:
Meetings in every single town and city of the country, where
the candidates speak to the public on their virtues and fu
ture projects. Attendance to these meetings can vary from
a few hundred to several hundred thousand. It is possible
for the candidate to attend several meetings in one day,
even in places that are quite distant from one another.
Massive advertising in the media (TV, Television, radio,
etc.). Every newspaper and radio station, even in the most
remote town, and regardless of its coverage, will.be used.
At the same time, posters and graffitti make use of all the
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space available for publicity.
- Social events, such as parties, concerts, caravans (some of
them with thousands of cars), and fairs are continuously
organized.
- Top consultants from the U.S. are hired to advise in mass
communications, propaganda and marketing in general. Their
suggestions are strictly followed.
- Fund-raising activities begin well before the campaign starts
and extend during the whole election year.
- Lobbying with popular or respected personalities of the coun
try starts quite early in the game. Artists, industrialists,
media executives, TV stars and other influential individuals
are contacted continuously to try to get their support for
the political organizations.
The above list is only a small sample of the tight schedule
that the Venezuelan political organizations must follow if they
have aspirations for power. The need for good planning, accurate
timing, coordination, control, information systems, functional
structures and adecquate decision making channels should be ap-
parent. Competition is fierce among the two dominant firms (AD
and COPEI, the two major parties) and the underdogs (the left and
other small organizations).
Bl. HOW THE ELECTIONS ARE CARRIED OUT.
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Showing an unusual preocuppation for the long term, the
Venezuelan parties start thinking of (and working for) the com-
ing elections 5 years in advance. Right after winning (or los-
ing) the polls, the parties start to devise a strategy that will
allow them to keep (or regain) the government. One of the main
objectives of the power games that are played by the different
leaders and factions that operate within a specific party is to
define who will be the next candidate for the presidency, and
which current will dominate in case of victory.
The presidential candidate is chosen in a national con-
vention, approximately 2 years before the elections. Well before
the official period for the campaign starts, the management team
that will be in charge of the project (the campaign) is designat
ed, and real work starts. Campaign coordinators are selected at
all levels within the organization, so that decisions can be
transmitted and implemented from the national leadership to the
lowest hierarchy. Work teams are integrated by function and by
geographical location. Decisions at the strategic level are made
by the top leaders of the party, who control their organizations
very tightly. The strategic plan is transmitted down to the
campaign board for the tactical design; the board, in turn, pas
ses the main goals and operational objectives to the state coor
dinators for its implementation at the district and town levels.
A complex information network,' some of it consisting of state-
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of-the-art systems, is put in place to monitor and control the
execution of the projects and sub-projects.
The rewards systems are quite informal, but nonetheless
very effective. People are rewarded by their dedication to the
campaign, their attributes as leaders, their personal contacts
and their political discipline. The rewards are desirable, by
all means: Being included in the list of candidates for the
national congress, the state legislative bodies or the city
councils represents the obtention of a share of power that might
bring status, wealth, respect and admiration. Besides the can-
didacies, positions in the numerous public offices (be them as
minister, director, supervisor or clerk) are also given out to
the party members as the prize for a good performance during the
campaign. Finally, contacts and friends in the government are a
good thing to have, for almost any purpose, even if no official
positions are held.
B2. THE RESULTS.
By all standards, the political campaigns in Venezuela
are successful. Even though only one of the two major parties
will be the winner, the loser will have, in the parliament and
other consultive organizations, a considerable amount of influ
ence. The Venezuelan political system has survived for 30 years
(a notable exception in Latin' America), and both COPEI and AD
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have been in government more than once during that period. From
the operational side, the efficiency displayed by the parties
during the campaigns is indeed impressive: The meetings start
on time; the crowds that attend the public meetings behave like
a well programmed machine (they organized themselves by sectors,
colors, geographical orign or whatever the previous plan dictates;
people keep certain distance from each other to make the crowd
seem bigger; they know when to applaud, when to leave, where to
stand, etc.); the logistics for the meetings is strictly follow-
ed (for the meetings in the major cities, people from all over
the country are provided transportation, so that they can attend);
the advertising campaigns are coherent, massive and pervading;
daily schedules of activities are publsihed in the different
media, several weeks in advance.
Even though a growing discontent can be felt in many
levels of the Venezuelan society, as a result of the continous
failure of the local governments in fostering economic and social
progress, the political campaigns are massive. Everyone partic
ipates, in one way or another. Since voting is mandatory by
law (an ingenuous way of forcing the peole to take political
stands) the participation in the elections is always above 90%
of the electorate. People forget rather quickly that the same
party that is asking for their votes is the one that did a
terrible job when it was in office 5 years ago. The hope that
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"this time things will be different" make people ignore recent
history.
B3. THE DRIVING FORCES.
As with the oil industry, I will try to look for the
deeper reasons behind organizational success-something beyond
structural frameworks and sets of rules. Petr61eos de Venezuela
applies its strategy through a structure that is coherent both
with the culture of its employees and with the competitive pres
sures of the environment. The political parties do the same.
They intuitively know the idiosyncracy of the country and have
addopted a structure that naturally coexists with the collective
culture.
The driving forces that make people work for their par
ties are several, the most important being: a) The rewards.
Obtaining power, both for the masses (for whom political acti-
vism is one of the best ways to achieve social status) and for
the leaders. b) The competition. The two major parties want
the government for themselves. c) The leaders. In a country
where institutions are less valued than personalities, the lea-
ders are quite influential on the people. d) The clarity and
simplicity of the final goals, shared by the whole party: Win
the elections.
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Apart from a common set of goals and motivational for
ces, the Venezuelan political parties rely on other, additional
factorsto keep their workforces united and with a strong sense
of loyalty. Several cohesive strengths can be mentioned: a) The
necessity of group membership that exists among Venezuelans.
Since the parties are clans more that institutions, a strong
degree of affiliation and friendship is developed among the
militants,and between them and the leaders. b) The dogmas. Be
it the ideological base of the party or the belief that working
for the party contributes to the welfare of the country, both
propositions are the basic myths that constitute a good part of
the vision that the political organizations pretend to follow.
Even though ideology has been long forgotten and the contribu-
tion of politics towards the welfare of Venezuela is highly
questionable, the political workers, from the top leaders to the
rank-and file, strongly believe that they are working for superior
goals. c) The leaders. Besides their role as a driving force,
the masses in Venezuela are easily congregated around the image
of individuals. Both leaders and dogmas complement each other.
In summary, the strategy is rational in that it is
oriented towards the long-term survival of the organization and
the achievement of power, by using a structure that properly
reflects the attitudes and values of the people,while motivating
them by offering the prizes they most desire. Once the motiva-
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tion dissappears (once power. is obtained), the need for. achieve
ment no longer exists;it will not be reactivated until the next
elections. Meanwhile, the government lacks the drive and cohe-
rence showed by the winning party during the campaign. After
the elections, competition practically stops and goals are not
clearly articulated any more (or do not exist, or are not clear
and coherent, or people are not interested). The parties are
maintained together by the need of affiliation and the dogmas.
The common objectives no longer exist, since everyone is too
busy exercising what they searched for: Power.
C. SUMMARY.
The two examples just described are probably a good repre-
sentation of the organizational extremes that can be found in
Venezuela. On the one hand, the oil industry functions by
aplying professional management to an organization whose cul-
ture is prepared to receive it and function accordingly. The
political parties, on the other hand, are a mixture of modern,
state-of-the art systems, with a paternalistic, authoritarian
management style that also fits the culture of their people.
In both cases, the vision and missions of the firm are clearly
stated, widely understood and followed by everyone. Also in
both cases, the strategies are rationally translated into action
programs. The strong differences, the cohesive forces, the
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specific driving forces and the rewards, depend clearly on the
culture of each organization. Both cultures are .successful,
since both are managed in a way that produces a constructive sum
of the efforts of individuals.
Most organizations in Venezuela, however, are caught in the
middle. While their goals are the maximization of profits (such
as in the oil industry) their management style and culture are
not coherent with the goals.
What solutions can be proposed, so that the country finds
a way to efficiently use its human resources? Must the culture
of the people change? Can it change? Should structure be the
link between strategy and culture? Can we design systems that,
taking into account the collective culture, make it work towards
economic growth? Should we copy the managerial style from the
political parties and use it to lead the workforce towards
productivity? The answers to the above questions are probably
mixed. The occupational culture of a country cannot be changed
overnight; the oil companies worked in Venezuela for 60 years
before a native group was ripe to take over. It is clear that
imported systems cannot be applied without major modifications
and adaptations. It is also clear that imaginative solutions
have to be developed from within.
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Some examples, however, might indicate that the task might
not be as gigantic and huge as it seems. The petrochemical com-
pany, today a subsidiary of Petr61leos de Venezuela, was created
in 1956 as a government corporation with the name of Instituto
Venezolano de Petroquimica (IVP). Until 1976, IVP had accumulat
ed losses of several billion dollars, and it was viewed as the
typical example of an inefficient, politicized, unrecoverable
government venture. In 1977, the IVP was handed to PDVSA, which
converted it into one of its subsidiaries. After changing its
name to Pequiven, PDVSA started a carefully studied invasion of
Pequiven, at all levels, with managers from the parent company
and its other subsidiaries. Since PDVSA enjoyed a high degree
of autonomy, it undertook, without external intervention, the
task to apply a rational strategy in Pequiven, by designing the
adecquate structural framework and, through the "invasion force",
attempting to change the culture patterns of the workforce.
Several thousand people were laid off, plants were closed, un-
profitable ventures were divested, delayed projects were speeded
up, etc. The results are self-evident: Fom a net loss of U.S.
$140 MM in 1977, Pequiven started a sustained recovery that end
ed up, for the first time in 28 years, with a net aftertax profit
of 4.5 MM$ in 1983. In 1984, net profit was 148 MM$.
It took only 6 years for Pequiven to reverse a trend that
seemed eternal. However, it did not stand alone in tis effort;
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it was surrounded, and controlled, by the oil industry, its re-
sources and its influence. Of course, PDVSA cannot take charge
of the whole economy of the country and the Pequiven example can
only be used as a reference for what can be achieved by a speci
fic course of action. Other solutions, however, will have to
be developed in a different way, probably without the possibili
ty of changing the culture. In those cases, the people will
have to learn how to manage it.
-158-
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VII. FINDING OUR COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE.
Somehow, a widely dysfunctional culture can be (and has been)
put to work efficiently under different systems. From an apparent
ly negative outlook at the beginning of the present analysis, the
time has come for some positive thoughts and, most important, for
concrete, down-to-earth, proposals. It is not enough simply to
say that Venezuelans carry a basic handicap that prevents them
from building economic progress. I strongly believe that there
are solutions which can combine the best of both worlds. Relevant
changes must occur, at many levels within the country: Economic,
social, political, at the levels of firms, industries and sectors;
in the government as well as in the private corporations. Vene-
zuelans probably have competitive advantages in many areas, but
very little can be achieved if we do not have a basic understand
ing of our needs, our wants, and our intrinsic abilities.
What I propose is a somewhat new way of looking at ourselves,
not experimented before in the country. Unless we start doing
things differently, our possibilities of getting out of the Third
world are quite small. Venezuela needs to find out what is it
that the country really needs to achieve socioeconomic development,
not only in terms of financial indicators but also in more concrete,
realistic parameters. The welfare of the population is obtained,
first of all, by fulfilling a few basic needs: Food, clothing,
housing, education, health, social security and human rights.
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Steel mills, computer factories, shipyards and semiconductors
are just a few of the thousands of enterprises that can contri-
bute to economic growth. The same benefits can be obtained from
mango trees, plantain trees, corn cakes, sugar cane or gold min-
ing. There are numerous examples, in the U.S., of mid-size firms
that have been exceptionally successful by competing in non-fash
ionable segments of a particular industry. In their book "The
Winning Performance", Clifford and Cavanagh found "Companies with
exceptional records of growth and profitability in such unglam-
orous, mature sectors as textiles, furniture, fasteners and cred
it reporting". Success, for then, means "finding the right spe-
cialized (usually small) segments of the market-the right niches"
(1). Competitive advantage, according to the classical economist
D. Ricardo, holds as "The special ability of a country to produce
one product or service relatively more cheaply than other prod-
uct or services" (2). If we combine both statements, and find
the right niches for Venezuela, those where we can deliver value
at the lowest relative cost, we will place ourselves in a very
comfortable position.
From the three factors of production (capital, labor and
natural resources), I have devoted the present analysis to the
characteristics of our human resources (Labor). Venezuela has
plenty of natural resources and raw materials, and has had a
steady provision of income during the most part of the present
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century. Our failures can be attributed to the most crucial of
the three. Money can be borrowed, raw materials can be bought;
people must be motivated.
A. THE NEED FOR MORE DATA. A QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN.
In order to complement the analysis of the Venezuelan idio
syncracy, based on research of the existing literature, direct
observation and references from previous studies, it was felt
that some additional data could be used, either to detect new
traits not identified before or to confirm part of what has been
expressed. To achieve this, a questionnaire was designed and
administered to a number of Venezuelan and U.S. managers from
the private and the public sector of both Venezuela and the U-
nited States.
The questionnaire, included in tables VII.1 to VII.12,
Apendix I,consisted of 104 questions, related to several dimen
sions by which the culture and basic values of the respondents
could be established and compared.
Al. QUESTIONNAIRE DESCRIPTION.
The dimensions under which the questions were grouped
are based on the work done by Hofstede (described in chapter V),
with the modifications suggested in Section V.F. A total of
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seven major areas can be distinguished.
Al.l. Uncertainty avoidance.
The first dimension analyzed by the questionnaire
is uncertainty avoidance (questions 1-20,85, table VII.1). Sever
al subcategories were established:
a) Uncertainty avoidance defined in terms of need for protec-
tion from the organization, attitude towards challenge,
respect for the rules, need for guidance from superiors and
conflict avoidance.
b) The degree to which the respondents prefer to stay within
their functional area of expertise (i.e. engineering, finan
ce, law, etc.), instead of becoming generalists by leaving
the protected environment of their specific discipline.
The questions for this category were taken from E. Schein's
Career Anchors (3), since I am assuming that the desire to
stay whithin one's specialty is a form of avoiding uncertain
ty.
c) The last category within uncertainty avoidance is related to
geographical security; that is, uncertainty can be avoided
by deciding to stay in a specific location instead of being
transferred continously.
A1.2. Power distance.
According to the discussion in chapter V.F., the
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questions in this section (questions 21-50, tables.VII.2, VII.3)
deal with different aspects of the power distance dimension, as
follows:
a) The width of the actual gap between people who excercise
authority and their subordinates. The parameters investigat
ed include the degree to which differences of opinion bet-
ween subordinates and superiors are tolerated;the managers'
perception of the worforce's attitude towards work, delega
tion of tasks, importance of hierarchies, leadership style
and desired characteristics of national leaders; degree of
intimidation superiors cause on subordinates, and, finally,
our perception of foreigners from different countries (the
U.S., Germany, England, France, Brazil and Colombia) as
superior, inferior or equals. This last parameter was not
included in the questionnaires handed to the U.S. respondents.
b) Equalitarianism. Departing from the notion that Venezuelan
society allows a high degree of mobility and social promo-
tion, questions in this area search for the degree of com-
munication (both formal and informal) between superiors and
subordinates, social mobility, and preference for democracy
as a political system.
c) Finally, the traditional caudillismo of Venezuelans, by
which power is centered in people and not in institutions,
is included as part of this section.
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A1.3. Individualism.
The 3rd. dimension mentioned by Hofstede, individ
ualism (questions 51-72; tables VII.5, VII,6) was divided into
two subdimensions:
a) The first subdimension is related to the dichotomy individu
alism/collectivism. Some questions were drawn from E.Schein's
Career Anchors, on issues like autonomy, entrepreneurship,
and life-style. At the same time, decision-making preferences
(collective or individual) attitude towards competition,and
need of being noticed were also investigated.
b) The second subdimension included is need for
affiliation and membership. From the discussion on the Ve-
nezuelan idiosyncracy, it was made evident that affiliative
feelings, different from collectivism and in contrast with
individualism, are very important in our country. The ques
tions selected dealt with group admiration, atmosphere in
the workplace, need for group advice, relative importance of
membership, reactions to group criticism, and the relevance
of clans or closed groups in society.
Al.4. Masculinity. (Questions 73-83, 86-90; tables VII.7,
VII,8).
As described by Hofstede, masculinity can be defin
ed in terms of assertiveness, ambition, need for achievement and
the like (4). The questions on this dimension deal with mascu-
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linity and sensitivity, within the following subdimensions:
a) The respondents' values in terms of challenge (5), role of
the sexes, need of achievement, ambition and attitude to-
wards work.
b) Particular inclinations in terms of the intuition/judge-
ment, feeling/thinking contrast.
c) E. Schein's concept of service Career Anchor, which can be
correlated with Hofstede's feminine dimension. According
to Schein, people with a service career orientation "are
oriented more to the values embodied in their work than
to the actual talents or areas of competence involved.
The most obvious examples can be seen in the so-called help
ing professions..." (6).
A1.5. Career anchors. (Questions 20, 91-95; tables
VII.9, VII.11).
Additional questions from the Career Anchors
concept were included in the questionnaire. Some of these ques
tions can be partially correlated with Hofstede's dimensions
and the subdimensions mentioned in chapter V, while others will
provide information on specific issues that will improve the
general understanding of the Venezuelan culture. Two categories
can be distinguished:
a) The importance given by the respondents to a managerial posi
tion (managerial Career Anchor), where "advancement, high
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levels of responsibility, opportunity to contribute to the
welfare of their organizations, leadership opportunities
and high income are the most important job values and become
the criteria of Success" (7). How identified Venezuelan
managers are with their positions and responsibilities is
an important issue.
b) The necessity of maintaining certain life style, regardless
of the consequences on one's career, and the associa-
tion of several symbols (money, admiration, achievement, ac
cess to exclusive circles) with the respondents' perception
of success. Reward systems and motivational techniques can
benefit from these answers. Other questians also drawn from
the concept of lifestyle career anchor, deal with the im-
portance given to the family relative to work.
A1.6. Locus of control.
Labeled "world as given", this area deals with the
locus of control (external or internal) that is found in the so-
ciety. The notion that the influence of external factors is real
ly important in the achievement of goals will be investigated in
this category (questions 96-99, table VII.10).
Al.7. Discipline.
The last section of the questionnaire deals with
the attitude of the respondents towards discipline, punctuality,
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tight schedules and the like. Given the Venezuelans' performance
in terms of discipline, sustained efforts and consistency, it will
be interesting to find out what our opinions are of ourselves in
this area. (Questions 100-104, table VII.12).
Al. METHODOLOGY. THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRES.
One hundred fifty copies of the questionnaires were air
mailed to Venezuela, where a network was established for their
distribution to people working in different industries and sec-
tors of the economy. The sample was selected as to include only
managers, that is, the only restriction imposed was that the
respondents should manage people (subordinates) and money(budget).
The answers were separated by three different sectors: The oil
industry, the private sector and the public administration. Mean
while, the same survey was made of the participants in the 1985/
86 Sloan Fellows Program of MIT, a group which contains a good
sample of North American and foreign middle managers. The lan-
guages used were English for the Sloan Fellows and Spanish for
the Venezuelan respondents.
The questionnaire was answered by marking the preferred
answer on a scale from 1 to 5. The scales ranged from, for exam
ple, "most important" to "of no importance", "always" to "almost
never", etc. The questions were scrambled so to make it diffi-
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cult for the respondents to find patterns and recognize the di-
mensions and subdimensions; it was important to avoid the fact
that people would reflect their desired image, and not their
true values, if they could decipher the parameters under which
the questions were grouped.
In orden to check consistency, several redundant ques-
tions were included, yet phrased in different ways. The scales
were shifted randomly, so that a 5 answer, for example, could
mean high power distance in one question and low P.D. in another.
Besides the 104 questions, the following generic data were obtain
ed from each respondent: Age, sex, number of subordinates (di-
rect and indirect), budget of the unit managed by the respondent,
educational level (high school, university, etc.), level of po-
sition held (low, medium,high, very high), work area (finance,
engineering, manufacturing, etc.), country, education area (tech
nical, business, law, etc.), business of the corporation, sector
(public corporation, private firm, oil industry, government, etc.),
number of employees of the corporation and annual sales of the
corporation. Table VII.A includes some of the generic data for
each group.
In total, 90 questionnaires were received from Venezuela
(53 from the oil industry, 28 from the private sector and 19 from
the government) and 37 from the Sloan Fellows (29 U.S. managers
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and 8 foreign). The sample included a wide range of industries
and corporations, as well as a variety of management levels, age
groups and work areas. For each group of respondents (U.S., for
eign Sloan Fellows; Oil industry, private sector and government
for Venezuela), the average and standard deviation of every an-
swer were calculated. Besides, overall averages and standard
deviations for the dimensions (including the answers to all ques
tions contained in a specific dimension) were also established.
All the numerical data are included in Tables VII.1 to VII.12
Appendix I.
In summary, the questionnaires were expected to provide
information on the following:
-- The dominant profile of Venezuelan managers in terms of
their values, beliefs and attitudes as defined by the di-
mensions previously discussed.
- Similarities and differences among managers in the different
sectors of the Venezuelan economy (oil industry, private
and government). Similarities and differences between the
managerial culture of each sector and the national idiosyn
cracy, as described in previous chapters.
- Similarities and differences between the sample from the
Sloan Fellows and the Venezuelan managers.
- Comparisons with Hofstede's results.
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Once the above comparisons are made, a good number of
conclusions will be available, in terms of our culture, our
managerial style (actual and preferred), proposals to improve
our current productivity, and strategies for the future. Among
the most important questions, a few could be mentioned: Are
Venezuelan managers representative of the native culture? Do
Venezuelan managers have the right values and attributes to act
as a critical link between the occupational culture of the work-
force and the tasks needed for socioeconomic development? How
different from each other are Venezuelan managers from the three
sectors of the economy? How different are Venezuelan managers
from their counterparts in the U.S. and Japan? How similar? In
the next sections, both the results from the questionnaires and
some specific proposals for the short and long-term will be dis-
cussed.
B. RESULTS FROM THE QUESTIONNAIRES. DISCUSSION.
Due to the redundancy of several questions from different
parts of the questionnaire, the answers that will be used in the
following discussion will be used selectively. The selection
will be based on the fact that some answers, when analyzed to-
gether, reveal contrasting values and attitudes from the respon
dents on the same issues. When looking for consistency, I found
that the phrasing of some of the questions might have triggered
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a defensive reaction, while others were subtle enough as to allow
the respondents to express their true beliefs. In any case, no
question will be dismissed without confronting it with its redun
dant and checking for a consistent response. Some other questions
were not clearly understood by the respondents (plenty of com-
ments about this were written on the questionnaires) and will be
given special attention, so that they do not contaminate the sam
ple.
An example of inconsistency in the answers can be found in
questions 1,5,6 and 7. The average answers for those questions
are as follows (on a scale from 1 to 5):
AVERAGE
5. Do you like to be given Venezuelan Oil Industry (OI) 1.81
high risk, high reward Venezuelan Private Sec- (PR) 2.00
assignments? tor
(1: very much like it.
5: seldom like it). Sloan Fellows U.S. (SFUS) 2.00
Venezuelan Government (GOV) 2.33
Sector.
7. Do you like to be assign OI: 1.26
ed tasks that are new and PR: 1.29
challenge your abilities?
(1: very much; 5: seldom) SFUS: 1.58
GOV: 1.58
6. Do you prefer to be as- PR: 2.68
signed tasks similar to GOV: 3.21those that you handled
successfully in the past? OI: 3.36
(1: very much; 5; seldom). SFUS: 3.72
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So far, the trend has been somewhat reversed. The risk-prone
private sector (from questions 5 and 7) appears much more conser
vative on question 6. The real inconsistency, however, shows up
with question No. 1. AVERAGE:
1. You prefer to have clearly GOV: 1.84
stated your duties and PR: 2.21
responsibilities.
(1: very much; 5: seldom) OI: 2.32
SFUS: 3.52
The Venezuelan organizations that looked quite willing to
accept risks and challenges wanted, on the other hand, a secure
environment where duties and tasks are clearly stated. The sam
ple from the Sloan Fellows, from being the most risk averse of
the 4 groups, according to questions 5 and 7, rates considerably
lower in the necessity of a protective set of clear rules and
responsibilities that diminish uncertainty.
A possible explanation of the above, in line with the Vene
zuelan culture, is that our pride and machismo do not permit us
to accept that we dislike challenge and high-risk. Even if we
feel much better in a protective environment and do not want our
abilities to be challenged, to admit it would be a sign of weak-
ness. Again, it is the culture of the street pervading the work
place. Since we are brave and we are not afraid of anyone (or,
at least, we have been taught so), we are not willing to accept
that there are tasks that frighten us. The respondents, apparent
ly, have not made a distinction between physical fear and intel
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lectual preference.
Bl. UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE. (QUESTIO1 1-19, 85).
Different ways of grouping the questions under this di
mension can be tried. The overall scale has been selected to be:
1, highest uncertainty avoidance; 5, lowest uncertainty avoid-
ance (see table VII.1).
1) If all questions initially classified under U.A. are averag
ed (questions 1-14,16,85) the resulting quantities would be
as follows:
AVERAGE
PR: 2.98 (highest risk aversion).
GOV: 3.01
OI: 3.03
SFUS: 3.35
2) If, besides the questions averaged above, we include ques-
tions 15,18 (functional career anchor) and 17,19 (geogra-
phical security), which reflect both the need for security
of the respondents, expressed as the desire to have a job
in which they can depend on their greatest ability (their
functional expertise), and their preference to stay in a
specific geographical location, the contrast is even high-
er:
GOV:
PR:
OI:
SFUS:
ti V EZRXGEJ
2.81 (highest risk aversion).
2.82
2.93
3.35
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3) Dismissing questions 5,7,11,13,16 and 85 on the basis of
the arguments explained above, and averaging, all the other
answers related to risk avoidance (including functional
security and geographical security), the results increase
the contrast to a higher level:
AVERAGE
GOV: 2.35
PR: 2.38
OI: 2.50
SFUS: 3.16
4) The dimensions labeled functional career anchor and geogra-
phical security are also quite revealing by themselves:
Functional C.A. GOV: 1.79 (highest functional C.A.).
(questions 15,18)
PR: 2.00
OI: 2.34
SFUS: 3.50
Geographical GOV: 2.32 (highest need for geograph
Security. security).
(questions PR: 2.42
17,19)
OI: 2.73
SFUS: 3,22
Summarizing, a few conclusions can be derived from the
results just shown, especially from sections 2,3 and 4.
- On a scale from 1 (high risk aversion) to 5 (low risk aver-
sion), Venezuelan managers seem to be on the high side of
uncertainty avoidance, They prefer to have clearly defin-
ed duties and responsibilities, prefer large companies (bet
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ter if the companies provide tenure), feel comfortable with
rules, are somewhat neutral in their preference for high-
risk jobs, like clear guidance from their superiors, and
respect traditions.
Venezuelan managers feel much more comfortable within their
are of expertise (functional career anchor). This issue
strongly contrasts with the preferences expressed by the
participants in the Sloan Fellows Program, where functional
inclinations were much weaker.
The functional career anchor of Venezuelan managers is not
surprising, though. Professional disciplines are universal,
management theories are not. While we can apply the same
principles of engineering, finance or manufacturing to any
situation in any part of the world, the same is not true
with people management. In Venezuela, professional special
ties and management theories are imported from abroad, and
while the former are quite effective, the latter are much
less successful. Managers in Venezuela perceive this fact,
and do not want to move from an area of certainty (their
specialty) to a dimension where their foreign tools are
inadequate.
In terms of geographical security, Venezuelan managers are
also on the high side of risk avoidance (below 3 points).
Besides their natural risk aversion, affiliative motives
can also be found here. Leaving the geographical location
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of their preference does not only mean to be faced with a
new, uncertain environment. It also means leaving behind
part of their families, friends, clans and group memberships.
The three sectors investigated in Venezuela show consistent
trends when compared among themselves. The government
managers show the highest ranking in uncertainty avoidance,
followed closely by the managers in the private sector.
The respondents from the oil industry consistently score
lower (from 5 to 20%) uncertainty avoidance than the other
two sectors. In fact, the oil managers are halfway between
the private and the government managers on one hand, and the
sample from the Sloan Fellows on the other. The argument
about the oil industry having a different, imported corpora
te culture is growing stronger.
The U.S. middle managers appear more risk-prone, less at-
tracted by their functional disciplines and less worried
abouttheir geographical stability than their Venezuelan coun
terparts. This contrast is greater vs. the managers from
the Venezuelan private and government sectors,and smaller
with the managers from the oil industry.
B2. POWER DISTANCE. (QUESTIONS 21-40).
As it happened with the uncertainty avoidance dimension,
a few contradictions were also found on the set of answers relat
ed to power distance (see table VII.2). In this case, a pattern
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that shows respondents reacting to an apparent challenge by deny
ing any evidence of fear is also present. By comparing the trends
showed by questions 21,28 and 35, I hope that the contrast will
clear.
Do you feel uncomfort
able when disagreeing
with your boss?
(1: Always; 5: very
seldom).
Do you think obedi-
ence is an important
(and positive) attri
bute when evaluating
your subordinates?
(1: Always; 5: very
seldom).
Do you believe in
strongly hierarchical
organizations?
SFUS:
OI:
PR:
GOV:
PR:
GOV:
OI:
SFUS:
GOV:
OI:
PR:
SFUS:
AVERAGE
3.59 (highest P.D.).
3.62
3.89
4.05
be made more
Question 21.
Question 28.
Question 35.
(higher P.D.).
(higher P.D.).
The trend has been reversed. It is quite apparent that,
if one gives obedience a high score and believes in strong hierar
chies, it will be somewhat difficult to disagree with one's boss
without some kind of intimidation (hierarchies are perceived
when looking up as well as when looking down). The strongest
contrast is observed in the answers from the government managers,
while the private sector is more consistent. Again, it seems
that direct, challenging questions that face the bravery of the
respondents are answered emotionally and with little sense of
2.14
2.37
2.66
3.28
1.61
1.83
2.46
3.41
reality.
The same analysis that was performed for uncertainty
avoidance will be done for power distance. That is, the scores
that includes all questions will be shown and discussed, and
then the averages without the dismissed questions will be analyz
ed.
1) The power distance dimension, all questions included, gave
the following scores:
(Questions 21-38,40) AVERAGE
(1, highest P.D. PR: 3.19 (higer P.D.).
5, lowest P.D.).
OI: 3.25
GOV: 3.37
SFUS; 3.72
2) If questions 21, 34 and 37 are not included in
the results are:
PR: 3.07
the average,
(higher P.D.).
OI: 3.14
GOV: 3.25
SFUS: 3.72
It is worth noting that, while the averag eof the Venezuelan
managers were reduced by eliminating the direct, challenging
questions, the average score for the Sloan Fellows remained
the same.
3) Several groups of questions should be analyzed separately,
-& • --2
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to try to uncover specific issues related to the notion of
power. Starting with questions 22, 25 and 27, it can be
seen that the oil industry managers are in favor of allowing
subordinates to influence their superiors' decisions, do
not feel that subordinates should ask for a salary increase
(even if they feel they deserve it) and are in favor of
delegating a great deal of work. The other two sectors, in
contrast, are much less inclined to allow subordinates to
influence higher-level decisions,but are quite open about
requests on payraises and delegation.
4) All managers from the three sectors, especially the respon
dents from the government organizations, think that employ-
ees want to make a real contribution to the company. (Ques
tions 23, 24).
5) Obedience and hierarchies are strongly valued. (Questions
28, 29 and 35).
6) Questions 30, 31, 32, 33 show a somewhat neutral attitude
with respect to the rights and knowledge of the country's
average citizens. There is a consistent trend, however,
that shows that the managers from both the private sector
and the oil industry are less inclined to believe in the
ability of the common citizen to understand the problems
of the country. The sample from the Sloan Fellows scored
the lowest power distance in all 4 questions.
7) Questions 39 and 40 (not included in the questionnaires
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administered to the Sloan FEllows) show another inconsisten
cy. While 67% of the respondents answered that the citizens
from the U.S., Germany, England and France were, at least,
somewhat superior to the Venezuelans, the average score of
the answers to question 40 (do you feel intimidated when
dealing with colleagues from the U.S., Germany or England?
1: Always, 5: Seldom) was 4.65. Again, Venezuelanssimply
will not admit that they feel intimidated, even if they are
faced with "superior" individuals.
In summary, several conclusions can be drawn, in
addition to those mentioned above:
- The separation among the three Venezuelan sectors is not as
clear as it appeared in the uncertainty avoidance dimension.
Here, the managers from the oil industry are closer to their
counterparts from the private companies and the government
administration (in fact, they are in the middle of both).
However, the oil industry's respondents are more willing
to allow a greater degree of participation in decisions and
less ready to break the rules by not permitting, for example,
the subordinates to ask for a salary increase.
The managers from the government are strongly inclined to-
wards hierarchical organizations.
All three sectors agree that power holders should enjoy
special privileges.
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All three sectors considered that the citizens from the de
veloped nations are superior to the Venezuelans.
The sample from the U.S. Sloan Fellows shows that U.S. mid
dle managers are more democratic, slighthy more willing to
delegate, strongly believe in the ability and knowledge of
the average citizen, pay much less atention to hierarchies,
and consider obedience a much less important value than
Venezuelan managers.
B3. EQUALITARIANISM. (QUESTIONS 41-47).
Contrasting the dimension of power distance, where Vene
zuelan managers where slightly above the neutral score, towards
loW P.D., the equalitarianism dimension shows average indexes
which reinforce the notion of Venezuela as an open society. (see
table VII.3). Power is concentrated by the power holders because
of intrinsic needstand as a valuable tool to implement orders in
an environment where there is a strong lack of collective disci
pline and a habit for rule-breaking, not because of a large
social distance between the powerful and the masses.
The average scores of the questions on equalitarianism
are as follows:
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AVERAGE
(1: highest eq.; SFUS: 1.64 (higher equalitarianism).
5, lowest eq.). GOV: 1.92
OI: 1.99
PR: 2.15
The same trend, with the government managers showing
the highest scores for the Venezuelan sample and the managers
from the private sector the lowest, is observed in all the indi
vidual answers. In general, the following patterns can be mention
ed:
Managers from all sectors favor open communications with
their subordinates, and oppose the idea of a distant rela-
tionship boss/employees. This trend is also observed when
excluding questions 45, 46 and 47, which are more related
to societal norms and democratic principles.
The answers from the Sloan Fellows show an even greater
disposition to open communication. In general, the U.S.
respondents achieve more openness and greater concern for
an equalitarian relationship in the workplace. Average
scoresfrom the U.S. managers are 20% lower.
B4. PERSONALISMO. (QUESTIONS 48-50).
The answers received to questions 48, 49 and 50 result
ed in a few surprises, given the personal character of the Vene-
zuelan institutions that was described in previous chapters (see
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table VII.4). When averaging out all the answers, on a scale
from 1 to 5 (being 1 highest "personalismo" and 5 lowest) the
results are as follows:
AVERAGE
SFUS: 2.98 (higher personalismo).
PR: 3.00
GOV: 3.41
OI: 3.43
It was quite unexpected that the sample from the U.S.
Sloan Fellows resulted in the highest degree of personalismo of
institutions. The Venezuelan managers score from neutral (3.00
points) to low (3.43 for the oil industry). Several explanations,
however, can be tried.
1) Question 48 shows that the majority of the U.S. managers
are in favor of a strong leader as the best way to achieve
the change that the country needs. When asked to choose bet
ween a strong leader, a reformist democracy and a revolution
as the best vehicle to positive change, 72% picked the
strong leader.
Assigning a value of 1 to the strong leader, 3 to a reformist
democracy and 5 to a revolution, the averages were:
SFUS: 1.55
PR: 2.33
GOV: 2.47
OI: 2.48
A'A
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Faced with these results, I went back to the respondents
(both from the U.S. and Venezuela) and conducted informal
interviews to try to clarify the issue. Overwhelmingly,
the Sloan Fellows explained that the strong leader they
selected should have to be democratically elected; they
were referring to a new H. Truman of F.D. Roosevelt. In
contrast, the Venezuelans who chose a strong leader meant
a dictator, an absolutist "perfect king" who would enjoy
total power and would not be democratically elected. The
difference, then, was in orders of magnitude, and gives a
good clue for future interviews.
It is encouraging, however, to find out that 70% of the
Venezuelan respondents chose democracy as the best means
to implement change. Apparently, 30 years of freedom have
definitely left a strong mark in theminds of Venezuelans
(at least of Venezuelan managers).
Finally, the phrasing of the question should have been dif
ferent. For subsequent investigations on this matter, a
wider range of choices should be included (not just 3 sharp
ly different options) so that cultural subtleties are not
hidden behind the answers.
2) Asked to choose between the organization and its leaders as
the image to which they would identify with, the Venezuelan
managers appeared much more inclined towards their organiza
tions than the U.S. managers from the Sloan Fellows Program.
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On the scale from 1 (100% organization) to 5 (100% leaders),
the averages were as follows:
AVERAGE
SFUS: 3.28 (higher personalismo).
PR: 2.32
GOV: 1.84
OI: 1.70
It is difficult to find an explanation for this apparently
unusual result, within the cultural context described in the first
chapters, but I would recommend additional investigation on the
issue, so that possible differences in both the Venezuelan and U.S.
approaches to the question are taken into account. There may
be basic differences between institutions in both countries that
allow for the above response to occur. For instance, while U.S.
organizations are impersonal and abstract, Venezuelan corporations
might show a paternalistic style that makes them more like a
family or a clan. In such a case, the Venezuelan managers are not
choosing an institution but some kind of membership in a group.
In any case, among the Venezuelan sectors, managers from the
oil industry are slighthy more identified with their company than
the respondents from the government. The private sector shows a
much higher score than the other two, even though still on the
low side of the scale.
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Finally, the high number scored by the Sloan Fellows might
be indicative of a new trend in the U.S. towards less trust and
respect for organizations and stronger individualism. The "com-
pany-men" of the 50s and 60s are slowly dissapearing.
3) The answers to question No. 50 (do you think that your coun
try will solve most of its problems by dethroning people
in power?") show a more familiar ranking. Scales go from
1 (certainly; high personalismo) to 5 (not at all; low per-
sonalismo).
AVERAGE
PR: 3.00
OI: 3.51
GOV: 3.61
SFUS: 4.67
The power and capabilities of individuals are much higher
for Venezuela than for U.S. managers. However, Venezuelans
are still on the low side of personalismo (above 3 points).
Whether Venezuelans are increasingly evolving towards a more
institutional view of the country, or the results just show
a consequence of the narrow sampling (only managers) cannot
be determined from the questionnaire. I would be inclined
towards the latter, since evidence of the high personalismo
that exists in the country can be found almost everywhere.
However, the national average is probably starting to evolve
towards a lesser degreee in the personalization of institu-
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tions (the low score of our managerial sample probably
indicating so, since managers should be the first to change,
the innovators). The extended period, for Latin American
standards, of democratic governments and the failure of
strong leaders when they have been elected presidents have
probably contributed to diminish the traditional trust in
strong personalities.
B5. INDIVIDUALISM. (QUESTIONS 51-61, 94).
The image obtained of the Venezuelan managers by anal
yzing their responses to questions 51 through 61 is quite dif-
ferent from the indexes obtained by Hofstede in his survey (see
table VII.5). It is true, again, that the sample is quite nar
row and that Venezuelan managers have gone through a considera-
ble amount of socialization within their organizations that
probably has brought them closer to their counterparts from the
U.S. However, the huge distance that existedin Hofstede's study
is not even apparent.
The total average of questions 51-61 is as follows:
(Scale; 1, highest; 5, lowest). PR: 2.33 (higher individualism).
OI: 2.48
GOV: 2.49
SFUS: 2.55
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Now, let us analyze several groups of questions within
this category to identify some subtleties.
1) Questions 51, 54, 56, 57 and 61 are referred to personal
contribution, individual lifestyles and personal freedom.
The combined scores, on the same 1-to-5 scale, averaged very
closely on all four groups:
AVERAGE (Questions 51,54,56,
57,61).
PR: 1.79
OI: 1.95
GOV: 1.96
SFUS: 2.02
Specific questions from this group showed that managers from
the government are the most willing to create or build some
thing of their own, and those from the private sector have
the highest concern for their personal freedom. Question 61
shows a different pattern, however, since government managers
would be slightly willing to sacrifice their lifestyle for
their careers, while the respondents from the oil industry
are neutral in this issue. The private sector managers
are inclined to prefer a career that enables them to lead
their lives in their own way.
2) Where questioned about competition (question 52), managers
in the oil industry strongly considered it to do more good
than harm, above both the U.S. sample and the other two
-190-
Venezuelan sectors. Managers from the government saw compe
tition slightly more harmful, but the difference in score
with the other two groups is almost negligible,
3) In terms of group decision-making, the answers indicate that
the private sector managers are the most neutral when decid
ing between group and individuals decisions. The respondents
from the government sector favor group consensus strongly
(3.74 from a maximum of 5), while the oil industry is in the
middle of the two, closer to the Sloan Fellows average.
4) Question 58 reveals a significant difference among the Vene
zuelan managers. When asked about the attractiveness of
starting their own enterprise, the respondents from the oil
industry, on average, rejected the idea, while the represen
tatives from the government slightly favored it and the
private sector managers found it more appealing. It probably
indicates a higher level of job satisfaction within the oil
industry and the presence of more entrepreneurs in the
private organization.
5) Question 59 correlates with the answers given under the un-
certainty avoidance dimension, and shows that, in average,
Venezuelan managers are comfortable with rules and regula-
tions in their jobs as much as their colleagues from the
Sloan Fellows program. However, it must be taken into ac-
count that the Venezuelan workplace is probably more regul
ated than the North American, so a problem of orders of
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magnitude might exist here.
Several conclusions can be drawn from the data:
The highest level of individualism is found in the managers
from the private sector, even though it is not significant-
ly different from the other two groups of Venezuelan respon
dents, nor from the Sloan Fellows.
The managers from the oil industry are probably the most
satisfied with their jobs; they give the highest importance
to work in a successful organization and are the least inclin
ed to start their own business. At the same time, entrepre
neurship is probably more frequent within the private sector.
The managers in the oil industry are the least concerned
about "doing things their way",and correlate better with the
Sloan Fellows on this issue than with the other Venezuelan
groups. In terms of lifestyle, the government managers are
more willing to adapt it to their jobs.
In general, there is no strong correlation (or lack of it)
among any of the four groups that can be used to form sub-
groups (as it was made in risk avoidance between the oil
industry and the Sloan Fellows). All four groups show a
high degree of individualism.
An additional comparison can be made using the answers from
the 4 Japanese managers that attend the Sloan Feloows Pro-
gram in M.I.T. In principle, I eliminated 4 questions from
the individualism dimension that could be identified with
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universal values (or practices) within the business world.
These questions are related to competition, personal con-
tributions and organizational success. In the end, questions
52, 54, 55 and 56 were excluded and the averages of the
remaining 7 questions calculated, with the following results:
AVERAGE (questions 51,53,57-61).
PR: 2.62 (highest individualism).
GOV: 2.87
SFUS: 2.90
OI: 2.96
SFJ: 3.44 (Japanese Sloan Fellows).
The above result gives a better idea of the similarity
in the scores between 2 of the 3 Venezuelan groups and the U.S.
managers, and, at the same time, uses the Japanese sample as a
contrasting reference.
B6. NEED FOR AFFILIATION. (Questions 62-72,84).
The average score of the eleven questions included under
this dimension shows a distribution that suggests a slightly high
er need of affiliation in Venezuelan managers (see table VII.6):
AVERAGE (all questions).
Scale: 1: highest OI: 2.49 (highest need affiliation).
need affil.
GOV: 2.58
5: lowest
need affil. PR: 2.67
SFUS: 2.78
Following the same reasoning explained in section Bl,
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three questions that asked too directly for the respondents'
values, so that a high affiliation score could be perceived by
the respondents as a sign of weakness, were dismissed from the
sample and the averages recalculated. So, after excluding ques
tions 65, 68 and 69 the new averages are the following:
AVERAGE (questions 62-64,66,67
70-72).
OI: 2.12
GOV: 2.22
PR: 2.28
SFUS: 2.53
Even though the ranking is the same, the spread between
the Venezuelan and the U.S. managers is larger. While the Vene
zuelan averages decreased by 17% when eliminating the three
questions mentioned above, the score from the Sloan Fellows
decreased only 10%. Again, our reluctance to show weakness is
evident.
Additional evidence of inconsistencies can be found by
dividing the affiliation dimension into subgroups.
1) Questions 62 and 71 deal with the importance of admiration
and personal recognition as rewards. Among the Venezuelan
managers, those from the oil industry give the highest
regard to these prizes.
2) In reference to the need for a friendly atomosphere in the
workplace, the government managers score highest, the Sloan
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Fellows lowest and the managers from the oil industry
lowest of the Venezuelan sample.
3) For questions 66 and 67, related to group affiliation, the
managers from the oil industry again give the highest
regard to membership. When asked directly about the impor
tance of belonging to a group, the Sloan Fellows scored
lowest.
4) In answering question 70, the oil industry managers and
the Sloan Fellows were slightly below the neutral point,
meaning that they consider socializing slightly more im-
portant that competing. The respondents from the other
two groups ranked on the extremes of the list, with the
private managers slightly more concerned about competition.
5) Question 72 of the affiliation dimension shows a good
contrast between the different perceptions of society that
Venezuelan and U.S. managers have. The scores on question
72 support the notion that closed groups and clans pervade
the Venezuelan society, while the average from the Sloan
Fellows (3.48 on a 1 to 5 scale, being 1 the highest per-
ception of affiliation) shows a totally different situa-
tion in the U.S.
Summarizing, this part of the questionnaire leads to the
following conclusions:
- Venezuelan managers are more affiliative than their coun-
terparts in the U.S.; this contrast could be defined bet-
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ter by averaging groups of questions that avoid direct
confrontation with some of the values held by the Venezue
lans.
Within the Venezuelan sample, the managers from the oil
industry show a greater degree of affiliation. This fact
can be perceived as a result of a different culture exist
ing within Petr6leos de Venezuela (ses chapter VI), which
would create a protective environment that would encour-
age the formation of stronger ties among the employees.
The image of the oil industry as a "cultural island" might
be reinforced by these results.
A friendly atmosphere in the workplace is critically impor
tant for Venezuelan managers.
B7. MASCULINITY. (QUESTIONS 73-79).
This dimension shows a sharp contrast between the
government managers and the other two Venezuelan groups (see
table VII.7). The overall scores are self evident:
AVERAGE (all questions).
PR: 2.77 (higher masculinity).
OI: 2.82
SFUS: 3.01
GOV: 3.34
1) All answers to question 73 coincide in that the respond-
ents feel highly motivated by a competitive situation or
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a tough problem, being the Sloan Fellows the lowest score.
However, question 73 is direct and challenging, so a situa
tion of emotional response, like the ones indicated in
sections Bl and B5, could be happening.
2) All respondents are strongly in favor of equality between
the sexes, with the government managers ranking with the
highest scores.
3) Ambition is seen slightly as a defect by the government
managers, while the other two Venezuelan groups perceive
it as a virtue. For the Sloan Fellows, it is certainly a
virtue (question 79).
In conclusion, our masculinity is comparable to that
of the U.S. managers, with the scores from the Sloan
Fellows and the oil industry in the middle, near to
the neutral point, and the private sector managers and
the government respondents on the high and low ends,
respectively.
There is a good spread among the four groups. The
managers from the government organizations are by far
lower in masculinity than the other two groups.
The Venezuelan machismo does not seem to prevent the
perception of the sexes as rather undifferentiated
in their roles.
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B8. SERVICE CAREER ANCHOR. (QUESTIONS 86-90).
The "service career anchor exercise" (see table VII.8)
can be correlated with what Hofstede defined as "feminine"
values (as contrasted to the more "masculine" assertiveness
and ambition, for example).
The average scores of the service dimension are the
following:
1: highest service c.a. GOV:
5: lowest service c.a. PR:
01PR:
OI:
SFUS:
AVERAGE (questions 86-90).
1,71 (higher service career
anchor).
2.05
2.08
2.27
The highest disposition for service of the government
managers is quite evident, a fact that correlates with their
lowest masculinity. Another notable factor is the spread bet-
ween the U.S. managers and the Venezuelan, which matches with
some of the concepts expressed in chapter III, section B2.11.
B9. MANAGERIAL CAREER ANCHOR. (QUESTIONS 20, 91-93).
The answers to questions 20 and 91-93 showed that, in
average, all respondents feel it is very important to raise to
a high managerial position. The average scores are as follows
(see table VII.9):
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AVERAGE (all questions).
1: highest mgr. c.a. OI: 1.87 (higher managerial c.a.).
5: lowest mgr. c.a. SFUS: 1.92
PR: 1.96
GOV: 1.99
It is worth noticing that, in spite of their strong
functional orientation (as showed by the results from the func
tional career anchor category), the Venezuelan managers have a
high regard for managerial positions.
B10. WORLD AS GIVEN. (QUESTIONS 96-99).
No significant contrasts were found in this dimension
(see table VII.10). In general, all four groups were rather
neutral, probably meaning that their perception is that part
of the world can be influenced or changed while the other part
is controlled by others. Averages are as follows:
AVERAGE (all questions).
1: highest "world as OI: 3.03
given"
5: lowest (highest GOV: 3.04
control) PR: 3.37
SFUS: 3.38
It can be observed that both the Sloan Fellows and
the managers from the Venezuelan private sector share a slight
ly less "given" notion of the world than the other groups.
- Even though the locus of control of Venezuelars is mainly
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external, ambiguity exists in that circumstances are seen
as controllabe (ses chapter V, section A); in other words,
externalities are minimized to increase the expectations
and maximized when the goals are not met. The fact that
a Latin American country sees the world as manageable as
the most powerful nation in the planet can be explained
by our unrealistic perception of the environment.
B.11. STATUS SYMBOLS.
The scores from question 95 (table VII.11), in which
different rewards were proposed, so that the respondents could
choose, on a scale from 1 (most important) to 5 (least impor-
tant), which ones they preferred, are self explaining:
AVERAGES Social
Money Power Respect/Adm. Achiev. Status
PR: 2.36 1.96 1.64 1.71 2.68
GOV: 2.77 2.35 1.68 1.47 3.47
OI: 2.44 2.22 1.44 1.45 3.04
SFUS: 2.43 2.83 2.59 2.07 2.28
Several issues are noticeable, with their correspond
ing influence on the design of reward systems for Venezuela:
The high need of power (considerably higher than for the
U.S. managers).
- The strong importance given to respect and admiration by
the Venezuelan managers. (Correlatable with their need
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affiliation).
The lesser importance given to money by Venezuelans, when
compared with the U.S. managers. The higher number scor-
ed by the government managers is probably related to their
much lower salaries, compared to the other two groups.
The high importance of achievement as a motivating force
for the Venezuelan managers. Given the generalized low n
achievement in Venezuela, the fact that people desire to
be achievers is somewhat unusual.
The little concern about social status for Venezuela mana-
gers from the oil industry and the government. Compared
with the U.S. Sloan Fellows, the "need social status" is
quite smaller.
B.12. DISCIPLINE. (QUESTIONS 100-104).
The last five questions were designed to deal with
the perception of discipline as an important value. However,
the phrasing of the questions was direct, asking the respond-
ents for their opinions about themselves, and this fact probab
ly contaminated the responses. The average scores are as fol-
lows (ses table VII.12):
-201-
AVERAGE (all questions).
1: highest discipline. GOV: 1.95 (higher discipline).
5: lowest discipline. OI: 2.07
PR: 2.14
SFUS: 2.79
According to the scores, the managers from the govern
ment sector are vitally concerned about their own discipline
and the consistency of their endeavours. Given the record of
our governments, this results might seem somewhat surprising.
The position of the Sloan Fellows as the least disciplined
group, in spite of the contrast between Venezuela and the U.S.
in terms of discipline and sustained effort, is probably more
related to cultural perceptions than to the real world. Our
tendency to wishful think is again evident, as well as our
great inability for self-criticism (see chapter V, section B2.
12).
B.13. HOMOGENEITY.
A final analysis of the questionnaires dealt with the
standard deviations of the answers. For each dimension of the
12 whose averages were calculated, standard deviations of the
answers were also obtained.
Subsequently, all the s.d. were added for each group
of respondents, with the following results:
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Group Accumulated Standard No. of questionnaires
Deviation
Oil industry 14.698 53
Government 15.383 19
Sloan Fellows U.S. 15.574 29
Private sector 15.614 28
The main conclusion that can be drawn has to do with
the homogeneity of the corporate culture of the oil industry,
when compared with the other groups. In spite of the greatest
number of samples, the variation in the answers was the lowest.
Again, the concept of "cultural island" is reinforced. Not
only has the oil industry a culture of its own, somewhat dif-
ferent from the national average, it is also a very strong one.
While it is true that the Sloan Fellows and the private sector
contain a wide variety of companies and industries, the sample
from the oil industry covers many different departments, profes
sional disciplines and management levels. In any case, the
above numbers are a good starting point for additional research.
B14. SUMMARY.
Little can be added to the findings drawn from the
questionnaires, except to emphasize: a) The spread between the
U.S. managers and their Venezuelan counterparts, subtle in some
dimensions but very strong in others. b) The separation bet-
ween the oil industry and the other two Venezuelan sectors.
Petr61leos de Venezuela has developed a culture that mixes North
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American values with Venezuelan patterns of behavior. c) The
necessity for a Venezuelan definition of management, independ-
ently of foreign theories, adapting when necessary and invent-
ing when copying seems counterproductive. This task will be
partially taken in the next section.
C. FINAL CONCLUSIONS. HOW TO MANAGE IN VENEZUELA?
Nowadays, Venezuela might be facing a historical opportuni
ty. The set of circumstances that are currently present in the
country are probably the best in decades, certainly much better
than during the years of the oil shocks. With the price of one
barrel of oil below 15 U.S. dollars and a strong pressure from
the market to drive it even lower, the time has come to do some
thing.
The economic crisis that started to develop in 1983, and
whose intensity has grown stronger during the last four months,
has been a meaningful slap in the face of all those who thought
that Venezuela was El Dorado, where wealth was a gift from
heaven and not the result of hard work and long-term vision.
It is now clear that the good news of the seventies, where our
income took off overnight, were really bad news, since we learn
ed that money was easy and work was irrelevant. On the opposi-
te, the bad news of the actual crisis are really good news,
since the only way out is through a constructive, sustained
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effort of the whole nation. Fear can make miracles, while com-
placency is often decadent.
The picture, however, is not that rosy. In the past, many
Latin American countries, when hit by economic or social crises,
have chosen the most counterproductive medicine. Demonstrating
our traditional short-term span, we have often asked the armed
forces to take posession of the government, in the hope that
just by rearranging the balance of power things will get better.
Things, of course, get worse, since the changes that are needed
are very deep and repainting the house (even with military green)
will not prevent it from collapsing.
In Venezuela, fortunately, the people seem to be on the
side of democracy, as it was suggested in the answers to the
questionnaires. The greater the political stability, the high
er the chance that the current crisis will be used as a positive
motivational factor, and not otherwise.
In the following sections, I intend to suggest a few gener
al directions that I consider appropiate for the change process
that the country must undertake, both at the national level
and at the levels of human resources management within firms
and corporations. It is impossible, however, to present an
exhaustive list of the actions that can be taken to improve our
efficiency and productivity, and each individual case must be
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treated separatedly. I hope that the conceptual groundwork that
was presented in the previous chapters, coupled with the sug-
gestions from this section (most of them in the form of specific
examples) will form a coherent proposal. The overall vision,
in any case, must be emphasized: Our culture has been dysfunc-
tional in the past, but that does not mean that we are either
inferior (as many answers from the questionnaires suggested) or
doomed by the Gods. We do have competitive advantages with re-
spect to the rest of the world, and there must be plenty of
niches where we can create more value than anyone else. Where
those niches are and what is the best process to get there are
some of the crucial issues. If only one of the proposals that
follow hits right on the target, the present work will be fully
justified.
Cl. THE NATIONAL CULTURE. MUST IT CHANGE?
Going back to figure 1 (chapter II), it was mentioned
there that the change process had to include a mixture of cul-
ture modifications with changes in the socioeconomic model.
There are patterns of behavior that are obviously handicapping
the capabilities of the country, while other traits could be
turned into productive forces by applying the right techniques
and pushing the right mental buttons.
From the issues discussed in chapters III and IV,
probably those related to our low-need of achievement and
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external locus of control are probably the most serious. The
protective environment that Venezuelan families build and sur-
round themselves with, establishes a relationship of dependence
from the children to the elder members that prevents the
development of confidence in our own, individual tools. Vene-
zuelan parents are most inclined to cover their sons and daugh-
ters with an ever-lasting shield that can be represented by an
umbrella under which mistakes are forgiven, warmth is permanent
and punishment does not exist. When things get tough, we are
most likely to search for refuge instead of fighting back with
our own hands. Our need of achievement has been prematurely
extracted from our personality, since our fathers were always
there to closelysupervise what we were doing and intervene im-
mediately if they felt the slightest possibility of a mistake
from our part, frustrating our independence and the process of
learning-by-doing. This paternalistic attitude, on the other
hand, does not have to be explicit; that is, direct interven-
tion does not necessarily occur. Many implicit messages are
passed on to the children by body language, advice, models
and the like, all of which result in a marked decrease on their
slef-confidence.
The permissive attitude of the Venezuelan society,
partly due to the basic patterns learnt during our childhood,
is another consequence of the environment created within the
family. Our mistakes will seldom have negative consequences,
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since excuses are always available to save face. The family
always provides unconditional help and support, even after
monstrosities are comitted by its members. The extensions of
the family, the clans, the roscas, are also there to forget and
protect. Punishment and responsibilities are watered down by
groups of friends, relatives and godfathers. Emotional ties
are above good and evil, the only way to break them being by
emotional sins (disloyalty, treason, etc.).
In a recent seminar attended by Venezuelan students,
where some of the problems mentioned above were discussed, se-
veral counterarguments were presented. It was said that, for
example, the index of suicides comitted among our teenagers
because of lack of affection was minimal, when compared with
the North-Atlantic world. While the argument was indeed valid,
other social problems overwhelm such positive factors. The
existence in Venezuela of a huge mass of people who live under
the limits of poverty, probably with a lot more affection than
food, cannot be dismissed by appealing to our human nature.
While I am not advocating for neutralizing our natural warmth
and our emotional, human values, it should be accepted that an
equilibrium must be reached somewhere in the middle. A society
in which the citizens have little motivation for achievement,
and where rules and institutions are replaced by blood-links,
just cannot function. In Venezuela, the most primitive rules
of social behavior, those according to which undesired patterns
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must be punished for the benefit of the majority, and best per
formers are given best rewards independently of their personal
connections, are weakly enforced. It is true that our laws do
not represent our intrinsic values, but social norms copied
from abroad; however, should we penalize emotional disloyalty
instead of corruption? Should we punish lack of affection
instead of robbery? Are the best the astute, the power players,
instead of the hard workers? It would be possible, in theory,
to replace our constitution for a list of commandments that
better reflect our national culture, but it is obvious that
such change would never happen in reality. We need to somehow
initiate a process through which a few universal rules smooth
some of our cultural values, and not viceversa.
Any cultural change at the national level will be inde
ed very difficult, even if it only tries to modify partially
a limited number of behavioral patterns. Our values are so
embedded within our history, our traditions and our environment
that it might seem naive even to try. However, the process
towards socioeconomic development could be made easier if a few
intrinsic obstacles are smoothed. At the same time, I am not
suggesting an overnight change; it might take several genera-
tions before it occurs, but we should start right now. Perhaps
a public campaign where our most urgent problems are discussed
openly and candidly could help us preparing the scene for more
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direct action. Pilot projects where a new managerial ideology
is applied to new organizations, could be carried out by both
the public and the private sectors at a reduced scale. A com-
mited minority of leaders may trigger the process, but it has
to cover several critical areas of our society: The family,
the schools, the courts and the political organizations.
While the above occurs at the macro level, some prac-
tices can be implemented in existing industries to improve their
productivity and the performance of the workforce. If they
are successful, they should be imitated by others, starting a
diffusion process that could change the micro environment of
firms and individual corporations.
C2. SPECIFIC PROPOSITIONS FOR HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT.
In this section, I try to show, through specific exam
ples, how our cultural values can be used by firms and corpora-
tions to increase both their productivity and the comitment of
the workforce. Based on the traits mentioned in previous
chapters, several ways of redirecting our values towards more
desired goals are suggested.
1) Rewards must include, besides the traditional payraises
and promotions, prizes that take into account some of our
intrinsic needs and wants. Premiums that are associated
-210-
with public admiration (employee of the month, best per-
former of the week), power (positions with a symbolic pow
er content, such as comittee chairmanships, organizer of
special events, etc.) and affiliation (the club of the
best salesman, memberships in exclusive groups, etc.) are
highly appreciated and sought for. A lot of hoopla, cele
bration and power symbols should be administered from the
shopfloor to the highest levels of management, together
with the more usual monetary rewards.
2) Given our fondness for friends, relatives and roscas, the
selection process, from the recruitment of personnel to
the performance appraisal system has to be both highly
formalized and consensus-based. No single person should
have a great deal of latitude in this matter, and individ
ual decisions on personnel selection and evaluation should
be constrained by ridgid rules and multiple cross-checks
with other people, both at the same level of the evaluator
as well as above and below. An example of this could be
a process through which a single person is evaluated by
his boss, his peers and his subordinates, with different
weights applied to each group. The final "grade" should
then be approved by several people at the same level and
above the boss before it is officialized, and translated
into rewards. Rewards, of course, must depend on formal
performance appraisals and nothing else.
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Instead of the traditional, one-a-year, personnel evalua-
tion system, a shorter period (quarterly, for example)
should be used. Our lack of perseverance must be counter
balanced by a closer sampling.
3) Besides subjective measures (initiative, work quality,
etc.), a formalized set of goals, negotiated in advance
by superiors and subordinates, should be used as the core
of the appraisal system. Since our tendency is to formu-
late unrealistic objectives and later find good excuses
for not meeting thew, the process of Management by Object-
ive is probably well suited to neutralize the local cul-
ture. Individual goals, once negotiated, should be close-
ly monitored and enforced. The negotiating process,
through which objectives are established, would have a
better chance to produce realistic goals if group negotia
tions are held, instead of one-to-one discussions.
The few high achievers that (statistically) attend the
negotiations could highlight the weaknesses of the propos
als and drive down the expectations.
The parameters to be included in the personnel apraisal
forms as issues for evaluation should be designed in line
with our values and societal norms, so to discourage dys-
functional cultural patterns and foster constructive deeds.
4) Venezuelans are communicative; competition is not a big
issue; peer solidarity is strong. This set of conditions
form a good environment for team work, especially if
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teams are formed by people at the same hierarchical level.
However, to prevent the teams from becoming a separate
organization and to insure the meeting of deadlines and
goals, a combination of a strict framework (in terms of
time and objectives) with enough intellectual autonomy
should be achieved. In other words, ad-hoc groups with
concrete tasks can be very productive in Venezuela, more
so if the success of the team is linked to attractive
rewards. Permanent committees, on the other hand, tend
to develop cultures of their own; clanish cohesive forces
which incrasingly separate them from the organization.
Any effort should be devoted to prevent the formation of
subgroups that will eventually constitute roscas with
their own life and interests.
5) One of the big problems in Venezuela is implementation.
Orders and instructions follow the same fate as rules and
regulations -they are not carried out, "se acata pero no
se cumple". Participative decision-making seems a good
option, for Venezuelan organizations, since decisions must
be internalized by each of the individuals (or functions)
that are affected by them before they are implemented, in
a true Japanes fashion. This, however, brings with it a
set of problems that are quite conspicuous. Venezuelans
tend to avoid responsibilities when things go wrong (re-
member the external locus and the high uncertainty avoid-
ance) and are rather quick in finding excuses for past
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mistakes and bad decisions. Group decisions present a
great opportunity for watering down the negative conse-
quences of bad performances. In such a case, even if the
process is collective, the decisions (and the responsibil-
ities) must be individual. The system should force the
decision maker to start up a consultation process in which
opinions are heard and different inputs are considered.
Once the decision is made, however, it is the sole respon-
sibility of a specific person, not of the group.
- Numbers 5) and 2) above can be summarized as follows:
Personnel decisions are to remain collective, while
administrative decisions, though participative, must be
in the end individual.
6) The concentration of power in a few individuals within
Venezuelan organizations represents a strong obstacle
against efficiency. While people at the top wan to interv
ene in everything, those at the bottom do not dare to
challenge their bosses and end up delegating upwards. The
distribution of authority must be layered, and well defin
ed. A manager is penalized if he makes a decision that is
above his level of authority, but nothing happens if he
steals the decision power from his/her subordinates. To
counter this behavior, authority must have upper and lower
limits. If a manager is authorized by the organization to
sign checks up to, say, 100,000, there should also be a
lower limit; that is, he should not be authorized to sign
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anything below 10,000, since there should be someone with
a lower hierarchy responsible for the lower quantity. In
Venezuela, stealing decision-power from below and upward
delegation are imbedded in our culture, and should be
discouraged.
7) The strong functional inclination of the Venezuelan man-
agers stands as a basic deficiency in the country's lead-
ers. On the one hand, Venezuelans do not feel comfortable
managing people, since they do not have adecquate tools;
on the other, the educational system is based on focused
disciplines. Finally, our high need for security leads
us to remain within our protected areas of expertise, man
aging things instead of people. Other than an urgently
needed change in our universities, which is beyond the
scope of this work, corporations must implement contin-
uous rotation of personnel across functional boundaries
(this would also prevent the formation of functional
roscas, which are quite frequent), again, in a Japanese-
like fashion. A corporation can be very successful with
mediocre technicians and excellent people managers, while
excellent professionals under bad managements will most
often fail.
In Venezuela, a great deal of effort has been devoted to
facilitate the access of the young generations to college
education. The role of managers, however, has been tradi
tionally neglected. While engineering can be studied in
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more than 20 universities, there is only one institution
that offers an MBA curriculum. Our managers operate large
ly by intuition, and their conceptual knowledge is general
ly poor. Massive training in human resource management
is badly needed, so that our intuitive Taylorian theories
of reward-punishment can be replaced by more effective
concepts.
8) The rotation of personnel across disciplines must be coupl
ed with a structure that favors these movements. Rigid,
functional organizations should give way to more horizontal
ly integrated schemes. Job-enrichment and a feeling of
purpose should be perceived by the employees; product-
oriented groups, where possible, should be implemented to
increase motivation through the satisfaction of achieving
a complete, finished task. However, our fondness for pow
wer should not be overlooked, since we like to concentrate
leadership, not share it. Top managers steal authority
from middle managers, and these, in turn, will try to
steal it from their subordinates and peers. Matrix struc
tures, where managers have to share their kingdoms, are
probably countercultural and will cause conflicts.
More subtle methods of achieving both functional excellen
ce and product orientation have to be devised, intense
rotation of personnel being one example.
Since power is such a strong motivational force, the Vene
nezuelan organization should have a good number of levels
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of management, so to have a ladder to the top with many
steps. People should always have the chance to be promot
ed quickly to a supervisory position, with its acompanying
power-status symbols.
In summary, fluid horizontal communication among depart-
ments, intensive rotation instead of permanent matrixes,
teams oriented towards the execution of complete tasks
(or sub-tasks), numerous management levels with plenty of
status symbols, and quick promotions to supervisory posi-
tions for good performers can created the right environ-
ment for Venezuelans.
9) The Venezuelan corporations must show, both explicitly and
implicitly, a high interest in social issues, employee
welfare, and the like. Venezuelans are likely to distrust
institutions, so organizations must appear as friendly
entities which care for their members. Statements of
corporate philosophy should make this point quite clear
and, most important, corporations should live by it. A
strong argument in favor of social conciousness are the
high scores achieved by Venezuelan managers in the ques-
tions related to the service career anchor. The workplace,
therefore, must be pervaded by a sense of social benefit;
the workers must perceive that their efforts will help
other people. Caring for others is a strong motivational
force in Venezuela.
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10) Accepting criticism is a tough job for Venezuelans. Any
attempt by a manager to criticize other people in the com
pany, be they subordinates or, worse, superiors, may end
up in conflict. A great many avenues for channeling criti
cism and dissension must exist, so that the desired ef-
fect of fault-signaling is achieved indirectly, without
the danger of head-on confrontation. Advisory boards,
counselors and arbitrators should exist at all levels
across the organization. Furthermore, these positions
should be perceived as critical and treated quite serious
ly.
11) Since new systems always need some fine tuning before they
are definitely implemented, reactions should be tested by
frequent surveys of employee opinion. In Venezuela,
employee surveys are the exception more than the rule, and
it is even usual to utilize surveys made in U.S. organiza
tions to design local systems and practices.
- As mentioned at the beginning of this section, these
suggestions are but a few examples of the kind of ap-
proach that Venezuelan organizations should try or, at
least, investigate. It is obviously not exhaustive,
nor it can be. More issues have to be discussed and
many details worked out before a new management style
is implemented. We need to know what specific activit
ies are best suited for the new systems, whether they
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are better for innovation or entrepreneurship, marketing
or finance, engineering or manufacturing. The general
objective, however, must be both to modify the culture
and to take advantage of it, doing both things indirect
ly. The first section of this chapter was about a cul-
tural change; the second one proposed to modify the
systems.
C3. THE PROCESS. WHO IS RESPONSIBLE?
The culture cannot change spontaneously; the process
must be directed from somewhere. A botton-up movement is exce-
edingly unlikely in the Venezuelan context. Implementation has
to be from top to bottom. Venezuelan managers are in a key
position; they have to understand the culture first, before
they start the process. At the same time, they must be able to
act from without, getting rid of their own cultural biases and
look at the process objectively.
According to the questionnaires,managers could be at a
midpoint between the masses and the goals, even though more
analysis is needed on this point. Even though common-place,
the concept of enlightened minority applies to the Venezuelan
situation. Only the leaders can provide the direction, and no
one else.
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There will be much opposition. The mediocre, the
selfish, the incompetent, those who have benefitted from the
bizarre selection mechanisms, those who have no other asset but
their personal connections and their lack of scruples, the pow-
wer players, the inefficient, the demagogues, the corrupt, and
many more, will be ready to defend the status quo, at any cost.
They, the beneficiaries of an ancient and underdeveloped system,
will not accept a change that will replace them by choosing the
fittest, the hard workers, the best performers. To make things
worse, many memebers of the first group are entrenched in pow-
erful positions, and will use their influence to stop the proc
ess. The task, then, is tough . The enlightened minority must
carry it out in the middle of cross-fire, with an ideology that
looks at the long-term, while the others posess the charisma
and the short-term arguments that more easily capture the favor
of the masses. In the end, the whole country, and not any
given group, will lose or win.
D. EPILOGUE. MORE WORK IS NEEDED.
Throughout this work, I hope to have clarified at least one
point: Venezuela, as Colombia, France or the United States,
must learn how to manage itself. Just as we create our music
and our folklore, we must create our rules, our systems and our
hypothesis for people management. The investigation of our own
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environment has been always neglected by ourselves. We pay ro-
yalties for packaged courses in problem solving, negotiation
techniques or managerial grids that were designed with a dif-
ferent culture in mind. The American dream is copied by our
country and translated into Spanish, with no room for cultural
differences. "Venezuela imported everything. The economic
principles, the political debate and social aspirations came
together with the hydroelectric plants, the automobile facto-
ries and the steel mills.... The origins of the political models
in Venezuela are not the ideas of Bolivar or Sucre but the
principles held by Jefferson, the French revolution, the Rus-
sian revolution, Marx, Lenin, De Gaulle and John F. Kennedy"
(8). In fact, even the ideas of Bolivar and Sucre belonged
more to the French revolution than to autoctonous theories on
the Latin America reality.
We need to write our own Search of Excellence, do research
in our own plants and organizations, survey our own workers and
find our own solutions. In many cases, we will have to rein-
vent the wheel, since sociological wheels are mostly endemic.
The hallaca, our traditional christmas cake, gives a good
graphic illustration. "Cross-road of a hundred different sto-
ries. The Spanish stew, the Indian corn, the Slave hands from
Africa, sugar from the Indies and Olives from Judea" (9).
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TABLES VII.1 TO VII.12
QUESTIONNAIRE AND ANSWER AVERAGES.
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